Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the relationship between India and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) has been fraught with complexity. Cultural, historical, and geographical ties between the two nations are undeniable, but these shared bonds have often been overshadowed by political tensions and mistrust. The situation has worsened in recent times, particularly under the Yunus-led interim government in Bangladesh. With Islamist groups gaining significant influence, the persecution of the Hindu minority has reached alarming levels. This hostility toward Hindus culminated in the arrest of Chinmaya Das, a prominent leader of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), on treason charges. This single act has not only inflamed communal tensions but also put India’s ruling BJP government under immense pressure to respond decisively. As emotions spiral on both sides, the prospect of an all-out confrontation appears imminent.
In recent months, several critical issues have brought the relationship between India and Bangladesh to a breaking point. The systematic targeting of the Hindu community in Bangladesh has been a growing concern for India. Under the Yunus government, groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Hizbut Tahrir have gained unprecedented power, creating an environment where minority communities live in fear. Attacks on Hindu temples, homes, and businesses have become alarmingly frequent. The government’s failure to address these atrocities— or worse, its complicity— has drawn widespread condemnation.
The arrest of Chinmaya Das marked a particularly egregious escalation. Das, a respected figure within ISKCON, was accused of treason, fueling accusations that the Bangladeshi government is actively working to suppress Hindu voices. This move, accompanied by demands from Islamist groups to ban ISKCON altogether, has been perceived in India as an affront to religious freedom and a direct challenge to its influence in the region.
Adding to these tensions is the role of Pakistan in the ongoing crisis. Reports suggest that some Pakistani diplomats stationed in Dhaka have been aligning themselves with radical Islamist groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami and others\ Islamist parties. These groups, while lacking widespread public support, are being used to destabilize the political landscape and embolden extremist factions. This interference has further been considered as a misstep of politics to the experts.
The crisis took another turn on December 1, when the Bangladeshi consulate in Agartala, India, was attacked by a mob allegedly linked to the BJP. The incident sparked outrage across Bangladesh, leading to nationwide protests and stern diplomatic responses from Dhaka. The following day, the All Tripura Hotel and Restaurant Owners Association announced a boycott of Bangladeshi tourists, highlighting the growing hostility at the grassroots level.
The current tensions between India and Bangladesh can be traced back to longstanding issues in their bilateral relationship. India’s consistent reliance on the Awami League as its primary ally in Bangladesh has been a significant misstep. By placing all its trust in a single party, India has alienated other political factions and much of the Bangladeshi populace. This one-dimensional strategy has fostered anti-Indian sentiment, particularly among the younger generation.
India must rethink its one-sided reliance on the Awami League and engage more broadly with Bangladeshi society. Building relationships with the people, rather than just political elites, is crucial for fostering goodwill. Bangladesh, on its part, must address the legitimate concerns of its Hindu minority and curb the influence of extremist groups.
Sheikh Hasina’s government, often perceived as overly compliant with India’s demands, has further exacerbated this resentment. Many in Bangladesh believe that Hasina’s regime has prioritized Indian interests over national sovereignty, providing concessions in trade, water sharing, and security cooperation. This perception has fueled movements like “India Out,” which, notably, have been driven by ordinary citizens rather than political parties.
India’s diplomatic approach has also been flawed. While it often touts its role in Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971 as a gesture of altruism, many in Bangladesh now view this intervention as primarily serving India’s strategic interests in weakening Pakistan. This narrative has gained traction among the post-liberation generation, eroding the goodwill that once defined the relationship.
The escalating crisis has triggered retaliatory actions from both sides. In Bangladesh, the attack on its consulate in Agartala has been met with a stern diplomatic response and widespread public protests. Demonstrators in Dhaka have condemned India’s perceived hegemonic behavior, accusing it of undermining Bangladesh’s sovereignty.
In India, the rhetoric has been equally heated. The boycott of Bangladeshi tourists by Tripura’s hospitality sector is a symbolic but impactful gesture of discontent. Meanwhile, Hindutva groups and BJP supporters have intensified their calls for action against the Yunus government, amplifying the narrative of Hindu persecution in Bangladesh.
The media in both countries has played a significant role in stoking these tensions. Indian outlets have focused on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh, painting a picture of a government that is openly hostile to its minority communities. Rumours of potential Indian responses, ranging from surgical strikes to boycotting trade, have further fuelled the fire. On the other hand, Bangladeshi media has framed the unrest as a justified backlash against Indian interference, portraying its citizens as standing up to a regional bully.
The current trajectory of Indo-Bangladeshi relations has far-reaching implications. Economically, both countries stand to lose from a prolonged crisis. Bangladesh’s reliance on India for medical treatment, trade and tourism is significant, and any disruption in these sectors would harm its economy. India, too, benefits from its economic ties with Bangladesh, particularly in terms of exports and labor resources.
Socially, the growing mistrust threatens to sever the people-to-people connections that have long been a cornerstone of the relationship. Anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh, particularly among the youth, risks creating a generational divide that will be difficult to bridge. Similarly, anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric in India could marginalize migrant communities and exacerbate communal tensions.
The security implications are equally concerning. The rise of radical Islamist groups in Bangladesh, combined with retaliatory actions by India, could lead to cross-border threats, including terrorism, smuggling, and refugee crises.
India and Bangladesh are at a crossroads. Their shared history and cultural ties should ideally serve as a foundation for collaboration, but political missteps and mutual distrust have brought them to the brink of conflict. To avoid an all-out confrontation, both nations must prioritize dialogue and seek common ground.
India must rethink its one-sided reliance on the Awami League and engage more broadly with Bangladeshi society. Building relationships with the people, rather than just political elites, is crucial for fostering goodwill. Bangladesh, on its part, must address the legitimate concerns of its Hindu minority and curb the influence of extremist groups.
