Israel has been ruled by the most right-wing coalition in its history. Its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, remains on trial, since March 2020, on multiple corruption charges. These two are interconnected. The composition and behaviour of Netanyahu’s current coalition is largely dictated by his desire to avoid sentencing or to quash his trial altogether. In previous coalitions he has led, Netanyahu has made efforts to include centrist parties, and has been generally successful in doing so.
But these parties are no longer willing to join his government, due to the corruption charges he faces and the way he dealt with his former centrist coalition partner Benny Gantz in 2020-2021. Now Netanyahu prefers to associate with parties to his right that support his goal of reforming the judiciary. Some in his coalition have more far-reaching aspirations than Netanyahu, who is most interested in three specific legal changes that could tip the judicial process in his favour.
Of the three changes Netanyahu is interested in, two have been approved by the Knesset as a bill, each one in the final days of the Knesset session: “Unsuitable for indictment” was passed in March 2023, while the related “criterion of reasonableness” was passed in July 2023. It is no coincidence that of the judicial reform package initially presented by Justice Minister Yariv Levin in early January 2023, the only two bills to pass were those essential to Netanyahu’s trial. This underscores how Netanyahu controls the legislative process and his coalition partners, even if it is often convenient for him to create the perception that they are holding him back politically. The Knesset is currently in recess until after the Jewish holidays in mid-October. Until then, there will be no new legislation, but once it meets again, Netanyahu’s third priority (changing the composition of the committee to select judges) will emerge, along with a bill that would formally exempt the ultra-Orthodox.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court must decide if and how it will intervene with respect to the two laws already approved. It may be the first time in Israel’s history that a Basic Law has been overturned, and the crucial Supreme Court hearing in mid-September on the “standard of reasonableness” bill will include all 15 justices, another first. On the “invalid for office” bill, the Supreme Court will debate at the end of September whether to postpone its implementation until after the next elections, to avoid it being a bil, tailored to Netanyahu.
Time and time again, Netanyahu has refused to say he will accept a Supreme Court ruling overturning the new legislation. Instead, his ministers are trying to delegitimize the court, saying it has no mandate to change Knesset decisions on basic laws, while the justices clearly say the opposite, and by publicly attacking the judges and their motives. In early August, far-right Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu said that if the Supreme Court struck down a basic law, it should not be respected and would suggest that judges “break the law in trials.”
All of this creates the risk of an unprecedented constitutional crisis, as the Supreme Court makes a decision the government refuses to accept. This sparked a lot of anxiety in Israel and speculation about worrying scenarios. Asked about this in a closed meeting, Mossad Chief David Parnea said in a constitutional crisis, he would be on the “right side of history”.
Along with judicial reform, the government is pushing its ideological agenda in other areas. Take drastic measures to increase control over the media, civil society, schools, universities, and more; restriction of freedoms there; and increasing tensions with the Palestinians. The recent decision by Education Minister Yoav Kish to ban the Israeli-Palestinian Forum for Grieving Families, a grassroots peace group, from schools, is just one example.
Israel is in uncharted territory and the crisis is likely to continue for months to come. The government is eager to continue its judicial reform, and pro-democracy Israelis are determined not to let that happen.
From day one of the current government, Israelis have taken steps to protect democracy. After several weeks of on and off work, led mostly by concerned citizens from all walks of life (rather than by major parties or NGOs), a broad pro-democracy movement began to take hold and has steadily grown ever since. For over 30 consecutive weeks, protests have taken place every Saturday night. At least a quarter million people regularly take part, sometimes many more. Similar protests have been held in cities worldwide by Israelis and Jews residing there. The protests are unprecedented in Idrael’s history.
Besides the usual weekly protests, additional resistance demonstrations and activities were organized around key events, such as the spontaneous overnight opposition to Netanyahu’s attempt to fire Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in March and the massive pro-democracy rally from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in July.
