For decades, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied on an outdated, force-heavy approach— high-intensity military operations, swift tactical victories, and brief moments of stability, only for insurgencies to resurface with greater adaptability. This cycle of violence, a damning indictment of a flawed playbook, exposes the limitations of relying solely on kinetic force while neglecting the socio-political realities that sustain militancy.
While battlefield successes may suppress threats momentarily, they fail to address the root causes of insurgency, ensuring that extremist networks remain resilient, ready to exploit state missteps and return with renewed force. The same fundamental errors persist— overlooking grassroots intelligence networks, sidelining indigenous populations, and ignoring the grievances that allow militant narratives to take hold.
The pattern is unmistakable. From the tribal districts to Balochistan, every phase of insurgency has revealed the inadequacy of an approach that prioritizes military solutions over a holistic COIN framework. Pakistan’s security establishment has yet to internalize a critical lesson: counterinsurgency is not won through firepower alone but through a multi-pronged strategy that combines intelligence-driven operations, political engagement, economic empowerment, and social integration.
Global case studies— from the U.S. failures in Afghanistan to the Sri Lankan military’s mixed success against the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam— prove that sustainable peace is only possible when states address the underlying conditions that fuel rebellion. If Pakistan fails to recalibrate its strategy, it risks becoming trapped in a perpetual war— fighting the same enemies, using the same ineffective tactics, expecting different results.
The resurgence of terrorism is not an anomaly; it is the inevitable outcome of Pakistan’s short-sighted COIN strategy, which continues to prioritize military might over comprehensive counterinsurgency principles. Insurgencies do not thrive in a vacuum— they are fed by political exclusion, economic despair, and the absence of state legitimacy. Military campaigns may kill insurgents, but they do not kill insurgencies. Without addressing the systemic injustices that drive people into the arms of militant groups, every so-called “victory” remains an illusion— a temporary pause before the next insurgent wave. Pakistan must abandon its fixation on body counts and adopt a strategy centered on dismantling militant ecosystems at their very roots.
A fundamental shift is imperative. A counterinsurgency strategy that does not integrate the people as allies is destined to fail. If Pakistan wishes to break free from the shackles of perpetual conflict, it must rewrite its COIN playbook— into one that prioritizes not just the defeat of militants, but the reclamation of hearts and minds.
Counterinsurgency, by definition, is not just about eliminating insurgents; it is about winning over populations, dismantling support networks, and ensuring long-term stability. Modern COIN strategies have evolved from colonial-era doctrines that combined military suppression with efforts to win “hearts and minds.” The British in Northern Ireland, the Philippines against the Moro insurgents, and even American campaigns in Iraq and Vietnam have demonstrated that insurgencies are not purely military conflicts but socio-political struggles demanding multifaceted responses. Yet, Pakistan’s strategy remains disproportionately tilted toward kinetic operations, failing to incorporate crucial political, economic, and psychological dimensions.
The British success in Malaya against communist insurgents in the 1950s provides a striking contrast to Pakistan’s flawed approach. Instead of relying solely on brute force, the British combined military operations with political reforms, economic incentives, and local empowerment, thereby cutting off the insurgents’ support base. The Malayan Emergency was won not through indiscriminate bombings or mass arrests but by creating conditions that made insurgency an unattractive option. In contrast, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaigns, whether in Swat, North Waziristan, or Balochistan, have rarely been followed by meaningful political engagement or economic rejuvenation. The absence of a post-conflict rehabilitation plan means that areas cleared of militants remain vulnerable to re-infiltration, turning every military success into a transient, illusory achievement.
Successive military operations— Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad, and now Azm-e-Istehkam— have undoubtedly eliminated key militant strongholds and disrupted terror networks. However, long-term peace remains elusive. The recent hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan, which claimed the lives of 21 hostages and four security personnel, is a chilling reminder that insurgents are far from being defeated. Their ability to carry out such high-profile attacks exposes a fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s approach: the state has been fighting symptoms while ignoring the disease. The persistent unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan raises an uncomfortable question— has Pakistan learned anything from its past failures, or is it merely recycling the same ineffective tactics under different names?
