AT PENPOINT
That the PTI and the government have begun talks is something of a boon, reflecting the depths to which Pakistan politics have sunk. It also reflects both the government’s feeling that it cannot bring stability to the country without some sort of agreement with the PTI, and the PTI’s that it cannot achieve its immediate goals without talking to the government.
That talks are happening are an indication of the government’s success. The PTI has itself overcome its objections to talks, which centred on three issues: First, the government consists of thieves and dacoits. Second, the government has not come to office by winning elections, but by an unholy alliance with the establishment. Third, talks must be held with the establishment, in particular the military establishment, not with the government, because it cannot deliver anything.
By engaging in talks, the PTI may not have changed its mind about the government’s being a bunch of thieves and dacoits, or about being robbed at election time, but it has tacitly conceded that the government can deliver something. It may feel that its only means of negotiating with the establishment, as it wants to do, is by talking to the government. It has conceded the government agency, and at least the ability to communicate the PTI’s demands the establishment, with which it is supposed to be hand in glove.
It can also be assumed that the PTI has been conveyed that it cannot talk to the establishment, though it may simply be that these talks are ‘public talks’ meant to conceal ‘private talks’. The government side seems to be somewhat hesitant about these talks, with Senator Irfan Siddiqui, one of the negotiators, having gone on record as saying that PTI founder Imran Khan could sabotage the talks.
This is not really an angry statement. It reflects past experience. Some of the initial reaction to the talks decision among PML(N) supporters might explain why. The ill-concealed glee that was displayed that the PTI had climbed down from its uncompromising stance might explain Imran’s reluctance to talk. Imran had made it a selling point that he did not talk to looters and plunderers. He had portrayed himself as so uncompromising a crusader against evil politicians that he would not even talk to them.
Talking to them might mean compromising with some of his base. This might show that traditional politicians are seen as exploitative, transactional and able to talk the hind leg off a donkey. Thus, speaking with them is seen as not just contaminating, but also unwise. Enough people had realized that their relationship with their representatives was transactional for them to want to replace it with a better relationship. With Imran? Yes, but only if he didn’t become one of them.
But if the PTI does talk to the forces of evil, where is the poor loyalist supposed to go? He is left with loyalty to Imran. This is not going to be enough for many. After all, Imran was supposed to stand for something. What? That would be difficult to answer, but a rejection of the mainstream political parties was one of them.
All conflicts end with talks, even wars. Even the 1971 surrender in East Pakistan was preceded the evening before by talks. Even World War II was ended by the signing of surrenders, first by the Germans, then the Japanese, but in each case preceded by talks just before. Though the PTI disdained talking to thieves and dacoits, it took part in talks with them, in the shape of parliamentary debates. Previously, it had refused to talk to the government without Imran being released. Now even that has been put on the table.
Neither the PPP nor the PML(N) supporter has got such a problem. Both have talked to the other, concluded a Charter of Democracy, and are presently in alliance. Whatever damage the parties were supposed to have suffered, they have, as their leaders have constantly expressed a desire to talk to the PTI, there is hardly any objection.
One of the concomitants of talks is the cessation of actions. The PTI has found itself stymied on two fronts. Now that Mr Justice Mansoor Ali Shah will not become Chief Justice, its hopes from the courts have faded. On the other hand, such is the nature of the cases against Imran and others, that prosecutions have been failing on appellate courts.
The problem the government faces is that courts demand evidence. Even if the judge is morally convinced, he can only rule on the evidence that has been placed before him. It has thus become difficult to keep on holding Imran. The postponements of the decision in the Al-Qadir Trust Reference to a date beyond the next meeting of the committee meeting on January 2. Transparently, the verdict is being held off till then. That case not only involves Imran, but also his wife, who had earlier been arrested, but was only recently bailed.
He is not the only person in legal trouble. KP CM Ali Amin Gandapur was absent from the meeting, which was explained away by a Cabinet meeting he had to attend, but he is also wanted in both May 9 cases, as well as the November 26 rally. Leader of the Opposition Gohar Ayub was also absent appearing in a case. Three members on the government side were also absent, none in connection with a case,
The sentences pronounced on May 9 accused in connection with the May 9 attacks also indicate that there is an attempt to tidy up things for a final settlement. So far, 85 of those accused have been convicted and sentenced. This could render one of the PTI demands, the release of its workers, more difficult. It is progressively more difficult to release an accused (no problem), an under-trial (bail by the trial court) and a convict (bail by the trial court, but what if it no longer exists? Courts martial are dissolved.)
One of the main accused in the May 9 cases, Imran himself, has not yet gone on trial, though his nephew has been convicted and sentenced to 10 years in jail. As long as the talks continue, his trial will probably not take place.
The PTI’s quid pro quo has been not to place a date on the civil disobedience Imran had announced. So far, it has held two rallies in Islamabad, cancelling one. The result has apparently been to convince the government that the PTI is to be heard out. The next meeting is supposed to be devoted to a consideration of a PTI Charter of Demands, but the PTI is probably not going to change much the demands expressed at the committee meeting, which were the release of PTI workers, including Imran; judicial enquiries into both the May 9 and November 26 incidents.
The indications are that both sides have become tired, and have run out of options. Talks are perhaps merely a sign that the rest of the life of the Parliament is to remain under the present government. However, some path of bringing the PTI to a more normal politics is being sought. The government and the establishment seems to be tired of the PTI announcing a protest whenever there are foreign visitors around. One protest (at the time of the SCO protest) was cancelled, the other (at the time of the Belarusian President’s visit) held. After that, only the civil disobedience call was left. The last time Imran issued such a call, before he took the government, it went nowhere.
All conflicts end with talks, even wars. Even the 1971 surrender in East Pakistan was preceded the evening before by talks. Even World War II was ended by the signing of surrenders, first by the Germans, then the Japanese, but in each case preceded by talks just before. Though the PTI disdained talking to thieves and dacoits, it took part in talks with them, in the shape of parliamentary debates. Previously, it had refused to talk to the government without Imran being released. Now even that has been put on the table.
