The underlying problems of the Pakistani state were not solved by the PTI government, but it is also worrisome that there are no indications from the other parties of any solution, which indicates that the failure of the present system might now be opening the way for untameable forces.
At the heart of the issue is the economic problem. The rupee is heading towards free fall; fuel prices are rising because of the world economy getting back on its feet after the covid-19 pandemic, while wheat and sugar have to be imported, after a long period of autarky, at a time of rising world prices for commodities. That PTI stalwarts benefited from this has just added to the mix.
That the government chose this time to engage in a controversy over the notification of the new DG ISI is unfortunate, but perhaps timely, as it coincides with the opposition narrative that the government has outstayed its welcome. In this view, the problems of Balochistan, where a vote of no-confidence in the Chief Minister was only averted by his resignation, merely signal the beginning of the end. The DG ISI controversy actually means that the end is inevitable, just as the notification was inevitable.
The PM seemed panicked. The next election, which is growing increasingly near, is weighing heavily on his mind, and is looking increasingly like a defeat. It is often brushed over but Imran’s cricketing career ended badly, because of a player rebellion led by Javed Miandad, immediately after the 1992 World Cup win. Imran never played for Pakistan after that triumphant World Cup final. He was not selected.
However, the underlying problem, remains. Imran’s backers thought that he would come good on his promises of fixing the economy, but it has become clear that he has been unable to do so.
Contrary to the impression trying to be given by both opposition parties, neither has really done much about promoting the economy. However, the PTI may well be worse. Its various populist measures have not done anything to improve the situation of the ordinary Pakistani in their tenures, and at present the opposition have not proposed any solution beyond that of offering better governance.
The underlying narrative, that a better form of governance will provide for a better and more efficient country, able to fulfil certain goals, is accepted. But no party remains untried. Even the religious parties have had a turn in the then NWFP, in the shape of the MMA, but that experience did not even persuade the electorate there to retain the MMA. Instead, the electorate chose to try the PTI. The experience was sufficiently promising to cause the KP electorate to re-elect it to a second term, and to let the electorate of the entire country turn towards it.
The PPP has won three terms in Sindh, but that may be more because the province is divided politically on ethnic lines rather than because the government has performed exceptionally well. The replacement of the MQM by the PTI in urban areas does not entirely reflect the interference that is alleged, so much as the fact that the MQM had lost the support it once had.
The MQM’s example should be a lesson for all those who attempt to keep an electorate loyal by use of force. Consent had been obtained for too long by force, with the result that a counterforce was able to tip the elections towards another party. The military has tried direct rule four times, but each time it has come a cropper on the question of acceptance.
Acceptance is not there not because people have a deep commitment to democracy, but because while better governance is delivered, and reflected in some improvement in economic performance, it is not good enough.
This may reflect the limit of the people to improve, but it may also be the limit of the regime. If that is so, the colonial belief that we wogs are incapable of ruling ourselves, would be true. (Neocolonialism says the same thing, wrapped in more acceptable language.)
There is another possibility, that offered by the Tehrik Labbaik Pakistan. Its recent protests, which come hot on the heels of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, indicate that the TLP is feeling encouraged. However, it too has not found an economic agenda beyond some vague protests against interest and feudalism. It has so far not adopted a full-fledged economic agenda, and is concentrating on the blasphemy issue, which is significant and attention-grabbing.
Now blasphemy is certainly of concern to the masses, but there is also concern about the tanking of the economy, and its impact on oneself. The religion card is now not likely to win even minimal support, unless the player also addresses the economic question. There would be questions of ability, because one of the explanations being touted for the PTI’s failure is its inability to find the right team. True, there may be questions about the ministerial team, but there is also a finger being pointed at the bureaucracy. Imran has shown that good ideas may not be enough; that the idea must also be implemented.
There would also be a definite question about how to implement the economic agenda. That agenda would be reversible, and probably partial, if implemented through the present Constitution. It should be noted that the military has twice taken over without abrogating the Constitution, and it has had the Amendments it made ratified by the Parliaments elected after the Martial Law.
This apparent devotion to the Constitution may prompt the military to make another attempt at using it. This brings the country back to 1988, when a party ousted by coup 11 years before, came back into power after a super power withdrew from Afghanistan. The next government (after an election, not one formed by Imran’s fall) is unlikely to be as friendly to the military, just as the PPP was in 1988, but like it, it will have done a deal to come to power
The expectations upon it will be immense. It will not only face pressure from the people, but also from the IMF. What has been conceded by the present government cannot be taken back, except by a regime ready to accept the consequences of withdrawing entirely from the current financial system.
The prospects of a revolution are becoming possible, though there does not seem any of the class opposition that characterized those after the Russian Revolution. The French Revolution is called a bourgeois Revolution, but it basically involved replacing the system. Similarly, a revolution in Pakistan too might spin out of control. So far, the mullah-military alliance, as some have called it, has upheld the post-Partition status quo. Will it hold in the event of a popular revolt? Can the institutions maintain their position?
These are questions the institutions do not need to find the answer to. As the episode of the DG ISI shows, they are very strong, but also have chinks in their armour. That the episode dragged out so long, and that too at the hands of a PM who did not tire of flogging the ’same-page’ metaphor, has exposed unsuspected vulnerabilities.
The PM seemed panicked. The next election, which is growing increasingly near, is weighing heavily on his mind, and is looking increasingly like a defeat. It is often brushed over but Imran’s cricketing career ended badly, because of a player rebellion led by Javed Miandad, immediately after the 1992 World Cup win. Imran never played for Pakistan after that triumphant World Cup final. He was not selected.
