Pakistan was born with its heart divided, separated by nearly 1600 km of hostile territory. Following over a century of British East India Company rule and another 90 years under the British Raj, the Subcontinent finally gained independence. What should have been a triumphant culmination of decades of anti-colonial struggle, however, was marred by unimaginable violence, bloodshed, and profound economic, political and social upheaval.
While one might point to the arbitrarily drawn borders crafted by British lawyer Sir Cyril Radcliffe— who, with just five weeks to redraw South Asia’s boundaries, had little knowledge of the region— there are other factors to consider. The growing tensions between Hindu and Muslim nationalism, as well as the British divide-and-rule policies, further exacerbated the divide. In East Pakistan, conditions worsened in comparison to West Pakistan, setting the stage for the eventual birth of Bangladesh. While mistakes were made in handling the situation, Pakistan’s prolonged silence following Bangladesh’s independence allowed biased narratives and distorted facts to take root, blurring the lines between truth and fiction. This article seeks to challenge those myths with facts, providing clarity on the historical realities that have often been obscured.
The importance of the Two-Nation Theory is further strengthened by the growing persecution of Muslims and other minorities in India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, inspired by RSS and the Hindutva ideology, has successfully proven the validity of Two-Nation Theory. The words of the Quaid-i-Azam accurately describe the current situation in India, “The Hindu Mahasabha wants to treat Muslims like Jews in Germany”. As Pakistan acknowledges the past and the role of East Pakistanis in the independence struggle, it is time to move forward, building a future of friendship and prosperity between Pakistan and Bangladesh
Before independence, East Bengal was significantly underdeveloped compared to West Bengal. It was the poorest region in undivided Bengal, with the lowest levels of urbanization, industrialization, literacy, and electrical power capacity. At the time of partition, East Bengal had only 314 out of 1,414 factories in the entire province, most of which were owned by Hindu industrialists like the Tatas, Birlas, and Dalmias, who shut down their businesses when Pakistan was formed. East Bengal lacked jute mills, with raw jute being exported to India for processing. However, by the 1950s, with investments from West Pakistan, East Bengal emerged as the largest producer of jute. The Pakistani government, through organizations like the PIDC and PICIC, encouraged industrial investments in East Pakistan, with families like the Ispahanis leading the way. During President Ayub Khan’s industrialization era, infrastructure developments, including the Chittagong Port and railway networks, were made possible with central government support.
A common myth suggests that West Pakistan imposed Urdu as the national language on its diverse regions. When Pakistan gained independence, each province had its own language, and Urdu, already a common lingua franca among Muslims of the subcontinent, was chosen as the official language, as envisioned by Quaid-i-Azam. This did not mean the suppression of regional languages. In fact, the government addressed East Pakistan’s concerns by recognizing Bengali alongside Urdu in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions.
Another myth is the notion that Bengalis were systematically excluded from civil services. In fact, representation of Bengalis in civil services grew significantly, reaching 40.9% by 1969, with 60% of positions in 1966 specifically allocated to East Pakistan. Furthermore, the myth surrounding Operation Searchlight—allegedly launched against innocent civilians—fails to account for the violent uprisings that necessitated such actions. The Awami League’s militants instigated widespread violence, prompting the military to restore order.
Lastly, the claim of a “three million genocide” has been thoroughly debunked by scholars, including Syed Karim and Abdul Mu’min Chowdhury, who found no evidence to support such inflated numbers. Research suggests that the actual number of deaths during the conflict ranged between 50,000 and 100,000.
Mukti Bahini, the armed militia trained and supported by India, were the main perpetrators of horrific crimes in 1971. By late 1970, they had begun targeting key infrastructure, such as power plants, railways, industries, and bridges, while also looting banks, raiding warehouses, and killing non-Bengalis. The violence was especially directed at non-Bengalis, particularly Biharis, and over 2,000 were slaughtered. Biharis were burned alive in buildings, guillotined in jute mills, and thrown into rivers, turning the waters red with the blood of their victims. According to American professor Rudolph Rummel, around 150,000 Biharis were massacred in this bloodbath. Hundreds of West Pakistanis, including army officers, were also killed in Mymensingh Cantonment, where East Pakistan’s military personnel revolted and murdered their colleagues, while Bengali mobs hunted down those trying to escape.
The myth that 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered has been widely circulated, but the true strength of Pakistan’s fighting force was just 45,000 troops, which included infantry, police, rangers, and militia. The 93,000 figure was inflated by including non-combatants like civilians and military support staff.
Another myth that India’s intervention was humanitarian, unplanned, and spontaneous is far from the truth. India’s involvement was strategic and premeditated, with plans drawn up in consultation with the Awami League leadership. The Indian military had been preparing for months, funding and training Mukti Bahini fighters, even before launching direct intervention. Lastly, the myth that Pakistan’s army did not fight valiantly is disproven by numerous acts of heroism, like those of Major Shabir Sharif who displayed exceptional courage in the face of overwhelming odds. The Pakistani military’s efforts in 1971, though overshadowed by the eventual surrender, should not be forgotten.
The creation of Bangladesh did not happen on religious lines, it happened due to political differences, fueled by bad decisions, regional politics, and mistrust. Moreover, the negation of the Two-Nation Theory would mean that after seceding from Pakistan, Bangladesh would merge into India, which it did not.
The importance of the Two-Nation Theory is further strengthened by the growing persecution of Muslims and other minorities in India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, inspired by RSS and the Hindutva ideology, has successfully proven the validity of Two-Nation Theory. The words of the Quaid-i-Azam accurately describe the current situation in India, “The Hindu Mahasabha wants to treat Muslims like Jews in Germany”. As Pakistan acknowledges the past and the role of East Pakistanis in the independence struggle, it is time to move forward, building a future of friendship and prosperity between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
