In February 2025, Pakistani Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar is scheduled to visit Bangladesh, which is going to be the first visit of any Pakistani foreign minister to Bangladesh since 2012. In fact, since the July Uprising of 2024, there have been lots of speculations about renewed ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan in the media and in popular imagination. However, Dhaka should develop its political, military-strategic, economic, and cultural ties with Islamabad in a realistic, pragmatic, and calculative manner.
The extensive support for the cause of Pakistan among the Bengali Muslims proved crucial to the success of the Pakistan Movement, and Muslim statesmen from Bengal, such as Abul Kasim Fazlul Haque, Hussein Shahid Suhrawardy, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Akram Khan, and Abul Hashim, played leading roles in the creation of Pakistan. Between 1947 and 1971, Bangladesh, then known as East Bengal (1947–1955) and East Pakistan (1955–1971), constituted the eastern wing of Pakistan, and contained around 56 percent of Pakistan’s population. Yet, Pakistan’s political power was concentrated in the geographically larger but demographically smaller western wing of Pakistan, known as West Pakistan between 1955 and 1971. During this period, the people of East Bengal/East Pakistan were subjected to extreme levels of discrimination in the political-administrative, economic-financial, cultural, and military-security spheres. In 1970, the military-controlled Pakistani government and West Pakistani political actors refused to hand over political power to the victors of the first Pakistani general elections, the East Pakistan-centric Awami League.
Instead, the Pakistani government launched a brutal crackdown, codenamed Operation Searchlight, on the Bengalis on 25 March 1971, sparking off the Bangladeshi Liberation War. During the war, Pakistani forces indiscriminately killed hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis, engaged in mass rapes of Bengali women, and forced some 10 million Bangladeshis to take shelter in India. Eventually, the Bangladesh Forces, with substantial Indian assistance, waged a successful insurgency against the Pakistanis, and the successful operations of the Indo–Bangladeshi joint forces in November–December resulted in the surrender of the Pakistani forces in Dhaka on 16 December 1971. Thus, Bangladesh obtained independence from Pakistan and the latter recognized Bangladesh’s independence in February 1974.
Following the war, a number of issues, including the refusal of Pakistan to apologize unconditionally for its atrocities in 1971, to implement a fair division of the assets of the former united Pakistan and to repatriate hundreds of thousands of stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh, continued to plague Pakistani–Bangladeshi relations. After the coup d’état of 15 August 1975, ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan gradually improved to a certain extent, but between 2009 and 2024, relations were again strained. Meanwhile, the issue of the division of assets has largely disappeared from public discourse over the decades, while Bangladesh has granted citizenships to the stranded Pakistanis born after 1971, making the issue of repatriation considerably less salient. Yet, the issue of apology continues to surface from time to time.
At present, Bangladesh and Pakistan share no territorial dispute, geopolitical rivalry, or economic competition. Only the complicated history of 1971 presents a sphere of friction between the two states. Following the fall of the Awami League-controlled government on 5 August 2024, there have been increased calls for greater cooperation between the two states, and Dhaka and Islamabad have undertaken some steps in this regard. Yet, foreign policy should be determined by rational cost-benefit calculations and not by popular sentiment. Hence, Bangladesh should be realistic, pragmatic, and calculative in forging ties with Pakistan.
First, since the formation of the interim government has provided Dhaka and Islamabad a new opportunity to rejuvenate bilateral ties, the two countries should undertake steps to bury their historical hatchet once and for all. The Pakistani government should formally admit Pakistan’s responsibility for the atrocities of 1971, and sincerely apologize to the Bangladeshi people. Also, instead of focusing exclusively on the Indian factor, they should acknowledge the many injustices which caused Bangladesh to break away from Pakistan. On its part, if the Pakistani government issues a formal apology, Bangladesh should accept it with equanimity and bury the hatchet.
Second, while Bangladesh has granted citizenship to many stranded Pakistanis, tens of thousands of stranded Pakistanis remain without citizenship and under restrictions, with many still willing to return to Pakistan. Pakistan has a legal, moral, and humanitarian responsibility to repatriate its citizens from Bangladesh. If Pakistan repatriates these stranded Pakistanis, it will not only improve Pakistan’s image but also remove a persistent thorn in its bilateral relations with Bangladesh.
Third, the political changes in Bangladesh in the aftermath of the July Uprising of 2024 have resulted in rapid deterioration of ties between Bangladesh and India. In this context, improving military-strategic ties with Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, appears a natural step for Bangladesh. Yet the reality is more nuanced. Bangladesh, nearly India-locked except for its southern border, should not engage in open hostilities against India. The country should preserve its economic ties with India for its own benefits, while the two countries should maintain security dialogues to ensure border and internal security. Also, contrary to popular perceptions, if a war between Bangladesh and India breaks out, Pakistan is unlikely to intervene on behalf of Bangladesh owing to its continuing economic troubles, the possibility of a destructive nuclear war, and the marginal role of Bangladesh in Pakistan’s overall security dynamics. Hence, a formal military alliance between Bangladesh and Pakistan is practically unfeasible.
Hence, the two countries can enhance military-strategic cooperation without entangling themselves into formal alliances. Pakistan has the potential to provide Bangladesh with weapon systems and ammunition, contributing to the diversification of Bangladesh’s arsenal. Also, the two states can host joint military exercises, initiate training programmes for each other’s military personnel, and engage in mutually beneficial information-sharing.
Fourth, the Pakistani–Bangladeshi trade volume currently stands at $782 million, with the balance of trade heavily favouring Pakistan. Recently, Dhaka and Islamabad have undertaken some steps, including the opening of direct shipping routes, to enhance their trade ties. The two countries should build on these measures and aim initially at a $1 billion annual bilateral trade turnover. The two states should remove undue tariff and non-tariff barriers over each other’s goods. Pakistan can be an important source of raw materials and intermediate goods for Bangladesh, while the latter can export a number of goods, including jute and medicines, to Pakistan. Also, Bangladesh should aim at enlarging its export basket to Pakistan to reduce the huge trade imbalance between the two states.
Finally, Bangladesh and Pakistan should expand cultural cooperation through the exchange of students, the hosting of each other’s cultural exhibitions, the exposure of each other’s culture in their media, and the facilitation of joint scientific ventures. Also, the two countries should undertake steps to promote more tourism and greater people-to-people contacts. This would not only be economically beneficial for both but also help the Pakistani and Bangladeshi peoples to overcome their complex historical legacy.
Historical complexity has long prevented Bangladesh and Pakistan from forging comprehensive and mutually beneficial ties with each other. However, the July Uprising has ushered in a new era in Bangladesh, and taking into account current geopolitical circumstances, the country should carefully cultivate its ties with all potential partners, including Pakistan. Through addressing their complex historical experience, forging military-strategic ties without formal entanglements, and boosting economic and cultural interactions, the two South Asian states can develop a pragmatic and mutually beneficial partnership in the near future.
