For almost a year now the Taliban and the Afghan government have been forced to sit in the same room but in vain. Today, both the parties are battling more fiercely than ever 1,800 km away from the table on the grounds of their “shared homeland”. Why is it so? Since the intra-Afghan dialogue initiated (at least for the cameras; in reality, it has not even begun to date) well before the start of troop withdrawal the blame for the Taliban’s fierce advance cannot solely be placed on the pullout and this has a direct linkage to the failure of these talks to cease armed action.
Coming back to the why question strolling in the heads of all analysts and policymakers whose interests are tied with Afghanistan, to answer which one needs to get hold over a book titled; Never Split the Difference by an ex-FBI hostage negotiator, Chris Voss. The former negotiator in this guide to effectively negotiate culminates the skill into getting a “you are right” from your opponent!
The moment the three magical words are voiced the ice is already broken into pieces and from here you and your opponent’s interests converge, making a complex negotiation facile. How does one redeem this magical “you are right” should logically be the next query bothering the reader unless he has already read Voss.
So, to those who have, they are welcome to skip the next few lines and for others, it is not that mystical as the world may make us think; it’s an art like any other which begins with empathy or to quote the exact expression “tactical empathy”.
These two sides must realize the dreadful price of their egos and genuinely talk in way negotiators are supposed to which is only possible if the international community, foremostly the USA, wholeheartedly incentivize these talks and not just act “responsible” by photographing the two sides on the same table. It is about time the facades of complacency are torn down and real negotiations commence, or it shall be too late for thousands of more Afghans who could be buried besides the empires in this catastrophic civil war in Afghanistan.
Building rapport through deference is the first key that unlocks the door for further talk. Afterward, once you neutrally understand the adversary you solely should acknowledge their concerns and put forward your own tactically in a way that makes your concern their concern: for example, if the Taliban want to impose Sharia, the Afghan government can positively acknowledge the demand and be willing to implement Sharia but in the pursuit should slightly slide in a concern about their own future in such a system highlighting their followers who may repel against the ideology.
The following reaction would apparently place the Taliban under control of the negotiation who would then be compelled towards finding a way to accommodate the followers of the Afghan government (and automatically its officials). After all, all humans seek is validity that can then take the best out of them! The theory is empirically proven once we look around our friends for a moment here; all we do is solely validate their concerns, or value their views and they are willing to go miles for us. Thus, the trick is neurologically proven and manifested each day and is not magical.
Yet, the hypothetical illustration above may sound too simplistic, but I am certain from watching the interviews of both sides of the table in Doha (and the battlefield in Afghanistan) that are full of perpetual blame gaming, with one blaming the other for violence and vice versa, that even this model has not been applied to at least check.
The most recent case is the interview of the Afghan chief negotiator Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to Al Jazeera in which he was confronted with the same query about the likelihood of any successful negotiation under the shadow of this constant blame gaming from both sides in whose answer he adversely furthered the notorious game by pointing towards the violent gains of the Taliban in the recent weeks, identifying them as a sign of Taliban’s aversion to peace.
It is this attitude of the Afghan leaders that steals the future of many Afghan children who instead of going to schools are sheltering themselves from the war they have nothing to do with. Why cannot the doctor who has seen blood on his land for years just for those children capitulate in his words to give Taliban the illusion of legitimacy by implying that their demands too are justified, and we seek to make space within those demands to accommodate ourselves and our followers!
For once, at least, the ice may break by mere words, and guns might be put to rest. I do not intend to sideline the responsibility of the Taliban who too should do the same, but since the Afghan officials are more “educated” or at least they claim to be, then why cannot they utilize “tactical empathy” that has the potential to save lives, else their higher education and liberal ethics are worthless if they too want to play the same way as the violent Taliban?
But let’s go back to reality now. It is a pity that while I was penning down the hypothetical scenario based on the former FBI negotiator’s technique it felt like writing a fairy tale. Realistically, the self-inflicted egos on both sides are too high for any breakthrough to happen as neither of the two even strategically want to validate the other. Maybe, the popular discourses have traditionally been arranged in a way that “people” are demonized, instilling a belief that people are inherently evil while in actuality it is the “differences” that are. Similarly, both the Afghan officials and the Taliban, even though they sit in the same room, consider the other non-human with no legitimacy apparent in the stalemate with not even an agenda or framework agreed yet.
Yet humans, while they are capable of the worst, they are of good too, and the pages of history are full of it; resolution of Cuban missile crisis, apartheid’s quashing in the USA and South Africa, the NPT regimes, are just a few amongst them. To add another such page these two sides must realize the dreadful price of their egos and genuinely talk in way negotiators are supposed to which is only possible if the international community, foremostly the USA, wholeheartedly incentivize these talks and not just act “responsible” by photographing the two sides on the same table. It is about time the facades of complacency are torn down and real negotiations commence, or it shall be too late for thousands of more Afghans who could be buried besides the empires in this catastrophic civil war in Afghanistan.
