AT PENPOINT
By proroguing the National Assembly without having a debate on a resolution on the French ambassador, the government seems to have committed the mistake that led to the Tehrik-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) protests that paralyzed the country at the beginning of Ramazan, in the middle of April. There seems to be a spirit within the government of ‘sufficient unto the day the evil thereof.’ A homelier metaphor would be ‘dang-tapaoo’. It seems as if the anxiety to get the original protests over outweighed everything else. Only later, when the government realized that it could not take the consequences of fulfilling its word, it decided to present the resolution in a way that prevented its being fulfilled.
The government does not seem to have realized that the protests were caused by its failure to fulfill its agreement to bring the issue to Parliament. The TLP also seemed disingenuous, in not pointing out that Parliament actually has nothing to do with foreign relations, as it is a purely executive matter. The President accepts ambassadors’ credentials because they represent a fellow head of state, but, as in other matters, he does so only on the advice of the Prime Minister (or the minister concerned).
Therefore, not to have the resolution debated would be a red rag to a bull. That would only make sense if one is sure that the bull has been neutralized. Whether the TLP has been neutralized by its recent protests, in which it has suffered casualties, and in which its new leader, Saad Rizvi, got arrested, is not clear. Only an assumption that the TLP is essentially controllable, would justify such assumptions as seem to be behind the prorogation decision.
It should be clear that allowing a debate would mean that MNAs, whether government or opposition, would not be able to oppose the expulsion of the French ambassador. The government may now claim that expulsion would mean reactions from the rest of the EU, or that foreign policy is its prerogative, but it would find it difficult on the floor of the House to defend a decision not to break off diplomatic relations.
There are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ militants. They are both motivated by belief. Any past attempt to convert believers is one thing, to serve nationalistic goals, have not worked. It has created organisations that follow their own agendas now. In their own way.
Worse, it would not know what to do. The government would want the motion defeated, but could it ensure the defeat? If members chose to vote so as to be able to return to their constituencies, they might decide to buck the party whip. In that case, the government might find that not only did it have a highly inconvenient resolution on its hands, but it had been administered the second defeat in the National Assembly, after the defeat of Dr Hafeez Sheikh in the Senate election.
The TLP is thought not to be acting alone. Certainly, its sit-in at Faizabad, which ultimately led to the resignation of Law Minister Zahid Hamid from the Nawaz government, was not a solo effort, with its end coming with military officers distributing money to the protesters. The plea was that this was to help protesters go back home.
The government may have engaged in just such an incredible plea. Saying that the expulsion was discussed in the National Assembly does not really cut it, unless the TLP also needs an excuse. There is another possibility that is not entirely to be ruled out, that there is a division in the establishment on the issue.
Members of the establishment are like other Muslims. There is a varying degree of practice, but there is near-unanimity on blasphemy. Actually, there is unanimity. The difference is the importance given to it. For some, the reaction is limited to raising slogans while part of a mob. Some may go as far as pelting stones. Rarer is the person who takes a weapon and goes seeking out the blasphemer. So while members of the establishment have not been part of these protests, there may be some sympathizers in their ranks.
It must not be forgotten that such establishment members are likely to be theologically naive, and ready to follow the TLP. Otherwise, the problem would be detected. First, expelling an ambassador is not even a response to blasphemy. Blasphemy is a Sharia offence, and its punishment must be prescribed by Sharia. The government is not even going here. It might have been advised that the Sharia punishment, the execution of the French President, is even more serious even than expelling his representative.
At the same time, because the TLP has previously played a role in Pakistani politics, having MPAs elected in Sindh after contesting the 2018 elections, it would not be appropriate to miss out on how this fresh crisis is playing out for Imran in the larger political context. Apart from the TLP protests, there is the internal rebellion shaping up within the PTI, centering around Jahangir Tareen. It is not directly related, but could it be that the forces which are behind Tareen are also behind the TLP rotests.
While the Tareen phenomenon is under control, the TLP one is not. The reason is that the latter has got too many people involved for meaningful control to be exerted. The second is that blasphemy is a much more emotive issue than anyone being made a scapegoat. Then there is the reality that while the Tareen situation can be handled by offering him justice, as has been done, there can be little done except to concede the TLP’s demands. It should also be remembered that while Tareen can control his supporters, the TLP leadership is impelled by its followers to adopt certain positions. Tareen’s supporters have no problems with the government as such, but TLP supporters have a certain agenda they wish followed. No one is willing to risk death for Tareen; TLP supporters have shown their willingness to do so, not necessarily for their leader, but for the cause of blasphemy.
Politicians have their fingers on the popular pulse, because they will either follow that public opinion, or guide it. This means that all parties slipped up, except the TLP, including the other religio-political parties, and didn’t notice either the issue, or the response of the public to it. That is a situation which leaves room for others to play. One player would be the establishment. Another player would be Indian agencies.
The government has followed the policy of repeating its mistakes. It has compromised not just on the writ of the state, but also the sovereignty of Parliament. It is not for anyone to dictate the agenda of Parliament. It did not suffer any consequences for making the original agreement, so much as for not fulfilling it. Also, by involving Parliament, it did not just involve all government parties, but also the opposition parties, for all would have to take a position on the issue.
It is almost as if one is witnessing a repetition of the legendary anti-Qadiani agitation of 1974, when one saw an apparently secular and progressive party take one of the most pro-Khatm-i-Nabuwat stances ever done in a Muslim country, and declare Ahmadis a minority, enshrining it in the Constitution.
There are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ militants. They are both motivated by belief. Any past attempt to convert believers is one thing, to serve nationalistic goals, have not worked. It has created organisations that follow their own agendas now. In their own way.
