Roadblocks in Pak-Afghan relations

The regional and global powers are equally anxious to establish a stable and development-oriented government in Afghanistan which, in the recent past, has suffered a lot in the shape of internal civil war and external pressure with the hope that soon a day will come in its favour and all odds will also set aside sooner or later

In the phase of uncertainty and chaos beginning from April-May 2021three possibilities emerged, which could be realised in future: a. negotiated settlement, b. civil war, c. Taliban takeover. As the first ideal idea aborted, the second prolonged for months but ultimately, the third option emerged stronger and it became clear on 15^th August 2021that the Taliban’s regime, repeating many features of earlier rule is the current fate of war-torn Afghanistan and with this, the Taliban of the country emerged as the strongest political force of the nation in days to come for internal development and as chief negotiator with foreign countries.

There onwards the future of Afghanistan was tagged on securing a stable position by the Taliban, recognition of the new regime by foreign countries and amount of funding received from foreign countries, particularly the USA. In the whole Kabul episode, Pakistan played an important role and remained standing by the side of the Taliban, provided moral as well as material support and also convinced the People’s Republic of China to help the Taliban against India and the USA. In the name of opposing the USA, Russia kept itself mum for having a soft corner for China and maintaining working relations with New Delhi, upsetting the entire regional strategy and balance of power.

However, in no way, this development cast a positive shadow on bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan which has a history of decades-old sovereignty concerns, security interests, geopolitical dynamics, cross-border ties, two-way connectivity and trade. They all deserve proper attention to make their relations smooth and normal in future.

Despite differences on several counts, the seven-decades relations between the two remained interesting for regional politics and superpower strategy in South Asia as Islamabad aligned itself with the USA and its forces in the global arena where it faces a hostile USSR for a long time, while its arch rival and enemy, India, after maintaining a non-aligned position for decades, ultimately sided with the USSR against the USA in the wake of the Bangladesh crisis. Initially, Afghanistan refused to recognise Pakistan when it was formed as a result of division of the Indian Subcontinent in August 1947, yet over the years and decades the coming happenings of global politics-US-Saudi backed proxy warfare, sponsorship of the Taliban and the post-9/11 event put the two countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the same basket in regional and global parameters to be aligned with the USA. The current and past connections between the two failed to check the roadblocks of bilateral relations which kept them poles apart till date.

In that context the most pinching for Islamabad is Afghanistan’s refusal of the colonial-era boundary, called the Durand Line, as a defining international border which divides the entire population of Pashtun people in two parts who are living alongside the border and on the issue, both accuse each other for fomenting proxy groups by interfering in one’s internal matter and shape policy orientation.

Security and strategic concerns apart, the emergence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been a hot and burning issue between the two countries. In the context Islamabad accuses both Afghanistan and India not only for the TTP’s emergence, but for its becoming a potent anti-Pakistan terror group responsible for many blasts in the country.

Having no solution in sight, Pakistan deepened its anti-Afghan approach in post-1971 periods and began arming and training Islamist fighters to counter pro-Pashtun groups in Kabul. In the 1980s Pakistan also refused Kabul’s demand to close the border to stop entry of the Mujahideen who were fighting against the Soviet forces in the name of religion. Afghanistan took it seriously and assumed that Pakistan had/has no respect for Kabul’s security and at the same time feared a comeback of anti-national forces from across the border. Even the present Taliban’s dispensation of Kabul is in no mood to accept the settlement in favour of Islamabad.

Long pending issues between the two have, to a large extent, shaped their perceptions towards each other which shaped their relations. Under the impression that Islamabad had sought to develop strategic depth in Afghanistan by backing friendly governments in Kabul and limiting New Delhi, Afghanistan continued to accuse Pakistan for much of the violence in recent decades. For years and decades Pakistan, in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, helped anti-Soviet forces in the country and desired a government that liked to hate both the USSR and India.

The funsd taken in the name of ending terrorism in the region and specially from Kabul were strategically spent for fueling and arming anti-Afghan guerilla groups living in Afghanistan through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). In another words, the money and materials given by the USA were used against the US interests in the region and nourishing terror groups in the post- 9/11 phase which ultimately defeated the forces of the USA and its allied Western powers in the year 2021. In a nutshell, the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained under pressure as Islamabad refused to comply with Kabul’s security concerns in terms of its relations with India and alleged Indian and Afghan support to anti- Pakistan militants for a long time on an almost regular basis.

Security and strategic concerns apart, the emergence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been a hot and burning issue between the two countries. In the context Islamabad accuses both Afghanistan and India not only for the TTP’s emergence, but for its becoming a potent anti-Pakistan terror group responsible for many blasts in the country. In addition, there is the cross-border people-to-people relationship and movement of refugees as well as families, commercial commodities, supported by the Pashtun population along both sides of the border, who are still angered on account of their having inadequate representation in government and bureaucracy as well. It all has limited the opportunities for the trade, investment and cross-border engagements essential for the smooth sailing in troubled waters for a long time to come.

The trade pact negotiated between the two in 2010, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), largely useful for both countries, have been slowed down in recent years, often leading to the closure of the border, limiting its scope around the border and the situation is likely to continue for some time to come harming the national interests of both.