AT PENPOINT
The talks between the government and the PTI could have hit a snag because of the sentencing by military convicts of 85 persons accused of involvement in the May 9 incidents, and as there is no breakdown, that would itself indicate that there have been preliminary talks, in which it was agreed that the PTI would not resist the process of punishment of those who had taken part in those attacks.
The convictions may have been an inevitability after the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench allowed the announcement of those decisions, after they had initially been stopped on the grounds that the military courts had no business trying civilians. However, the effect of social media was probably unexpected, True. when it came to choosing between Imran and the armed forces, some chose Imran. That might have been true for many of those who escaped punishment, but many of those involved posted videos of themselves in action on social media.
The motive of those videos was probably to catch the eye of the party Chairman, but it provided evidence against them. In a way, it is a little like what some Israeli soldiers are doing in Gaza: posting videos of their misdeeds there, and incidentally providing evidence of war crimes.
If the perpetrators of the attacks had refrained from making those videos, they might have escaped punishment, because there might have been some difficulty in pinning responsibility on them, as that would have depended on other evidence, rather than the readymade videos that were at hand. The role of those videos in building opinion against them was also considerable.
One of the issues raised in the inaugural session of the government-PTI talks was the fate of all political prisoners. Of course, in the realpolitik of negotiation, no obstacle is going to be insuperable, but there is going to be a difference when negotiating about prisoners who are waiting trial, or undergoing it, and those who have been convicted and sentenced, and are now serving that sentence.
Though the PTI has for the time being equated Imran and the other workers, that equation no longer exists, not that it ever really had. For a start, Imran has successfully resisted attempts to put him in military custody. He has also so far avoided undergoing trial by court martial. As for the cases against him in an anti-terrorist court, he has succeeded in obtaining bail. The convictions has relieved some of the pressure on him, because it means that the perpetrators of the May 9 attacks, especially those who posted videos of themselves and thus outraged opinion within the military and among the families of the martyrs whose monuments were desecrated, had been punished. However, the course of the talks will demonstrate whether enough has been done.
Now the talks are taking place, with the PTI getting postponement of the presentation of demands, which it will at the next meeting, which will take place after a PTI team meets Imran in jail. At least now he is meeting political subordinates, which had been prevented before. At least that has been gained. One step at a time.
It should be remembered that the May 9 attacks were not merely an attack on an institution, but have been interpreted as an attempt to challenge its discipline and chain of command. Fixing responsibility on Imran would involve demonstrating how May 9 was planned as an insurrection. It should be remembered that institutional pressure would exist for such a fixing of responsibility, and the leadership of the institution may find itself merely acting as a conduit for that pressure.
This creates a problem, especially for the government negotiators. The fate of Imran or the military court convicts cannot become bargaining chips, but have to take due effect. This is problematic also for the PTI, for while it may conceivably throw the May 9 convicts under the bus in return for Imran being treated leniently, what if Imran cannot be treated leniently? What incentive does the PTI have to keep negotiating?
In the second round, the demands were basically two, both of them combining two demands together. By merging the release of Imran and the others, the PTI is apparently making two points: first, no one is being thrown under the bus; second, the óthers’re not just can on fodder for Imran. The second point is more aimed at the PTI cadres, about whom it is being assumed that leaving workers in jail will cause disaffection,
The PTI’s purpose of negotiation is to get Imran released, not because he has been broken by the experience, but because there seems no other path to power. Because his release is necessary for grabbing the attention of the establishment, the need is being felt to place the blame for two incidents away from the PTI. That is perhaps why there is a single judicial commission being asked for the May 9 and November 26 incidents. One is something the PTI claims it didn’t do, for it has made obvious the analysis that the establishment was guilty, through agents provocateurs, of the attacks on military installations. As for November 26, the PTI is still adamant, and though it has moderated the number of dead from ‘hundreds’ to 12, it still insists that the crowd at D Chowk was fired upon by military personnel. The government says that no one died, and there was no firing by the military.
The insistence on a judicial commission must be seen in the light of the many lawyers who have risen to prominence within the PTI. This might also be seen as a form of pressure on the military, because even if there is not a word of truth in the allegations, there could still be a large number of officers summoned, and even if they do not help the PTI case, they would be thoroughly inconvenienced. This might seem as purposeless as it is childish, but the PTI has yet to prove it is above such childishness. (The PTI is hardly an exception among political parties in this.)
Thus it seems the judicial commission mechanism is the PTI’s attempt to do what it has been unable to do so far, which is talk with the military. At the same time, and at this stage, it might prove a useful bargaining chip to be discarded if the government agrees to Imran’s release.
However, it remains to be seen what the government wants from the negotiations. It should be seen that the government has become a victim of its own success. It has so far resisted all opposition efforts to topple it, to the extent that it has presided over a decline in inflation, and over an economy that seems out of the woods, and which may be looking up.
However, it has found the PTI staging occasional protests, Even though it has survived them, it is probably afraid that the fuss surrounding that protest may well spook investors. The incoming Trump Administration and the EU have apparently applied pressure, and both are powers that the government listens to. The civil disobedience protest of the PTI seems to have dissipated, which can be counted a success of the government.
This disappearance can also be seen as a relief to the PTI. The idea was floated after the now-or-never rally on November 26 ended at D Chowk with protesters being teargassed. But what if it failed to spring Imran, as seemed likely.
Now the talks are taking place, with the PTI getting postponement of the presentation of demands, which it will at the next meeting, which will take place after a PTI team meets Imran in jail. At least now he is meeting political subordinates, which had been prevented before. At least that has been gained. One step at a time.
