AT PENPOINT
When Chief Election Commissioner Sikandar Sultan Raja and his fellow Commissioners called on President Arif Alvi, he probably did not think of it as a visit to the dentist, but that is what it was, the President having been a dentist much longer than he has been President. He had gone to give him the date of the next general election, something he apparently felt as much pain in doing as in having a tooth extracted.
Therefore, on February 8, the country will go to the polls. The date might have come from the President on the recommendation of the ECP, but the reasons why this happened are not to be sought in the love of any institution for democracy and the Constitution, but because of existential compulsions.
The ECP’s first problem was the fact that the date had not been announced. The last time this happened was when President Ziaul Haq in 1988 interpreted the constitutional provision to mean that he had to give a date in 90 days, not hold elections in that time period. He dissolved the National Assembly on 29 May 1988, and on 20 July, well within the time limit, he set the date for general elections as 16 November. He did not appoint a caretaker PM, and was head of government. He had planned thus to rule himself for six months. However, he died on August 17 in that fateful aircrash, leaving his replacement as President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, to head the government for three months.
It seems that example has not faded, and the ECP has met the challenge of giving a date, any date, within 90 days, even if the date itself is February 8.
The Supreme Court has made the best of a bad deal, and said that the February 8 date must not be violated. The Supreme Court has not got a good record of making the ECP do what it wants, as seen in last year’s Islamabad local body election, which was postponed indefinitely from December 31 after Parliament increased the number of seats from 101 to 125. Then, the Supreme Court ordered polls to the Punjab Assembly held on May 14. However, the responsible authorities all refused to do what they had been told. The Election Commission was not given the needed money, the extra forces needed for polling duty were not available, and the intelligence agencies all said the security situation made it impossible.
However, the Supreme Court really has no choice but to order that the Constitution be followed. It could not fall in with the wishes of those forces that wish to avoid elections beyond a certain date to also avoid making an order incapable of implementation. Therefore, it had to accept the date that was given it. If it had not done so, the ECP might still have held back on fixing a date, at least until the completion of the delimitation process, which will take place in January.
However, there was another pressure on the ECP, the need to provide the visiting IMF review team the assurance that Pakistan was heading towards political stability. Of course, there are some that feel the formula for stability is like the present: handpicked individuals, and none of the politicians and crooks (same thing, really) around, with the right type of people exercising the real control. The IMF does not agree. It wants its money back, which means that it not only wants a government which can withstand the public pressure because of the conditionalities it sets, but can create an atmosphere of political stability. That means not reneging on its promises.
It is the economic motivation which is driving the PML(N) acceptability. The word out is that the Gulf countries and China both feel more comfortable with Mian Nawaz than with Imran, thus to attract investment from the former, and retain that made by the latter, it would be politic for Mian Nawaz to return to office.
The IMF is not really concerned with the Constitution. It can deal with any government. But it wants its money back, so it wants a government in place that can deliver on its agreements. As Pakistan faces increasing debt servicing charges domestically, and some humongous foreign debt servicing charges this year, the IMF must sign off on this tranche of its Stand-By Agreement, or else the consequences would be disastrous.
Previous COAS Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa has made it very clear, towards the end of his tenure in 2022 that the establishment was out of the business of determining election results. Present incumbent Gen Asim Munir has confirmed this, and this has received the endorsement of formation commanders.
However, the speed with which PML(N) Quaid Mian Nawaz Sharif doubled back on his initial demand for action against individuals he feels have wronged him in the past, ndicates that Mian Nawaz has changed an important part of his narrative because he is getting something in return, which is widely predicted to be election victory.
The PML(N) will not win so much as the PTI will lose. Even though the main PTI votegetter, Imran Khan, is behind bars, if left without help, PML(N) candidates might face problems against the PTI’s, but the PTI may be a guarantee of a large number of votes per constituency, but there is a presupposition that the candidate will bring with him a substantial number of votes, either personal or biradari.
The PTI model was based on having ‘electables’ as candidates. One advantage was that the party did not have to provide the candidates any funds. Another was that it only had to deliver some votes, not all, the rest (the bulk) being made up by the candidate himself. A third was that the establishment would help.
That help is not forthcoming. Also, ‘electables’ may be scared off from the PTI from fear of the unknown, which may range from the ire of the local representative of the establishment (which would mean that the local administration turns hostile), to actual arrest, as presaged by the recent arrests of Fawad Chaudhry and Asad Qaiser.
The alternatives for the electables are the PML(N) and the PPP. Neither has changed, not so much their leaderships, as their support bases. They still want a particular individual to rule, not necessarily solve the problems of the nation, which are economic.
It is the economic motivation which is driving the PML(N) acceptability. The word out is that the Gulf countries and China both feel more comfortable with Mian Nawaz than with Imran, thus to attract investment from the former, and retain that made by the latter, it would be politic for Mian Nawaz to return to office.
There is a risk involved. Mian Nawaz is a politician, and thus might try to do something about those who ousted him. The solution would be to have him return to office, but hampered by allies who can bring him down whenever their strings are pulled.
Nawaz has been where Imran is today. However, the fact that an election has been called should not conceal the fact that the result is predetermined, not by the electorate, but by puppeteers who claim they are not playing the game.
