AT PENPOINT
The arrest of a retired lieutenant-general should not have political repercussions, but the arrest of Lt Ge (retd) Faiz Hameed has been important enough to cause a revision of political calculations to the extent that it now seems the government, with the tacit consent of the establishment, is now proceeding to a course of action which will involve PTI chief Imran Khan facing legal proceedings for his role in the May 9 attacks on military installations.
It is perhaps unsettling enough that a former DC ISI and a former corps commander should be court-martialed, but that that court martial should be a preliminary in the trial of a former Prime Minister is perhaps equally unsettling. Perhaps most unsettling of all is the charge that either could be suspected of trying to overthrow the current order.
General Faiz is being tried under a Supreme Court order, for misusing his official powers as DG ISI to interfere with the First City Housing Society, using subordinate officers. That is the accusation for which he is being court-martialed, but it is the political charges that are causing more interest.
Court martials differ from ordinary trials in that the prosecution is usually in a much better position. Charges are brought after a board of enquiry, which duly considers evidence, and comes to a conclusion expressed in its finding. If it recommends penalty within the competence of the commanding officer such as reduction in rank of a non-commissioned officer, that will be imposed, However, major penalties require that conviction must be by a court martial competent to pass a sentence. Court Martials usually follow the enquiries, with the result that they lead to fewer acquittals than civilian criminal courts, which view the process of enquiry (carried out by the police) with deep suspicion.
General Faiz is being tried by a Field General Court Martial, rather than a General Court Martial. While a GCM quires at least five officers, an FGCM requires only three. Also, a GCM can only be convened by the Chief of Army Staff, but an FGCM can be convened by any officer of or above the rank of brigadier, who commands a portion of the Army. This is relevant to the paperwork involved, because the convening officer is also responsible for confirming both the findings and the sentence.
The FGCM mechanism is meant for wartime, when it may not be possible to assemble five officers, who all have held commissions for at least three years, and four are least captains. It will be easier to assemble three lieutenants fresh out of the Academy or Officers Training School, which is all that is needed to convene an FGCM. Those are the Courts martial which try such offences as desertion, sleeping on sentry duty and cowardice in the face of the enemy. There are other types of court martials, with a limited power of sentencing, and thus meant for relatively minor offences, but FGCMs have no limit on their power of sentencing, which means they are competent to try any offence
The charge General Faiz faces, that of conduct unbecoming, carries a jail sentence, but charges for the May 9 incident, may carry the death sentence if they include any attempt to persuade officers or men to mutiny.
More than the political charges, the First City charges should make it something of a relief that General Faiz was not appointed COAS. His interest in First City is alleged to be because of his brother Najaf, now retired as a naib tehsildar.
Whatever the final decision about the prosecutions, there cannot be any real doubt that General Faiz’s arrest and prosecution are momentous events. At the same time, it should not be thought that there was a political motive. The purpose is accountability, something the military has always been firm on, even if other institutions have been lax.
The parallel with Gen Aziz Ahmed of the Bangladesh Army is unmistakable. General Aziz, who was COAS from 2028 to 2021, also had brothers, the most prominent being Tufail Ahmad Joseph, who was convicted of murder in 2017, and pardoned in 2018, after his brother became COAS. There were two other brothers, who are abroad and not coming to Bangladesh because they are wanted by the Bangladesh Police. According to a TV documentary they busily arranged for contracts for the Bangladesh Army. While the resemblance is there, it would be a mistake to think Najaf Hameed as anything but a law-abiding government official, or to resemble Tufail Ahmad in any way. It should be made clear that General Faiz’s family is not one of habitual criminals, as General Aziz’s is.
However, while the First City case is of interest to those directly involved, the May 9 cases have more general interest attached to them. General Faiz being charged in those cases would mean that there has been an enquiry, and the charges are brought with full consideration of their implications. In this case, the conspiracy would not stop at General Hameed, but would reach Imran.
It is worth noting that his trial by court martial has not been precluded, on either the First City or May 9 charges. The Supreme Court had acted to prevent trials of civilians by court martial for May 9 offences, which was a relief from which Imran also benefited, but not General Hameed.
Only two other officers of three-star rank have been executed after trial.
One dates back to the 18th century, and comes from a different service, Vice-Admiral John Byng, who was shot after a court martial convicted him of failing to pursue the French fleet at the 1756 Battle of Minoraca. Then there was Lt Gen Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov, the World War II Soviet Commander, who surrendered, and then deserted, raising a Russian Liberation Army to fight against the Red Army. He was captured in 1946, tried for treason and then hung.
Of course, General Faiz is not the first officer of his rank to be court-martialed. There have been at least two to precede him. Though there have been precedents of major-generals being court-martialled for attempted coups, if General Faiz is indeed tried for the May 9 incidents, it would be the first time a three-star officer would be tried for a political offence.
How justified is Imran’s fear that General Faiz would turn approver against him? He strongly suspects that that is what will happen, the most glaring evidence of which is that he has not sprung to the defence of General Faiz, stating that it is a matter of the Army’s internal accountability His having raised the prospect is also evidence. However, most of all, his experience of how his trusted Secretary, Azam Khan, deposed against him in the cipher case might have caused him to realize that while officials belonging to an institution might be faithful servants for a time, in the end, their loyalty would be to the institution.
One complication is that while General Faiz is liable to a court martial for any involvement he may have had in the May9 incidents, Imran might not be so liable. Another point wortyh considering is to what extent any recordings would be used. It has between made public that the UK’s Security Service (the MI5) had allowed spies to remain unprosecuted, because it did not want to produce its evidence, because it did not want the ‘óther’ (first the Germans, then the Nazis, and then the Soviets) to find out its capabilities. Some such scruples may prevail while Whatever the final decision about the prosecutions, there cannot be any real doubt that General Faiz’s arrest and prosecution are momentous events. At the same time, it should not be thought thst there was a political motive. The purpose is accountability, something the military has always been firm on, even if other institutions have been lax considering any prosecution of either Faiz Hameed or Imran Khan.
Whatever the final decision about the prosecutions, there cannot be any real doubt that General Faiz’s arrest and prosecution are momentous events. At the same time, it should not be thought that there was a political motive. The purpose is accountability, something the military has always been firm on, even if other institutions have been lax.