This process creates new alliances that transcend former dividing lines in Israeli society. This is perhaps most evident in the various weekly protests in Jerusalem, in front of the President’s House, where a unique mix of Israelis congregate and take the stage. But these same events are also leading to dramatic polarization between those supporting and opposing the government’s actions, and have already led to violence against pro-democracy protesters.
While Netanyahu seeks to downplay legislation already passed, the pro-democracy camp highlights just how dramatic the changes really are. As a result, large numbers of IDF reservists stopped volunteering for service. High-tech companies are gradually moving their business elsewhere; Clinicians collectively and individually research resettlement options; consumer boycotts are gaining momentum; Foreign investment is declining. and more. The protest movement, decentralized in nature, has given rise to new leaders with unusual backgrounds. For example, Professor Chikma Pressler, a physicist at the Weizmann Institute, has become a prominent figure Others, including those in the high-tech sector, have risen to the occasion and altered their lives and career plans to help protect democracy.
This will eventually lead to a political renewal in the Israeli liberal camp, the first signs of which will be evident in the next municipal elections, in October. Pro-democracy Israelis also seek international support. They are learning from peers in Hungary, Poland and Turkey, who have experienced gradual but dramatic democratic decline. They warn against the “Lebanonization” of Israel, seek to raise awareness abroad of domestic developments, work to create joint liberal networks with like-minded partners in other countries, and mobilize international politicians and leaders to express concern and take action.
International struggle has already achieved results. For example, after a long campaign by Israelis in the USA, Arthur Danczyk, the main benefactor of the right-wing Kohelt Forum, decided to stop funding the think tank that had spurred judicial reform. Everything in recent months inside Israel and in its troubled relations with the Palestinians also affects Israel’s relations abroad.
In response to the new Israeli government, the USA initially invested its energy in seeking détente between the Israelis and the Palestinians, especially around Ramadan and Passover. It held two regional summits in Jordan and Egypt, and has expressed his concern and opposition to settler violence and settlement expansion. Over time, President Joe Biden has become increasingly critical of the judicial changes in Israel. He did so while highlighting his commitment and friendship to Israel, as evidenced by President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Washington.
Biden refused to invite Netanyahu to the White House until he changed course, and he was making his concerns and positions public by speaking to American and Israeli journalists. So far, Biden has failed to turn words into action, and his repeated interventions have not affected the course of events in Israel. One-sided legislation was passed despite opposition from the Administration. In response, Netanyahu gave a series of interviews to US media, painting an optimistic and inaccurate picture of events in Israel. Outside the USA, criticism of Netanyahu’s policies in Europe has been expressed, but quietly, and mainly by European member states, not the EU as a whole. This is due to internal divisions among EU members (some of which suffer democratic setbacks of their own), differing foreign policy priorities in Europe (such as the war in Ukraine), and the interest of some in maintain close relations with Israel. Closer to home, Arab states have slowed their cooperation with Israel in recent months, a trend evidenced by the repeated postponement of the Negev Forum meeting in Morocco, originally scheduled for March and intended to convene ministers of Israel, the USA and several countries. Arab leaders have regularly sent messages of concern about Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, while refraining from taking steps that would jeopardize their current relations with Israel.
Efforts are underway to advance the implementation of previously agreed upon projects, such as the water and electricity exchange agreement between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. It seems that some Arab countries are ready to move forward with Israel, even in the current circumstances, as long as its main demands are met. This is the case of Morocco, regarding Israel’s acceptance of its position with regard to the Western Sahara, and this seems to be the case of Saudi Arabia as well, in the case of the US nuclear programme, and in the event of an Israeli government willing to make some concessions on the Palestinian issue.
In short, Israel is in uncharted territory and the crisis is likely to continue for months to come. The government is eager to continue its judicial reform, and pro-democracy Israelis are determined not to let that happen.
This could lead to several possible options, ranging from an unprecedented constitutional crisis with deep social polarization to a change in the composition of the government due to internal chaos, a major security escalation with the Palestinians or Hezbollah, or a diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia. It is difficult to predict political events in Israel in normal times.
