The ongoing wave of terrorism was widely expected by the Law Enforcement Agencies once the Taliban took over in Afghanistan. The reasoning was based on many assumptions. Firstly, the apparent victory of the Taliban was expected to embolden our own home-grown fringe right wing. Secondly, that the groups fighting the LEAs in the erstwhile FATA would have a friendly haven in Taliban controlled Afghanistan, and could do hit-and-run against Pakistani authorities. Thirdly, our resident groups would be able to import more buddies from across the western  border, now free from fighting the Americans, and thus the numbers of the Tehreek i Taliban (TTP) would swell. Fourthly, that external enemy powers would use this new scenario to infuse more money into terrorism in Pakistan so as to destabilize the national security of Pakistan; the ideal paradigm for present-day hybrid warfare. Fifthly, that the sleeper cells maintained by external and internal enemies of the country would be reactivated to further roil the waters.
These assessments have by and large come true. The pattern is clear and defined. The armed forces, the police, society at large, minorities, have all been separately targeted. The number of casualties so far are few and in small numbers, (each human life and limb is precious and priceless), but this is not the end of this present wave but possibly the urban beginning of a few months of mayhem by criminals eager to justify their keep to their sponsors.
There has also been an increase in the petty crime and street offences in urban centers. Whether there is a connection is a moot question, but there is certainly a great public disquiet on the issue. Everything needs to be taken as dots to be connected to see the wholistic picture.
The problem which commentators like me face in analyzing and then initiating any debate is that we do not have the requisite information and therefore can only generalize our opinion on previous history of terrorism in this country, and the solutions of choice adopted world-wide to douse the flames. We are lucky to have an army which has the resolve, wherewithal, and acquired skills to defeat guerrilla insurgents as they have amply demonstrated in the last decade. But as Joe Biden present POTUS said somewhere, the urban terrorist is not hunted by a soldier in battle fatigues and night goggles, but the lowly cop walking the beat in his neighborhood of responsibility.
Every act of terrorism is a criminal offence in some police station of the country. So for a successful counter-terrorism strategy, the state needs to look at, organize, enrich, and empower the police.
Every act of terrorism is a criminal offence in some police station of the country. So for a successful counter-terrorism strategy, the state needs to look at, organize, enrich, and empower the police. However much of a distaste you may have for the police, the stark reality is that there is no option B.
As enunciated earlier the clear reading is that we are at this time in a wave of hybrid war of which terrorism organized by internal and external enemies is a part. And for this reason, a different set of policing skills needs to be infused into the system. My take is as follows:
Firstly, the Special Branches need to be trained by officers of the Inter-Services Intelligence ISI for better collection, collation, and action thereon. Modules to be taught must include agent creation and maintenance because unless the police is able to infiltrate these criminal cells, they will not be able to pre-empt offences.
Secondly, the selection, training, equipment, and funding for the provincial Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTD) needs to be upped to the same level as is availed by the Motorway Police, so that the right quality of policemen volunteer to serve in these recently created units. The CTD must have their safe houses, transport, wireless and internet, and proper body armor.
Thirdly, one of the weakest areas in our police system is officer safety. Hundreds of police are killed or injured in targeted attacks by fly-by killers, mostly to create panic. By the very nature of their functions, the police cannot be insulated from the street, but a lot of such incidents can be avoided or challenged by better training in officer safety, and less reckless behavior. Many policemen have this false sense of security that their uniform is some kind of body armor. The killing of police officers is bad in two ways; one, it lowers morale in the force. Two, it leads to many policemen becoming trigger-happy resulting in many tragedies. So, train in officer safety.
Fourthly, we are, as a nation, very poor at organizing institutional memory. The Police Rules 1935 (Still in effect, believe it or not) lay a great stress on maintenance of particulars of crimes and criminals at the level of the Police Station, the district, and provincial. For effectively dealing with the inter-provincial offence of terrorism, we need to have comprehensive information available with the National Police Bureau in Islamabad as a national archive updated each day and available to all district police officers throughout the country.
Fifthly, it is common knowledge that witnesses in cases of terrorism resile in court due to fear. It is now imperative that statements made to investigating police officers by accused persons be admissible in evidence, subject to the right of cross-examination. The present law, enacted in 1872, and kept as such by successive governments be annulled. We need to trust our police.
Sixthly, it is common knowledge that most persons arrested in terrorism are granted bail very soon by courts. It may largely be due to poor and incompetent prosecution. Or it might be due to other reasons. An in-depth review of the bail system needs to be done and laws made to tighten the regime.
Lastly, this ongoing hybrid war on our law and order already has an equally hybrid response in the National Action Plan. Sadly, the Plan which has the backing of the whole nation is floundering. Enforce all articles of the Plan in letter and spirit and we will defeat the enemies of Pakistan.
