In an era defined by interconnectedness and shared challenges, global security has emerged as a paramount concern. Against this backdrop, China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) assumes a significant role in shaping a safer world. The GSI, which Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced in February this year, has garnered interest from scholarly experts in Chinese studies since its inception.
As China rises as a global power, expectations from the GSI are high, and rightly so. This proactive and comprehensive initiative holds huge potential to promote international cooperation, address security threats, and foster sustainable peace. As this initiative gains traction, it is critical to examine the expectations and implications for the rest of the world.
GSI revolves around multiple core concepts. A primary expectation from the GSI is its commitment to multilateralism. The success of any global initiative depends on international collaboration and cooperation. In order to encourage inclusive dialogue, consensus-building, and collective decision-making when addressing security challenges, the GSI must build on this foundation and further strengthen the current multilateral structures. Global security is significantly threatened by cross-border risks like terrorism and organized crime, and the world expects proactive action from the GSI in mitigating these dangers. China’s history in managing internal security crises, especially its counter-terrorism activities in Xinjiang, makes it a key player in international anti-terrorism initiatives. The GSI should collaborate with other nations to enhance the exchange of intelligence, orchestrate operations, and devise efficient strategies to counter terrorism.
Moreover, as societies evolve towards greater digitalization, the importance of cybersecurity as a fundamental aspect of global security is enhanced. The GSI is expected to encourage global cooperation in cybersecurity matters, including the establishment of standards for responsible cyberspace conduct by states, enhancing capabilities, and sharing information. China, with its rich cybersecurity knowledge and rapidly growing technological abilities, is a pivotal participant in this sector. It is irrefutable that conflict and instability causes substantial damage to global security; the GSI possesses considerable potential to foster a meaningful shift in the promotion of global peace and dispute resolutions. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China’s capacity to influence international peacekeeping endeavours and mediation initiatives is greatly amplified. The GSI should take a practical role in aiding peacekeeping operations, promoting diplomatic communication, and offering logistical support to nations going through conflicts.
The GSI is also expected to prioritise environmental security by promoting sustainable development and addressing climate-related risks. China is committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and has immense investments in renewable energy which make it an influential actor in this domain. Moreover, during instances of humanitarian emergencies and natural catastrophes, the world expects the GSI to play a pivotal role in delivering immediate and efficient aid and disaster relief.
The transition of the GSI from rhetoric to reality is still in progress, although China has presented numerous rebranding frameworks to other countries, but few have advanced beyond Beijing’s merely nominal endorsement, raising doubts about this initiative’s chances of taking off.‎Â
China has already effectively persuaded numerous countries to endorse the concept of the GSI. Although the idea might have been ambiguous, when it was proposed by President Xi at the SCO Council of Heads of State in Uzbekistan, the initiative was rapidly backed by the majority of SCO members, that is, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In addition to these, over 80 nations and regional organizations, including Cambodia, Mongolia, Cuba, Uruguay, and Nicaragua, have expressed their appreciation. Pakistan also strongly supports the Global Development Initiative, a similar Initiative aimed at expediting the process of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS), 2030, and the GSI. In Africa and the Middle East, the GSI has been used in a variety of foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, Gulf governments consider the GSI as well aligned with their security views, hence it will likely receive support from different parts of the Gulf region.
However, despite this initial enthusiasm, the GSI will face significant challenges in the actual implementation. It is essential to comprehend the actual capacity of China to implement the GSI as it appears to function more as a rhetorical tool to promote Chinese perspectives on global security governance than as a concrete strategy for establishing a Chinese world order within the realistic framework of China’s role as a participant in international security. It is believed that the GSI actually lacks the necessary regulatory tools to carry out President Xi’s aspirational policy objectives, and it also needs an economic programme in addition to security measures.
The transition of the GSI from rhetoric to reality is still in progress, although China has presented numerous rebranding frameworks to other countries, but few have advanced beyond Beijing’s merely nominal endorsement, raising doubts about this initiative’s chances of taking off.‎ Therefore, it is crucial to track the progress of the GSI over the coming years and how it relates to China’s larger objectives of reforming global governance. It is also imperative to take into account the practical limitations that will be placed on China when analysing its motivations. Eventually, for the GSI, process is as important as results and even if the most specialized components of the GSI results in few concrete policy outcomes, the overall initiative will still foster a friendly international network.
