Washington Watch
A decade ago, we were in the throes of what observers in the West termed the “Arab Spring.” An assessment is now in order.
Because analysts in the West first assumed that these uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were organically linked, mirroring the revolutions that brought down the Communist regimes that had operated under the protective cover of the Soviet Union, they termed them the “Arab Spring.” These Arab uprisings, however, were not threads of one unraveling region. While sharing some common characteristics, in each instance local factors shaped them.
One shared feature was their almost exclusive occurrence in the so-called “Arab Republics”— countries that for decades had been ruled by military regimes that lacked broad legitimacy and had become increasingly ossified, distant from the needs of their publics, and corrupted by privileged elites who drained wealth for themselves and their cronies. Also, each of these uprisings had begun as largely non-violent youth-led protests focused on poverty, employment, the need for services, and the desire for greater freedom and political rights.
While some Western analysts mistakenly termed these uprisings “revolutions,” Tunisia has been the only true revolution, bringing about a change in governance— though its result remains quite fragile. Our polling shows that despite retaining grievances, Tunisians have some hope in their situation. Our polling also shows that other Arabs see Tunisia as the only mildly successful Arab Spring country.
While developments in Egypt have gone through ups and downs, nothing close to a revolution occurred, as the military remained in control throughout. They deposed Mubarak non-violently and then later violently removed the Muslim Brotherhood, in the face of increasing concern from Egyptians, according to our polling, that the Brotherhood was attempting to impose its politicized version of Islam as the law of the land.
The USA needs to understand that any new deal with Iran must include pressing Iran to stop exploiting sectarian divisions and end its meddlesome and violent behaviour in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. And the USA should tailor future assistance programs to these governments to focus on job creation, private sector growth, and improvements in education, health care, and delivery of social service.
In the process, however, the Egyptian military may have created a problem for themselves. Repression has increased with tens of thousands imprisoned or cowed into silence. Our polling also shows that, as a result, Egyptians’ approval of the military has plummeted by more than 35 points. By more than three to one Egyptians now say they are worse off than they were before, and by a two-to-one margin say that they have less hope their situation will improve in the future. Despite the government’s confidence, the situation should be seen as quite worrisome.
The experiences of Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been different. Because they were fragmented societies— Syria by sect and tribe, Libya by tribe and region, and Yemen by sect, tribe, region— with the deposing of the old regimes, groups either sought or were sought out by external powers, resulting in prolonged and bloody civil conflicts, the outcomes of which remain uncertain.
Even with this checkered record, new uprisings are still occurring in several more Arab countries. In recent years there have been sustained mass protests in Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Once again, while different and not fundamentally linked, each of these uprisings have exploded for similar reasons: lack of jobs and needed services, bad governance, and a lack of hope.
The revolts in Algeria and Sudan are somewhat similar to those in the other “Arab Republics,” with only Sudan being a potential success story. There, the military dictator has been deposed, and after continuing protests the military agreed to form a new government with equal participation of military and civilian leadership. Because this “experiment” is projected to have a three-year run, only time will tell whether the transition leads to full civilian control.
The outcomes in Lebanon and Iraq are even more difficult to predict. While the demands of their uprisings are similar, and include an end to sectarianism, the repressive violence of Iranian-supported militias in both countries (and the stubbornness of the corrupt sectarian feudal elites in Lebanon) pose real roadblocks to change.
Ten years after the first uprisings, the fragile “stability” that once characterized the old order of the “Arab Republics” has given way mostly to chaos. Despite the uneven record of these unsettling events and their uncertain futures, there are lessons to be learned.
Regimes should know that repression is no substitute for unresponsive governance that fails to provide services, opportunity, and hope. They should understand that those who are protesting, especially the young, are not the enemy, but their citizens and their nation’s future. Leaders should respond to the protestors’ legitimate concerns and offer them real hope for change.
The protesters, especially in Lebanon and Iraq, need to develop a coordinated leadership, a coherent programme of demands, and a plan for implementation. Where possible (as in Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq), protestors must organize politically for the next election. In too many instances, because of the lack of political organization, the uprisings have been co-opted by the Muslim Brotherhood or other politicized sectarian movements— because they were the only organized political forces in the country. The USA needs to understand that any new deal with Iran must include pressing Iran to stop exploiting sectarian divisions and end its meddlesome and violent behaviour in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. And the USA should tailor future assistance programs to these governments to focus on job creation, private sector growth, and improvements in education, health care, and delivery of social services.
