After the first Indian nuclear test on 18 May 1974, the international community was alarmed, prompting the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the London Group, to counter the threat of Indian proliferation. Led by the USA., the UK, France, Germany, and Japan, the London Group attempted to impose economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on India to discourage further nuclear activities and prevent such instances of proliferation from other countries. The formation of the London Group also demonstrated the gravity with which the international community perceived India’s nuclear ambitions.
Despite international condemnation and economic sanctions, India conducted additional nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. These tests demonstrated India’s hawkish commitment to its nuclear weapons programme and its stubbornness in defying global norms in pursuit of its strategic objectives. Indian tests further heightened tensions in South Asia and reinforced concerns about the potential for a dangerous regional arms race.
India’s nuclear tests marked the first instance of state-sponsored nuclear proliferation, because, firstly, in the past, countries like the USA, the USSR, the UK, France, and China developed their nuclear capabilities in response to perceived external threats or as part of a broader arms race during the World War II and Cold War. So, the development of nuclear weapons was driven by security concerns and strategic competition.
However, when India conducted its nuclear tests, particularly the 1998 tests, its motivations were different. India’s nuclear program was driven primarily by a desire to establish itself as a regional power and gain strategic advantage over its neighbours, particularly Pakistan. While there were certainly external security concerns that influenced India’s decision-making, the tests were more about asserting India’s regional dominance and enhancing its international prestige.
Secondly, India’s nuclear tests violated its civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada. India used plutonium produced in a ‘CANDU reactor provided by Canada to conduct its nuclear tests, thereby undermining the trust between the two nations and jeopardizing future cooperation. This breach of trust not only strained bilateral relations between India and Canada but also called into question the effectiveness of international safeguards designed to prevent the misuse of civilian nuclear technology for military purposes.
The international community must engage with India to address its nuclear arms buildup in South Asia. International forums, such as the UN, and dialogue, should be encouraged to promote confidence-building measures and cooperative security arrangements. By fostering open communication and encouraging regional cooperation, it is possible to mitigate the potential for conflict, reduce the risks associated with nuclear proliferation, and establish a more stable security environment in South Asia.
The startling consequences of Indian procurement of nuclear weapons are clear as crystal. It further contributed to the fragility of the region, which has witnessed several conventional conflicts in the past. Indian nuclearization attempts paved a way towards increased risks of nuclear brinkmanship and contributed to an alarming arms buildup in South Asia that has far-reaching implications for regional and global security. Indian nuclear weapons ambitions also heightened tensions and prompted neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, to think about going down the nuclear route in response. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is largely a response to Indian nuclear activities, driven by regional security concerns and the desire to maintain a balance of power in South Asia.
These developments led to a precarious situation in the South Asian region. Consequently, the potential for a nuclear arms race, spearheaded by India, between the two countries poses a significant threat to regional stability and peace with global implications. India has consistently disregarded international arms control and non-proliferation efforts, for instance, India remained outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and resisted efforts to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without providing logical explanation for not signing the treaties. In fact, it is believed that India in future wants to test thermonuclear weapons, which is why it is not signing the CTBT. Therefore, Pakistan’s stance has been influenced by such Indian nuclear ambitions and its threat perception that its security depends on possessing a credible nuclear deterrent against Indian strategic weapons buildup is validated.
India’s refusal to participate in critical disarmament initiatives undermines global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote disarmament. However, Pakistan has shown willingness to engage in nuclear arms control measures in the region. For example, Pakistan proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) in 1998, which aimed to address the nuclear and conventional arms imbalance in South Asia. The proposal included three interlocking elements: nuclear restraint, conventional balance, and conflict resolution. While the proposal has been rejected by India, it demonstrates Pakistan’s recognition of the need for arms control measures in South Asia.
India’s ongoing investment in expansion of its nuclear weapons programme has contributed to transforming the arms race in South Asia into an even more dangerous and complex competition. South Asia now faces the risk of a destabilizing arms race, with potentially catastrophic consequences for regional security. Indian expansion and modernization of its nuclear weapons programme has further escalated tensions in the region, it has encouraged deadly technological advancements in the ballistic missiles field, prompted shifts in nuclear strategy, and has also impacted global non-proliferation efforts.
The international community must engage with India to address its nuclear arms buildup in South Asia. International forums, such as the UN, and dialogue, should be encouraged to promote confidence-building measures and cooperative security arrangements. By fostering open communication and encouraging regional cooperation, it is possible to mitigate the potential for conflict, reduce the risks associated with nuclear proliferation, and establish a more stable security environment in South Asia.
