AT PENPOINT
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Amr Bil Maaroof rally held by the PTI in Islamabad was the absence of any dramatic announcement by Prime Minister Imran Khan, though his supporters were quick to point out his claim (based on a letter he showed no one) that foreign powers were out to get him, just as they got Z.A.Bhutto in 1977.
He also reserved the other ‘surprise’ for the day after the rally, by announcing that he was finally doing what it seems everyone was clamouring for him to do, and replacing Usman Buzdar as Punjab CM. This was accompanied by the announcement of the desertion of four Balochistan Awami Party members, with only their minister, Zubeida Jalal, remaining loyal to Imran. BAP may well have been more concerned about the survival of the Bizenjo government in Quetta. It perhaps should not be forgotten that Quddus Bizenjo cut his political teeth in the PPP, which is headed by an ethnic Baloch.
PM Imran Khan’s comparison of himself with Bhutto falls on a number of grounds, the first being that Bhutto had neither a prior sporting reputation or any record in philanthropy to smooth his way into politics. They had both been to Oxford, but while Bhutto also attended the University of California at Berkeley, Imran never looked back after Oxford. Bhutto came away with a reading habit (which he must have developed early, while still at school), with the result that he was formidably well-read. Not even Imran’s greatest supporters would like to make that argument for him.
Another problem that arises while trying to make the comparison is that the reason given is not big enough. Even if the idea of Bhutto having been overthrown because of the USA wanting him is accepted, it is because of his having begun the nuclear programme. Imran interestingly says it was because Bhutto was following an independent foreign policy. He claims that he is trying to follow a similar foreign policy, and thus is also being overthrown.
One problem that Imran faces is whether he is willing to take his argument to its logical conclusion, that the coupmakers of 1977 were as much foreign agents as those who have brought the vote of no-confidence against him. In 1977, the political parties ranged against him have their heirs active today. It is interesting that the PPP is also ranged against Imran today, and one of his major opponents is Bhutto’s grandson.
However, just as Bhutto was much better read than Imran, the reason for US dislike of him was also apparent: the nuclear weapon. That is supposed to be why he was supposed to be made a ‘horrible example’ in the phrase US Secretary of State Henry Kisinger. It was not foreign policy: it was something more tangible, more specific. What is Imran supposed to want to do? There was some talk of Bhutto leading the OIC, which he certainly kept alive by hosting the Lahore Summit in 1974. However, Imran’s hosting of the OIC Foreign Ministers may present a talking point, but it hardly compares. The OIC itself is hardly the force it was in the 1970s, and though the world is facing an oil threat now, it is from Russia, not OPEC. Indeed, the OPEC countries are content to make the money that higher prices bring, but not to go further.
A problem has been that the main reason for the grouse against Imran, the state of the economy, has been worsened by the no-confidence motion maelstrom. Worse, the opposition does not seem to have a formula, except for the claim it would provide better governance.
The OIC has also become increasingly dominated by Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan has not been able to resist Saudi pressure not to be part of the new Muslim bloc gathering around Malaysia and Turkey. Imran’s government has not been as inclined to China as would bring down punishment on his head. In fact, Pakistan should have inclined to China’s side in its conflict with the USA, but did not.
Unless Imran attempts some egregiously pro-China move, he will be seen as going along with the present policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hares. His being in Russia on the day it invaded Ukraine may not have pleased US policymakers, but the USA is hardly likely to harm Imran because of what was a minor infraction.
Certainly, the very fact that he has to have his record searched, in a way that Bhutto’s did not, to find something that might cause the USA to conspire behind his removal. It must also not be forgotten that the policy for which he was allegedly killed, the pursuit of a nuclear weapon, was also pursued by his successor, not just because it was a national policy, but one backed by the military. It should also not be forgotten that the Afghan Jihad helped Pakistan go nuclear, in the sense that the USA needed Pakistan to fight the Russia and hadf to choose etween its going nuclear, and defeating the Russia.
At present, it is not possible to see why exactly the West needs to remove Imran. Is something that failed in 1977 likely to work in 2022? The claim implies that the establishment is willing to do the USA’s bidding. However, in the past, military takeovers have heralded Pakistan serving US interests. Only in the case of the 1968 Martial Law was Pakistan’s military not positioned in advance. The ‘heavy lifting’ of making Pakistan join CENTO and SEATO had already been achieved.
However, it was after Yahya Khan’s take over that Pakistan facilitated Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing, which paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s famous visit. Similarly, the ouster of Bhutto saw the Zia regime only getting US approval only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, the Musharraf takeover came before 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan. The US withdrawal from there did take place on Imran’s watch, and his refusal to provide the USA bases to observe the Taliban was a source of mystery, as the USA said it had not made any request.
Even if such a request had been hinted at, and though the USA made clear its desire to blame Pakistan for the defeatr in Afghanistan.There has been some talk of Imran going public withe the letter he claims as the smoking gun, though it is unlikely to show the sort of smoking gun Imran is trying to claim.
More relevant has been Imran’s pledge to replace Buzdar. Clearly, Imran is appealing to the military with his claims of foreign pressure, and also by replacing Buzdar, who had received most flak from the establishment. As the establishment’s pick for CM in 2008, he is seen by it as a safe pair of hands.
However, picking him has led to the PML(Q) losing an MNA, Tariq Bashir Cheema, while it is not certain how the Tarfen-Aleem group of PTI dissidents will react. Imran may have made a promise he cannot deliver on. He might fid it easier to convince the MQM(P), for it should not be that difficult to get them another Cabinet slot if they accept. On the other hand, it will mean giving up a share in Sindh.
Imran still has a long road to travel to save himself, but things are looking up. Though he had not really exploded any bombs at the rally (whose name indicates the religiousd trope he wanted to invoke, but didn’t), things have begun to look up for him since then. Most important for him, he has stopped the momentum staying with the opposition.
However, the MQM coming out against him, it does seem the numbers are now against him. All the decisions have been made, and now Imran will retain office in the hope that there will be some U-turns to save him. Otherwise, there is really no other reason to hang around.
A problem has been that the main reason for the grouse against Imran, the state of the economy, has been worsened by the no-confidence motion maelstrom. Worse, the opposition does not seem to have a formula, except for the claim it would provide better governance.
