With us or against us

The catchphrase ‘with us or against us’ has once again gained traction in the Western capitals in the aftermath of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine; so has India’s protracted fence-sitting. There has been the proverbial tug-of-war between the contending parties. But, as the conflict continues to polarise the world, India’s hesitation in taking sides has started to exasperate its key Western sponsors — the United States and its European allies. Despite their strategic convergence in the Asia-Pacific region, the Quad, New Delhi’s muted stance on the crisis is increasingly becoming a cause of particular concern for the US. President Joe Biden has described India as the only country among the Quad members that is “somewhat shaky” in acting against Russia. During his visit to New Delhi, US Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh also alluded to potential “consequences” for countries attempting to undermine US sanctions.
The West has responded with unprecedented sanctions and relentlessly rallied for Russia’s complete economic isolation. However, India has shied away from boarding the sanctions bandwagon and abstained from successive United Nations resolutions reprimanding Russia.
New Delhi has increased its oil imports from Russia by circumventing international sanctions. It has received 34 million barrels of discounted Russian oil since Feb 24. According to Kpler, a Paris-based data analytics firm, Russia’s Ural crude oil imports are now the second-largest source for India after Iraq, when the US and its allies are rallying hard for a united front against Russia. More importantly, India’s heavy reliance on Russian military hardware and its blossoming strategic partnership with the US has created a strategic dilemma for New Delhi. Going by the figures released by Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, India has ordered Russian weapons worth approximately $70 billion since 1991.
Similarly, India’s strategic partnership with the US dates back to 2001, when it began to pursue the latter for cooperation in three crucial areas known as ‘Trinity’’. It included easing restrictions on dual-use high-technology goods, civil nuclear cooperation, and civilian space cooperation.
The same was reiterated in January 2004 at a joint press conference by president George Bush and prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that “the US-India ‘strategic partnership’ included expanding cooperation in the trinity areas as well as expanding dialogue on missile defence.”
The cooperation was later converted into a ‘quartet’ and further expanded as the Next Steps Strategic Partnership (NSSP).
The collaboration through NSSP helped to establish enhanced cooperation in the fields of dual-use, space and nuclear technology, which led to the signing of ‘Agreement 123’ between the two countries in 2008, giving India an undue advantage in the realm of nuclear technology and adversely affecting the state of strategic stability in the region.
The US has also been lobbying for New Delhi’s permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). As a result, the bilateral trade between the US and India stood at $119.42 billion in 2021-22, making the US surpass China to become India’s top trading partner. Likewise, the Indian diaspora makes up the second-largest immigrant group in the US, becoming a source of sizeable remittances for India. But, despite numerous strategic concessions, technological facilitation, and favourable trade regimes, India has proved to be an unreliable strategic partner for the US. So, will India be able to prolong its ‘wait-and-watch’ policy and cater to its partners — the US and Russia — at the moment?
The big question for Washington is: whether it should continue its alliance and support for India despite its double-dealing or, to put it bluntly, back-stabbing?
Farah Khan Abro
Islamabad