THIS is with reference to the letter “Jinnah’s children or unworthy orphans?” (June 9). Can we achieve the Quaid-e-Azam’s vision of Pakistan by disputing his seminal speech? The speech on Aug 11, 1947, to the Constituent Assembly is the Quaid’s most discussed speech. As such, the speech is perhaps the only one from which many find some substance to raise objections against Pakistan being declared an Islamic state. In the present circumstances when militancy in the name of religion has caused much damage to the country and its image globally, such objections have earned a new lease of life.
The speech in question had actually come as a shock to the Quaid’s advocates and followers. The chronicler of Pakistan’s press, Zamir Niazi, has recorded the reaction in his book, The Press in Chains. Undoubtedly, his account is based on authentic contemporary sources. Hamid Jalal revealed that the establishment had sent a press advisory to black out the speech. Altaf Husain, the editor of daily Dawn at the time, had to foil the move by threatening to “go to the Quaid himself”. Niazi corroborated Jalal’s account, while recording attempts in later years to censor the said speech.
Apart from these accounts, the Quaid’s biographer, Stanley Wolpert, has also discussed the speech in detail in his book Jinnah of Pakistan. “What was he talking about? Had he simply forgotten where he was? Had the cyclone of events so disoriented him that he was arguing the opposition’s brief? Was he pleading for a united India — on the eve of Pakistan …?”
The fact of the matter is that the Quaid was analysing the events at the end of an exercise. What else he could have said on that occasion, when Pakistan was coming into being and its two major provinces, Punjab and Bengal, were experiencing a bloodbath? Besides, communal killings were taking place across India. What was the way to stop these communal riots and pacify the non-Muslims living in Pakistan on the eve of independence? The Quaid said what any statesman of his stature would have said. The fact is that the government in Pakistan — current and future — should make every effort to fulfil the promises made in that speech. That much is beyond doubt or debate.
As for the debate as to whether the Quaid wanted Pakistan to be an Islamic state or not, it was at that particular time beyond even the Quaid’s control. When the All-India Muslim League had lost the 1936-37 elections, the Quaid and the League both faced much ridicule at the hands of Congress leaders. Their claim of the League being a representative of all Muslims in India had failed to clear the electoral test.
Until then the League was a party of the elite Muslim classes. To make it popular among the masses then eventually became a matter of survival. In this endeavour, the Quaid contacted Muslim clerics and scholars in India. It was only when these people started campaigning wholeheartedly for the League that the Pakistan movement really got its legs to run the marathon that it needed to run. As a result, the League won the 1946 elections, and the Quaid was accepted as the sole spokesperson for the Muslims of India. Besides, the riots that started in 1946 and continued till partition were also solely on religious grounds.
Keeping in mind all such facts, how could the Quaid even imagine trying to change his stance regarding the nature of the newly-established state of Pakistan? The Quaid was a principled man of international stature. Thus, he knew it all very well that there was no going back.
DR TARIQ MAHMOOD KHAN
KARACHI
