Changing Global Perceptions on Kashmir

Not only the internal situation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir but the US approach on the issue underwent a significant change over the decades as direct and indirect mediator between the concerned parties of the dispute. In the context there are two key points that are vital in understanding the US approach to the Kashmir dispute. First, the USA does recognise that it is an international issue, and the final closure will require the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) leading to the removal of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) from both sides of the Ceasefire line. This fact has not changed and I do not know why anyone would scour world media daily to catch snippets on Kashmir in order to reassure their psyche that the Kashmir issue is still an international issue, when in fact that status has neither changed nor has been disputed by the major powers. The second point, though, is even more important. The US position on resolving the Kashmir issue has changed over the years. This change is neither dramatic nor topsy-turvy; it is merely a slow evolution that was inevitable given the knowledge and depth of comprehension within the US national security apparatus that existed about the dispute in 1947-48 as compared to today, as well as by the growing stature of the bilateral relationship between the USA and India.

As such, Barak Obama, on becoming US President repeated what has been a long standing bipartisan view of both Democrat and Republican governments, that the Kashmir issue should be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan. Today all major powers echo the statement made by President Obama that the Kashmir dispute can only be resolved by the two countries themselves. Although President Obama expressed his intention to try to work with India and Pakistan on Kashmir, in view of several criticisms which appeared in the media, later he became reluctant on the issue. In an editorial in The Washington Times, Selig S. Harrison, director of the Asia Programme at the Centre for International Policy and a senior scholar of the woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars called it Obama’s first foreign policy mistake.  Another newspaper The Australian called Obama’s idea to appoint a presidential negotiator ‘a very stupid and dangerous move indeed.’  Likewise, Reihan Salam, in an editorial in Forbes, noted, ‘The smartest thing President Obama could do on Kashmir is probably nothing. We have to hope that India and Pakistan can work out their differences on Kashmir on their own.^’ Even according to The Financial Times, ‘India has warned Obama that he risks ‘barking up the wrong tree’ if he seeks to broker a settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Undisputedly, the problem of Jammu and Kashmir has been recognised by the big powers of the world as a bilateral one between India and Pakistan to solve on their own.’

India’s key failure has been to eradicate its culture of exclusion, which privileges religious identity over citizenship. Each bomb represents an idea and each idea, in turn, is rooted in a larger political and cultural context. Policing can arrest perpetrators, not the historical processes which create them. Even though te ideological sources and material resources of the Indian Jihad are global, the specific conditions in which it grew are local. India in the decade since 9/11, has failed to engage with, and address, those conditions. India’s key failure has been its inability to hold an honest national conversation about communal violence, and the ways in which it is embeded in our cultures: a key cause of the persistence of the Jihadist movement.

In a recent attempt during the period of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, a new term ‘quiet diplomacy’ was discovered and propagated as a possible solution to the Kashmir problem. Speaking to journalists on the sidelines of an All-India newspaper editors’ conference, then home minister P. Chidambaram disclosed, “We are working on quiet diplomacy and such efforts are essential to take the process forward.” Earlier in April 2006 too, India and Pakistan agreed on quiet diplomacy to further the solution of the Kashmir issue. Under it, major initiatives will be taken up at the top level, rather than being discussed in the media. According to Dawn, ‘Back-channel diplomacy will be used to debate proposals like self-government demilitarisation and independence. In the process some intellectuals and former bureaucrats and general of the two countries will meet and discuss various solutions. They would later brief their government about the outcome of their meetings and various proposals for resolving the dispute.’

 However even at the beginning the initiative was criticised by pro-freedom leader and Hurriyat Conference chairman Sayed Ali Geelani who said that the offer was aimed at forcing a compromise solution on the people of Jammu and Kashmir against their aspirations, sacrifices and over six-decades long struggle. “Quiet diplomacy is secret diplomacy where people will decide things and force a solution on Kashmir.” He urged the people to be cautious and remain firm on their resolve and added that “if we compromised at this juncture we will always have to move backwards.” In the context the separatists’ bullet that killed the moderate Hurriyat leader, Fazl Haque Qureshi, had also, to a great extent, wounded the prospect of quiet diplomacy for settling the Kashmir problem.

The European Economic Community (later the European Union) affirmed in its preamble that signatory states were determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. They specifically affirmed its political and economic integration creating a customs union, colloquially known as the ‘Common Market.’

The establishment of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 also contained several characteristics and used ideas of the EEC. With its formation it was hoped that the organisation would encourage India and Pakistan to cooperate like Germany and France to overcome their enmity after decades of devastating wars. The Heads of State and Government of the region including India, Maldives, Sri Lanka and others felt the need of a common currency like the euro that would boost South Asia’s economic and political stability. Through the efforts and effectiveness of SAARC the south Asians expected to fabricate a secular umbrella to isolate the communal forces of the region as in Europe where the Basques in Spain, the Italian Catalans, and the Irish IRA terrorists have been reduced to nonentities.  The first step in this direction would be the introduction of a common currency that, like the euro, would accelerate trade and commerce and, more importantly, unleash the centripetal force to help consolidate economic, political and cultural cooperation among South Asian countries.

The concept of peace suggests not only the absence of conflict, violence and hostility but it also signifies an ambience of prosperity, be that economic, social or cultural. Without delving and getting stuck into the ruins of history, Kashmir, in the most recent times, has been showing some semblance of peace. But, the million dollar question is, is this really an era of peace or just another short-lived phase of calm before it could once again return to the storm of conflict that we got to witness on several occasions in past? In Kashmir, the psycho-social fallout of the lingering conflict situation has not been diagnosed appropriately, nor has it been tested with keen interest.

In the context India’s key failure has been to eradicate its culture of exclusion, which privileges religious identity over citizenship. Each bomb represents an idea and each idea, in turn, is rooted in a larger political and cultural context. Policing can arrest perpetrators, not the historical processes which create them. Even though te ideological sources and material resources of the Indian Jihad are global, the specific conditions in which it grew are local. India in the decade since 9/11, has failed to engage with, and address, those conditions. India’s key failure has been its inability to hold an honest national conversation about communal violence, and the ways in which it is embeded in our cultures: a key cause of the persistence of the Jihadist movement.