The Prime Minister’s signing of the summary for the appointment of the new DG ISI came at last, and after first having claimed that the appointment was his prerogative, he ended up doing what the ISPR had earlier announced. That announcement, it is generally assumed, was presumably approved by the COAS, and represented the consensus of the senior Army leadership. However, one of the side-effects of the whole episode, which incidentally shows why the Prime Minister interferes in such matters at his peril, is the proviso that the appointment will not take effect until November 20. Whatever other significance that might have, what it does mean is that a number of lieutenant-generals are frozen in place until then. Apart from the ISI, two corps and the National Defence University are involved.
The political consequences are grave. It showed the PM’s administrative style as puerile, ready enough to claim being on the same page, or to exert civilian supremacy when needed. But why was it needed? The lack of apparent reason, of any political logic, led to rumours of an occult logic. The whole confusing miasma played a role in the fall of the stock market, as well as behind rumours of a coup. Even now, every commentator seems to mention that previous such disputes have led to takeovers. Everyone has been at pains to point out that the military institution has a long memory and is not tolerant of errors.
The new DG ISI, who comes to Aabpara from commanding the Karachi corps, will find his new assignment very different. If he were to realize it, his primary task will be to repair the image of the organisation, which will only be possible if it restores its primary focus as its sole focus, and refrains from any more of the political engineering it is accused of. It should be able to speak of what it does, not try and conceal. Of course, intelligence agencies must not speak of what they do, but they can certainly be blunt about what they won’t. That is what the new DG must do.
