By: Muhammad Abdullah-Al-Mamun
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) stands as a testament to China’s growing geopolitical and economic footprint across all continents, and perhaps no region better exemplifies its strategic utility than the Middle East (Arabian Peninsula or Gulf region). The BRI is considered a counter strategy against the USA and Western Countries.
China’s infrastructural ambitions in the Middle East— a region characterized by geopolitical complexities, economic potential, and varying degrees of infrastructural development— align seamlessly with its BRI objectives. The cooperation between two, such as China and Middle Eastern, countries under this framework explains the symbiotic relationship between infrastructure development and geopolitical influence, all within the evolving contours of global power dynamics.
Therefore, based on the above, the China-Middle East infrastructure partnership, framed by the BRI, represents a critical juncture in the geopolitics of infrastructure. As of today, by focusing on tangible, high-impact projects that address the region’s most pressing needs, China has already positioned itself as a key player in the region, though mainly in the realm of economic landscape. Yet, this success is contingent on a careful balancing act—managing the region’s political volatility, staying ahead of international competition (China-USA conflict, USA-Russia conflict, USA-Iran, China-India crisis, Russia-Ukraine war), and ensuring that its investments deliver long-term value. Under prudent leadership, if China can address or curb these challenges, the BRI’s legacy in the Middle East might very well become one of the 21st century’s defining geopolitical narratives
Infrastructure, long recognized as a critical pillar of economic productivity and societal advancement, forms the backbone of China’s outreach efforts in the Arab region. The region, which has historically grappled with underdeveloped infrastructure —despite its immense natural resources —presents China with an opportunity: one that allows Beijing to leverage its engineering expertise and financial muscle to engage with Middle Eastern states economically, while subtly deepening its political and diplomatic clout.
China’s cooperation with the Middle East is not a recent phenomenon; in fact, the region was one of the first to establish infrastructure partnerships with China following the latter’s economic opening. Over time, this cooperation evolved from simple subcontracting endeavors to far more complex modes of engagement, including Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC), and Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The BRI has improved these dynamics, with infrastructure development now forming a cornerstone of the productivity cooperation between China and Middle Eastern nations.
What makes this relationship particularly compelling is the convergence of needs: Middle Eastern states, especially those undergoing post-war reconstruction or economic diversification, desperately require infrastructure investment. Meanwhile, China, eager to project its influence and economic interests globally, views the Middle East as an untapped market with strategic importance. This alignment has catalyzed cooperation in key sectors such as transportation, power engineering, and housing construction, with Chinese enterprises playing leading roles.
From a strategic perspective, China’s involvement in the Middle East under the BRI framework transcends mere economic collaboration. Infrastructure development serves as a soft-power tool, fostering goodwill and creating long-term dependencies that benefit Beijing in other realms, including political alliances and security partnerships. For Middle Eastern states— particularly those with limited internal resources or political stability— the influx of Chinese capital and expertise represents a lifeline, enabling them to pursue ambitious development goals without the stringent political conditions often imposed by Western nations or international institutions.
However, this relationship is not without its challenges. The Middle East remains a volatile region, where political instability, sectarian violence, and economic shocks frequently disrupt long-term projects. For Chinese enterprises, navigating this landscape requires a delicate balance of risk management and strategic foresight. In addition to the geopolitical risks, Chinese firms also face competition from other international players like the USA and Western countries, particularly in sectors where profit margins are thin, such as housing and transportation infrastructure. Additionally, rising protectionism within some Middle Eastern states, coupled with stringent import controls, adds another layer of complexity to the operating environment for Chinese firms.
Despite these obstacles, China’s comparative advantages— ranging from financial resources to technological prowess— continue to give it a competitive edge. Notably, Chinese enterprises have successfully transitioned from being subcontractors to major players in the broader infrastructure ecosystem. This shift, exemplified by high-profile projects such as the Doha Metro in Qatar and various power plants in Saudi Arabia, reflects China’s growing expertise in managing large-scale projects that encompass planning, design, procurement, and construction.
The Middle East’s infrastructural challenges are manifold: weak transportation networks, outdated energy grids, and inadequate social infrastructure have hampered the region’s economic integration and global trade competitiveness. Chinese investment, through the BRI framework, seeks to address these bottlenecks, not only by building physical infrastructure but also by fostering local capacity and improving governance frameworks. The World Bank’s findings— that every $1 billion in infrastructure investment generates over 100,000 jobs in the Middle East— underscore the socio-economic benefits of this cooperation, particularly in regions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, where job creation and economic diversification are top priorities.
One area where China has made significant strides is in energy infrastructure— a sector where the Middle East holds unparalleled importance as the world’s leading energy producer. Despite the downturn in oil prices and reduced capital investment in recent years, energy projects remain central to China’s strategy. Moreover, the advent of high-tech cooperation— encompassing sectors like nuclear energy and satellite technology— demonstrates that Sino-Middle Eastern relations are not limited to traditional industries, but are expanding into cutting-edge fields that will shape the future of global energy markets.
Still, the road ahead is not without challenges. The decline in global oil prices, political unrest in key states like Iraq and Syria, and the broader uncertainties within the global economy have introduced new risks. For China, mitigating these risks requires not just financial and technical prowess but also an acute understanding of the political dynamics at play. The rise of local infrastructure companies, bolstered by government protectionism, adds further competitive pressure, forcing Chinese firms to continuously innovate and adapt their business models.
Ultimately, the success of China’s infrastructure cooperation with the Middle East under the BRI will depend on its ability to navigate these complex and often contradictory forces. The economic potential is vast, but so are the risks. However, if China can maintain its strategic focus—prioritizing long-term partnerships, diversifying its portfolio of projects, and leveraging multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—it stands to pointedly augment its influence in the region, while simultaneously fostering development and stability.
Therefore, based on the above, the China-Middle East infrastructure partnership, framed by the BRI, represents a critical juncture in the geopolitics of infrastructure. As of today, by focusing on tangible, high-impact projects that address the region’s most pressing needs, China has already positioned itself as a key player in the region, though mainly in the realm of economic landscape. Yet, this success is contingent on a careful balancing act—managing the region’s political volatility, staying ahead of international competition (China-USA conflict, USA-Russia conflict, USA-Iran, China-India crisis, Russia-Ukraine war), and ensuring that its investments deliver long-term value. Under prudent leadership, if China can address or curb these challenges, the BRI’s legacy in the Middle East might very well become one of the 21st century’s defining geopolitical narratives.
The writer is Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He can be reached: [email protected]
