AT PENPOINT
The Election Commission of Pakistan has issued an election schedule to follow on its issuing of an election date. Just as with the date, the schedule was announced only after the Supreme Court intervened. The issuing of the schedule was not the same as issuing an election programme, which is done just before nomination forms are made available to the candidates by the Returning Officers.
The Returning Officers have been taken from the executive, repeating something which had been done in 2018. The PTI had no objection at that time, but it has one now. If one was to agree with its allegations against the ROs’ boss, caretaker CM Mohsin Naqvi, one could see the PTI’s point. It could also argue that though the 2018 elections were supervised by executive officers, the party had not got the sort of favours from the caretaker CM that Naqvi has been giving to the PTI’s opponents. It could once again repeat the earlier allegations that Naqvi had been involved in removing the Imran government.
It is interesting whether he can influence officials. He might not find officialdom very compliant, unless it becomes clear that he speaks, acts and orders on behalf of more permanent institutions. It should be remembered that Naqvi does not formally represent an institution the way Usman Buzdar represented the PTI and Shehbaz Sharif the PML(N). Even Ch Parvez Elahi, in his brief second tenure, could be seen as representing the PTI. The only institution he could be said to represent has said that it will no longer be influencing politics, so that is out
The issuing of the schedule that will form the election programme is not illegal, but is unusual. One effect will be to reduce the speculations by those who claimed that the elections would be put off yet again. It should be remembered that elections are not taking place when the Constitution prescribed they had to.
Actually, the first violation occurred when the ECP did not obey the Supreme Court’s orders to hold local body elections in Islamabad. Then elections to two provincial assemblies, those of Punjab and KP, were not held on time. As a matter of fact, all those elections have not been conducted. While the national elections on February 8 will be accompanied by elections for all four provincial assemblies, it will mean that two caretaker governments will have held office for over a year, which is a considerable period (ask Hamza Shehbaz, who held office for only 87 days, and Parvez Elahi, whose last tenure lasted less than six months).
The federal caretakers will have held office, by election day, since August, for six months, and will probably have another two weeks before a new PM actually takes oath. All of them can been congratulated on their good fortune, for they did not deserve to hold office for more than 90 days.
The caretaker experiment was undertaken because of the 1977 election, which was widely decried as rigged. Incidentally, that election is the reason for the demand for the judiciary to act as Returning Officers. However, elections have been taking place in India under outgoing governments acting as caretakers. There have been no complaints against them, though there are complaints aplenty against opponents.
However, the Balochistan delimitations have not been allowed to act as a barrier for elections. The way has been cleared for ROs to begin issuing nomination forms, which is the first step of the electoral process. Pakistan will go to the polls again.
Bangladesh experimented with the caretaker idea, using it as a means of transition from military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad to an elected government in . It then formalised the arrangement through a constitutional amendment, and there was an alternation of power between the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party. However, when the BNP government completed its tenure in October 2006, elections were not held until December 2008. This is the so-called ‘Bangladesh Model’. An important component was that the caretakers had the backing of the Army, and were supposed to be the government of all the talents that would solve the country’s problems.
Whether it did so or not, can be debated. Bangladesh has not lifted itself out of poverty, but its metrics have improved. The election of 2008 have resulted in an Awami League government. It ma naged to pass the necessary constitutional amendment abolishing it in 2011, and the Awami League has won the next two elections. The BNP has boycotted the election being held in January, but before the boycott had demanded caretakers supervise the polls.
The caretaker arrangement, going by the Bangladesh example, is one of those you-can’t-live-with-it you-can’t-live-without-it kind of things. By itself, it does not guarantee an acceptance of the results by the losers. Without it, election results may be managed. It is not simply that the caretakers conduct fairer elections. An election must be accepted by even the losers if it is to reflect the will of the people. That is one reason why winners in democracies accommodate losers, at least to the extent of giving them legal rights.
However, the caretaker mechanism, as both Bangladesh and Pakistan have seen, is subject to manipulation. The danger sign is of the caretaker government running on beyond its constitutionally fixed mandate. In the case of both countries, the caretaker set-ups have not been some sort of self-willed automata which would decide whether or not to prolong their stay. In both cases, the Army played a key role in backing the caretakers. In both countries, caretakers have been used as a kind of Martial Law Lite. That caretakers do not necessarily stop Martial Law can be seen by the example of Pervez Musharraf, who held election in 2002 without using the caretaker mechanism, retaining the office of Chief Executive for the polls.
It should not be forgotten that, among other things, including the creation of Bangladesh, that flowed from the 1971 polls, they were conducted by ROs drawn from the executive. The tradition which had by then developed was for rigging to be committed by favoured candidates with the help of the district administration and the police. The ROs were mostly drawn from the Local Council Service, could not do much. That is why it made more sense to suborn or terrorise the polling staff at the level of the polling station. They were mostly drawn from the Education Department, which employed the largest number of persons, but even such federal departments as nationalized banks could be used.
Those who object to the use of officials need to ask why the 1970 elections are counted as fair, even though the ROs came from the executive. And why did the opposition claims of rigging in 1977 win such acceptance? In both cases, it was because of public perception. In 1970, the candidates did not complain, and the public experience was of fair polling. In 1977, PNA candidates claim there had been widespread rigging, a claim which squared with the experience of enough voters for the PNA to launch a movement against the government.
Going by that relatively rough standard, the post-1985 elections were fair. It must be accounted a coincidence that they always turned out the way the establishment wanted. The ruling party was generally ousted, and the opposition won. These were all two-way elections, with a three-way election occurring only in 2018, when, again as the establishment wanted, the PTI won. It was unceremoniously ousted in 2022, but it seems that the elections would not allow all that the establishment wants done, even though the parties are all willing to play ball.
However, the Balochistan delimitations have not been allowed to act as a barrier for elections. The way has been cleared for ROs to begin issuing nomination forms, which is the first step of the electoral process. Pakistan will go to the polls again.
