AT PENPOINT
The extent to which mainstreaming may go has been shown by the expiry of the ceasefire with the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as the Sialkot incident, where a Sri Lankan manager was killed because of another party, the Tehrik Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). The TLP has indicated that it is willing to be a kingmaker in the next Parliament, but the TTP has wider ambitions, which were reflected in its claim of affiliation to the Afghan Taliban, and to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
The TTP negotiations are a mystery, which will perhaps come out only later. Their very existence was only made public in Prime Minister Imran Khan’s interview to a Turkish news outlet: it was not announced in Parliament or even disclosed to a Pakistani news outlet. Only the TTP has disclosed its demands, and neither side has disclosed the response they received. Also, the discussion between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban was made public, without any intervention from any Pakistani government source.
The breakdown of the ceasefire does not mean that the talks have come to an end, but they do imply that what amounts to a civil war will continue. One of the subjects of discussion, in particular, indicates that the TTP sees itself as in the position of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Army as in the position of occupying forces: that it be allowed to establish a political office in another country. That keeps in view the experience of the Afghan Taliban, whose political office in Doha dealt with the USA, leading to the withdrawal of its forces.
That the aim of the TTP is the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from the Tribal Areas is shown by its demand that the Tribal Areas be reverted to their old status. Clearly, the TTP finds the old pre-integration Tribal Areas, with their pre-independence administration, more conducive to establishing their writ. It was only after a corps-level operation that the TTP occupation of the two Waziristan Agencies was ended, followed by their integration into KP, and the consequent arrival of regular police.
Their mainstreaming might suit some, but the cost to the country may be immense, and be in the form of a religio-political party even more uncompromising, even more extreme, and beholden to no one.
These two demands, combined with the claim to be affiliated to the Afghan Taliban made them sound more like Pukhoon nationalists seeking a merger with Afghanistan. It is not to be forgotten that the Taliban are mostly Kandahari Pashtoons, who exhibited a certain parochialism in their first stint in power. There was also the internationalism that showed in the support for the the Uighurs and the Kashmiris, not to mention the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the ex-Soviet republics.
The Afghan Taliban have stomped on this claim of affiliation, and has declared clearly that it has no intention of interfering in anyone’s internal afairs. This makes some things clear. First, it will give the TTP no aid. If TTP individual use personal contacts with Taliban stalwarts, that is another matter, but the Afghan organisation will not support the Pakistani. However, if the TTP gains the upper hand, the Pakistan government can expect no support. This may present a model for other worried states, especially China, that the new Taliban regime will not support any Muslim jihadi movements against them.
However, it leaves unanswered the question implicit in the TTP’s appeal: whose Amir is Akhounnd Haibatullah? He say he is the Emir of the Emirate of Afghanistan, but who is the appointing authority? Or is he taking the Gulf states as examples? Qatar, which hosted the Taliban talks with the USA< provides an example, apart from the seven emirates that make up the UAE.. The Emir of Qatar also claims to run an Islamic government, but the provenance of his state is not so clearly Islamic as the Taliban’s. No one is trying to join his state.
It is said of Mullah Omar, the first Emir, that he was offered the baia, or pledge of allegiance as Caliph, but he told those making the offer to go off and form an Emirate of their own. Is that the message the TTP is getting? That they should form an Emirate of their own?
However, one thing to emerge from this is that the agencies, which are accused of backing the TTP as well as the Afghan Taliban, are probably innocent or else guilty of conspiring against their own state. This seems psychologically impossible. It must be assumed, therefore, that both the Afghan mujahideen and the TTP at some point cut themselves adrift, and now owe no loyalty to Pakistan. The Taliban backing of Pakistan is therefore the free expression of gratitude, not to mention making sense considering the position of the Taliban, which has to maintain a minimum of non-interference unless it wants to be ousted.
One of its competitors is the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, which does have the advantage of owing allegiance to a Caliph, Abu Ibrahim Al-Hashimi, who succeeded his predecessor, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, four days after his death in October 2019. However, Al-Hashim suffers the disadvantage, indeed disqualification, of being in hiding. The Caliph is supposed to be sufficiently in control of his state so as to have a capital. He heads a government, after all, not a terrorist group.
However, if he was offered the rule of Afghanistan, or even Afghanistan-plus-Pakistan, it would be another matter. It might be remembered that Ayatollah Khomeini arrived that way in Iran, after the Shah had been expelled. However, the Taliban have no intention of going anywhere.
Mainstreaming the TTP also means drawing a blanket over all those who were killed by militant action in the last 20 years. The TTP might consider the fact that there is no concept of amnesty in Islamic law, and thus any amnesty might not be possible. Its demand for the release of its arrested stalwarts would thus be theologically dubious if they have been arrested for offences that are also offences under the Shariah, like murder.
Mainstreaming the Tehrik Labbaik Pakistan means the same thing, as there have been deaths among the police for which there has been no accounting. The Sialkot incident showed that the TLP as a political party inspired passions which could lead to violence. If the TLP bases its appeal on an emotive issue, can any other party stand in its way? It is difficult to imagine the campaign against it. Which returning officer will take the risk of announcing its candidate’s defeat?
Another theme that Mr Khan has repeated several times is that of an amnesty for those who accept the Constitution. Both the TTP and the TLP both contain elements which reject parliamentary democracy. The emirate-model is against parliamentary democracy. How this aspect is handled will be of great interest. It is also worth noting that while both the TTP and TLP are Hanafi, the former is Deobandi, the latter Brelvi.
Their politics is based on hatred, in the case of the former of the Shia sect, in the latter a minority, the Ahmedis.However, iIf both entered the hurlyburly of politics, where a thick skin is essential, how long before they turn against one another?
Their mainstreaming might suit some, but the cost to the country may be immense, and be in the form of a religio-political party even more uncompromising, even more extreme, and beholden to no one.
