AT PENPOINT
The blast at Lahore raised a number of spectres, the most worrisome being that the USA has once again abandoned Pakistan to face the blowback from Afghanistan. The irony of Pakistan having presented a National Security Policy just before the blast, is striking.
At a very basic level, the blast in Anarkali was meant to terrorize. It was not just that it took place away from Afghanistan, but that it took place in a crowded market. The message was clear: that any market in any city in Pakistan was vulnerable.
This was hardly unfamiliar. Pakistanis had spent two decades facing just such a situation, but since last September, expected that this would come to an end. After all, the Taliban had won, and thus Pakistan had been vindicated.
However, support of the Taliban in the 1990s had led to the formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan, which aimed at two things: supporting the Afghan Taliban and bringing Pakistan under Taliban rule. When the Taliban were ousted, the TTP changed the first aim to support of the resistance, and the second to killing Shias and other religious minorities. Now, it seems, while the TTP has declared allegiance to the Afghan Taliban, its secondary aim (which is actually now its sole aim) is to fight the Pakistan Army.
Thus it now seems that its aim is not just random terror, but to bring the Army back to the negotiating table. The Afghan Taliban used the tactic quite successfully against the USA, of stepping up their resistance in intervals of negotiating. True, the US Army was essentially an occupying force, while the Pakistan Army is a national army. It might be noted, though, that the Afghan Taliban did not negotiate with the US Army, but with the US government. Are the talks with the Pakistan Army merely because the TTP sees no point in talking to the political government?
The Lahore blast therefore ended up asking a very searching question: what should be the price of peace? And who can deliver it? That was a problem the USA faced in Afghanistan. Could the Taliban guarantee a safe withdrawal? As it turned out, they couldnât, and the US withdrawal was marred by an IS bomb blast. The last time demands of extremists were accepted by Pakistan was in 1971. Can either the BLA or the TTP hope to have their demands met in similar fashion?
The demands that the TTP made during the last negotiation are not such as can be fulfilled by anyone. There was a disconnect that made it impossible for the Army to continue. Did it reflect the views of the Taliban? The Kabul government has been careful to distance itself from the TTP, and it seems to wish to be part of the present international system, something the TTP does not wish to do. It has not agreed to take any action against the Taliban, thus providing it the kind of sanctuary the TTP had in the Waziristan Agencies.
Their demand that the Tribal Area status be reversed is perhaps the biggest non-starter of all, for the merger was achieved by the passage of a constitutional amendment by Parliament, and to get the majorities needed to get the amendment passed is probably beyond the ability of the ruling PTI. It should not be forgotten that the KP Assembly would also have to pass an enabling resolution, and there is no certainty that the PTI would be able to do so, vast majority as it enjoys in the KP Assembly.
However, the demand that they be allowed to open a political office in another country is perhaps the biggest nonstarter of all, not so much for what it shows of their own picture of themselves as the difficulty they might face in getting such an office, no matter what assurances they might have got. It should not be forgotten that the Afghan government did not look kindly upon Qatar for hosting the Taliban office. Thus if the TTP is looking to Afghanistan, it should remember that while the Afghan Taliban have shown that they are not Pakistani puppets, they will listen enough to Pakistan to avoid giving as much offence as hosting an office would.
The TTP is a dangerous organization of militants. Its leaders are not known as religious scholars, the way Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (of the Jamaat Islami) is because of his monumental Tafheemul Quran, or Sayyid Qutb (of the Ikhwanul Muslimeen) for his Fi Zilal al-Quran, the exegesis of the Holy Quran he wrote while in jail. Both have been influential well beyond their parties.
This lack of ideological input might point to another motive. This becomes even more obvious if one notes how the Baloch Liberation Army cropped up in the Lahore blast. It took responsibility, but the Interior Minister seems to discount that. However, whether the BLA made a false claim, or someone made a false claim on its behalf, there is no denying that that the BLA could well make the claim.
The BLA and the TTP are opposed to each other in Balochistan. They face each other across an ethnic divide, with the BLA deriving support among Baloch, and the TTP among Pashtuns. While Baloch youth avoid madrassas, Pashtuns have attended them in large numbers. The two militant organizations have ideological differences as well, for the BLA has a liberal leftist ideology, unlike the TTP.
However, the pool of young men from which they recruit have this much in common; they are both finding out that the education they have got is not all that it is cracked up to be. It does not prepare them for the job market, and thus they are left at something of a loose end.
This dovetails with the National Security Policy, which might ultimately bite the hand that created it. The NSP has been criticized for not having any input from stakeholders, but is that to misunderstand the nature of the policy. It was drafted by an institution that believes that it knows better than civilian institutions, and may have been meant for a foreign audience, to convince other countries that Pakistan is no longer a security state, but one ready to concentrate on geo-economics. Unfortunately, India, its main interlocutor, is not ready for this, and has come under the sway of a party which seeks to undo the Partition.
However, the NSP also has another dimension. It may also be seen as a guarantee of what is expected of any government that comes to office, a sort of bare minimum that must be followed by any government coming to office. In an indirect fashion, it is an admission that the PTI may not obtain re-election. It also reflects the desires of the same forces that desire a consensus on economic projects and decisions. However, the NSP also promotes internal security, so the NSP was shown as not worth as much as it was supposed to be by the blast.
The Lahore blast therefore ended up asking a very searching question: what should be the price of peace? And who can deliver it? That was a problem the USA faced in Afghanistan. Could the Taliban guarantee a safe withdrawal? As it turned out, they couldnât, and the US withdrawal was marred by an IS bomb blast. The last time demands of extremists were accepted by Pakistan was in 1971. Can either the BLA or the TTP hope to have their demands met in similar fashion?