The choice before Pakistan is stark and unforgiving: persist with a failing strategy that breeds more conflict or adopt a new path grounded in inclusivity, justice, and political reconciliation. Anything short of this is a betrayal of the sacrifices made, a failure of leadership, and a guarantee that today’s insurgents will return tomorrow—stronger, more emboldened, and deadlier than before
One of the most damning aspects of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency approach is its alienation of local populations. The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, who should be the state’s strongest allies in rooting out insurgents, often find themselves treated as adversaries. Heavy-handed military operations, reports of enforced disappearances, and unchecked human rights violations have fostered resentment rather than cooperation. By prioritizing force over dialogue, Pakistan has allowed insurgents to manipulate this discontent, turning grievances into recruitment tools. Instead of weakening insurgencies, such policies have inadvertently fueled them, pushing communities further toward disillusionment and rebellion.
Pakistan’s counterinsurgency missteps are compounded by its failure to incorporate a robust political strategy. Any successful counterinsurgency effort requires legitimacy, something that cannot be achieved through coercion alone. Political participation and representation of marginalized communities are critical in addressing insurgencies. The US failure in Vietnam was largely due to its inability to establish a government that commanded local legitimacy, while in Iraq, the exclusion of Sunni groups from governance after the 2003 invasion led to widespread insurgency. Pakistan must take heed. Without political reforms, local grievances will continue to fester, providing insurgents with a steady stream of recruits.
The failure to integrate political solutions into counterinsurgency efforts is another crucial misstep. In successful COIN campaigns worldwide, military action has been complemented by structured political dialogue. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, which brought an end to decades of violence, was a product of strategic negotiations alongside security operations. Pakistan, on the other hand, has repeatedly treated insurgency as a law-and-order issue rather than a political crisis requiring engagement with marginalized communities. Instead of preemptive diplomacy, the state responds reactively, often after insurgencies spiral out of control. A lack of genuine political representation, denial of basic rights, and refusal to address historical grievances have created a vacuum that insurgents have filled with their own narratives.
The intelligence dimension of counterinsurgency is another glaring weakness in Pakistan’s approach. The most reliable intelligence in insurgency-ridden areas does not come from sophisticated surveillance or satellite imagery—it comes from people on the ground. Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), for all its flaws, managed to infiltrate Taliban ranks by cultivating deep local intelligence networks. The US Special Forces’ success in targeting Al-Qaeda leaders relied heavily on human intelligence from communities. Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts, however, have been plagued by a lack of community-based intelligence networks. Fear and resentment toward security forces discourage civilians from cooperating, depriving the state of critical ground-level intelligence.
Recent statements by Chief of Army Staff Gen Asim Munir advocating for a holistic counterinsurgency approach are a step in the right direction, but rhetoric must translate into action. A truly effective strategy would integrate security operations with meaningful political reforms, economic revitalization, and trust-building measures. Winning over local populations is not a sentimental ideal— it is a strategic necessity. Pakistan must abandon its outdated fixation on brute force and instead focus on governance, development, and inclusivity.
The insurgencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are not mere security threats; they are symptoms of a deeper national failure. Pakistan’s inability to formulate a coherent counterinsurgency strategy has prolonged conflict, destabilized entire regions, and drained economic resources. If the state continues to repeat its past mistakes, it risks further entrenching insurgencies rather than dismantling them.
The time for superficial measures and reactive policies is over. A truly holistic approach— one that prioritizes long-term stability over short-term military victories— is the only path to peace. Anything less is a guarantee that Pakistan’s counterinsurgency failures will continue, with devastating consequences.
The verdict of history is undeniable: insurgencies are not crushed by sheer military force; they wither when the grievances that fuel them are addressed. Pakistan can no longer afford the self-defeating cycle of waging wars against its own people while turning a blind eye to the deep-rooted political, economic, and social fractures that militants exploit. The failure to recognize this reality does not merely prolong violence— it erodes national cohesion, destabilizes entire regions, and gradually weakens the very foundations of state authority. A counterinsurgency strategy that ignores the human dimension of conflict is not just ineffective; it is a recipe for perpetual warfare.
If Pakistan is to escape this relentless cycle of insurgency, it must discard the illusion that military might alone will bring lasting peace. The real battlefield is not in the war-torn landscapes of Balochistan or the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa— it is in the state’s policies, its governance structures, and the level of trust (or distrust) between the government and its people. Insurgencies thrive where the state is absent, indifferent, or unjust; they perish where people find hope, opportunity, and justice within the system rather than outside of it.
The choice before Pakistan is stark and unforgiving: persist with a failing strategy that breeds more conflict or adopt a new path grounded in inclusivity, justice, and political reconciliation. Anything short of this is a betrayal of the sacrifices made, a failure of leadership, and a guarantee that today’s insurgents will return tomorrow—stronger, more emboldened, and deadlier than before.
