On 18 January 2022, invoking the principle of Universal Jurisdiction, a London-based law firm Stoke White submitted extensive evidence to the British Metropolitan Police’s War Crimes Unit on the ways Indian Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane and Home Minister Amit Shah were responsible for committing war crimes by torturing, kidnapping and killing of activists, journalists and civilians in Indian-held Kashmir. The firm demanded the arrest of both the culprits over their roles.
The story dates back to 5 August 2019, when Indian President Ram Nath Kovind issued a decree revoking the special status granted to the State of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, besides annulling its Article 35-A. Along with that, the State was bifurcated into two Union Territories: Ladakh division as a Union Territory without a legislature, and Jammu and Kashmir as a Union Territory with a legislature.
India annexed the part of Kashmir that it had been controlling through Article 370 as a special territory having its own flag, constitution and Assembly. India suddenly discovered that it was loath to the formula of one country, two constitutions and two flags. In an attempt to tilt the status quo in India’s favour, the Indian government scrapped Article 370, which was a symbol of the conjunction of the princely state with the Union of Federal India since the incorporation of the article into the Indian Constitution in 1949, effective 26 January 1950.
Scrapping Article 370 was part of the 2019 electoral manifesto of the ruling BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) represented by Indian Prime Minister NarendraModi, but no one had thought that the Article would be done away with by violating the terms of inclusion of the special status of Kashmir as a sovereign State enjoying internal autonomy. Representing the Instrument of Accession of 1947, the special status had pledged that the Centre would govern only defence, foreign affairs and communication whereas the rest of powers to run the State affairs would lie with Kashmir’s legislature.
Apparently, under the spell of neo-realism, it is the astuteness of the Modi government to tilt the status quo in India’s favour, but it is quite early to say it has succeeded. Any military might can resort to any adventure and achieve an immediate victory, but to sustain the same is an altogether different thing. This is why, in international relations, the sagacious view immediate gains as different from lasting ones.
From 2016 onward, Pakistan started losing its political connection with India’s PM Modi, who was disparaged in Pakistan so much so that Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who had fostered a personal rapport with Indian PM Modi, was demonized and derided publicly. Politicians who favoured friendship with India were accused openly of being anti-state elements. Now, Pakistan is in trouble about how to negotiate and persuade India to reverse the steps it has taken regarding its part of Kashmir. Nevertheless, there are three aspectsto understand the issue.
First, in the India-Kashmiris context, a school of thought says that India’s PM Modi has outclassed the Kashmiris by reducing the issue to the internal affair of India. Further, Pakistan and China can follow suit by annexing their parts of Kashmir and make the prevalent disputed lines as permanent international borders. This school of thought relies on the assumption that after some time both the Kashmiris (residing on either part of the LoC) and, perhaps, Pakistan would accept the annexation as a fait accompli. This school of thought, however, overlooks the fact that in the Security Council of the United Nations, there are still pending certain resolutions on the Kashmir issue since 1948. China also disagrees with India’s action.
Second, in the India-Pakistan context, a school of thought says that since the 1970s, whereas India has been projecting the Kashmir issue as a bilateral one to be solved through peaceful means in light of the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan has been resorting to certain proactive mischiefs to internationlise the issue. This school of thought leans on the assumption that the latest move of the Indian government has created a third option of internalising the issue. This school of thought, however, overlooks the fact that in an effort to internalise the issue, India has served Pakistan’s purpose of internationalising the issue, though the Kashmiris inhabiting the Valley have been paying the cost of such a paradigm shift.
Third, in the India-USA context, a school of thought says that the timing to undertake such a step was propitious because Pakistan was tangled in a three-pronged challenge. That is, to deliver on Afghanistan which is to Pakistan’s north-western border; to satisfy the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global watchdog on anti-money laundering and combating financing terror, on cracking down on Islamic militant organisations; and to deal with the Kashmir disturbance created by the Modi government on Pakistan’s north-eastern border. Interestingly, this school of thought predicates itself on the assumption that Pakistan is too fragile to prefer to be engaged in the Kashmir imbroglio.
Hitherto, one thing is clear. The Kashmir issue existed as a bilateral one between India and Pakistan awaiting its final resolution. Even the critics who are averse to the bilateral character of the Kashmir issue do acknowledge unequivocally that all the three bilateral agreements viz., the Simla agreement of 1972, the Lahore declaration of 1999, and the Islamabad declaration of 2004, have depicted the Kashmir issue as an unresolved issue of Partition since 1947.
Apparently, under the spell of neo-realism, it is the astuteness of the Modi government to tilt the status quo in India’s favour, but it is quite early to say it has succeeded. Any military might can resort to any adventure and achieve an immediate victory, but to sustain the same is an altogether different thing. This is why, in international relations, the sagacious view immediate gains as different from lasting ones.
Despite its military might, India is still reeling under the fear that any popular insurrection especially in the Kashmir valley would turn the tide. India is pinning much hope on the FATF to engage Pakistan under the assumption that the Kashmiris cannot fight back without any external help.
Above all, despite a forceful change in the status quo, the internal dimension of the problem remains unchanged, as the Kashmiris are now more vociferous in their demand of the right to self-determination than ever before.
