The fifth wave of the Baloch insurgency began with the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006. Tribal groups initially led the movement, but it eventually expanded to include the middle class and educated segments of society. Bugti’s assassination led to the emergence of several insurgent groups. The ongoing insurgency has seen escalating violence, including attacks on military and law enforcement agencies, government installations, gas pipelines, targeted killings and hostage-takings.
Although multiple militant groups are involved in insurgency in Balochistan, the BLA and BLF have been responsible for numerous attacks in the province. The BLA is evolving from guerrilla warfare to sophisticated urban warfare, while the BLF remains focused on guerrilla warfare, ambushes, and attacks on developmental projects, primarily in Awaran, Panjgur, and Turbat. Notably, the BLA has a presence in both rural and urban centres, with a strong concentration in Baloch ethnic areas.
However, in 2017, the BLA experienced a significant split, when two of its members— Ustad Aslam Achu and Bashir Zaib— were expelled for violating group command rules. It led to the formation of a splinter group, also using the name BLA, which has since become one of the deadliest groups carrying out numerous militant activities. The splinter group is led by Bashir Zeb and has evolved into a sophisticated militant outfit with various wings, including the Fateh Squad, responsible for clearing the way for suicide bombers; the Majeed Brigade, which carries out suicide attacks; ZIRAB, functioning as the intelligence wing for data collection and analysis; and Hakkal, serving as the information wing.
Empowering local government and focusing on socioeconomic development can also help alleviate the governance deficit that has contributed to the insurgency. In fact, addressing the underlying issues of economic deprivation, political disenfranchisement, and social marginalization is essential to finding a lasting solution to the conflict
This structural transformation has enabled the group to shift its tactics from traditional guerrilla warfare to more sophisticated urban warfare, posing a significant threat to provincial security. The group has expanded its operations, targeting not only security forces but also civilians and infrastructure. Insurgent groups are also targeting Chinese nationals with the deliberate intention of damaging the country’s critical relations with China and sabotaging the CPEC. It appears to be a strategic move that aims to undermine Pakistan’s economic interests, create tensions between Islamabad and Beijing, disrupt law and order, and discourage Chinese nationals from visiting Pakistan.
With expanding information technology, the insurgent groups continue to leverage social media to disseminate propaganda, foster anti-state sentiments, and recruit new members. Insurgent groups now carry out coordinated attacks, exert control over highways, take hostages, and target ethnic groups from other provinces, particularly Punjab. Insurgent groups have developed a diversionary strategy, where they block highways to divert the attention of law enforcement agencies and paramilitary forces, while simultaneously carrying out attacks on other targets. A notable example of this tactic is the incident where they blocked multiple highways across the province, while targeting an FC camp in Lasbela district, last year.
Moreover, insurgent groups have also expanded their recruitment tactics to include women in a combat role, thereby exploiting their perceived vulnerability and psychological docility to utilize them as shields for suicide bombing missions. This tactic not only inflicts damage on the target but also creates a psychological impact on the security forces. Women are often lured into the insurgency through social media, which has increased their exposure to propaganda warfare, allowing insurgents to disseminate tailored messages that resonate with their emotions and concerns.
Furthermore, the educated class in Balochistan is joining the insurgency, driven by feelings of marginalization and frustration stemming from the perceived disparity in development and basic rights between their province and other parts of the country. This sense of deprivation, coupled with a lack of employment opportunities after getting education, is fostering anti-state sentiments. The insurgents effectively tap into these grievances, using them as a “rallying cry” to mobilize support and justify their actions. The BLA’s strategy is designed to exploit the state’s security policy in order to drive a wedge between the state and society.
In a strategic shift, insurgent groups— particularly the BLA— are seeking to obtain belligerent status by temporarily occupying certain areas of the province to demonstrate their capabilities, with the ultimate goal of gaining international recognition. As the security forces focus on combating the insurgency, the BLA seizes opportunities to occupy areas, showcasing its strength and control. This temporary occupation aims to claim belligerent status, seeking recognition as a legitimate entity in Balochistan
The group’s social media campaigns and public outreach efforts are designed to build support and create a narrative of resistance against the state. As the BLA continues to challenge the state’s authority, it is likely to further erode trust between the state and society. The BLA seeks to garner public support, capitalizing on the collateral damage and anti-state sentiments created by state security operations. This tactic has led to a deterioration in state-society relations, with the public increasingly turning towards the BLA and developing favorable sentiments towards the group. Moreover, the insurgent group appears to be seeking a political face in order to acquire political legitimacy in the province.
The state’s response to the insurgency will be crucial in determining the outcome of this conflict. A heavy-handed approach may only serve to fuel further resentment and support for the BLA. In contrast, a pragmatic approach like addressing the grievances of the Baloch people and providing economic opportunities may help to undermine the BLA’s appeal. Indeed, the quest of the BLA for belligerent status is a calculated move to gain legitimacy and challenge the state’s authority. The outcome of this conflict will depend on the state’s ability to respond effectively to the strategy of insurgents and address the underlying grievances driving the insurgency.
The current military-centric approach to the insurgency has proven ineffective and counterproductive. It has only amplified grievances and state-society relationsdeteriorated. So, the state ought to rethink its security policy. The military option has solely focused on militant groups, but the government has neglected the civil population’s concerns as military operations have contributed to collateral damage and human rights abuses. As a result, it has led to poor public perception of the government and widened the chasm of trust between the state and society, which can only indeed be bridged through political reconciliation.
To achieve lasting peace in Balochistan, it is imperative to move beyond a solely military-centric approach. The state must prioritize political engagement and reconciliation over military action. Resolving the “missing persons” issue and constituting a powerful parliamentary committee to initiate a multilayered dialogue with various stakeholders are crucial steps in this process. In dealing with hardcore militant groups, “targeted operations” should be carried out in parallel with non-kinetic policies aimed at earning public support and restoring state-society relations.
Also, empowering local government and focusing on socioeconomic development can also help alleviate the governance deficit that has contributed to the insurgency. In fact, addressing the underlying issues of economic deprivation, political disenfranchisement, and social marginalization is essential to finding a lasting solution to the conflict.
