LAHORE: The Institute of Peace and Connectivity (IPAC) hosted a session titled: “Indo-Pak relations in context of Indo-Pacific strategies” here on Thursday.
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Chairman and Director of IPAC and renowned specialist on South Asia, Prof Christophe Jaffrelot spoke at length on the occasion.
In his address, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri stated that from Pakistan’s perspective, the Indo-Pacific policies are naturally viewed in the background of the unfortunate and enduring state of tension between Pakistan and India.
He added that, as Foreign Minister, he was part of the process that resulted in a framework on a possible settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. The details of the draft agreement given in his book, “Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove” have not been contradicted by any Pakistani or Indian of consequence. In fact, the book launch was attended by the principals themselves on the two sides, including former President Parvez Musharraf, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and former Leader of the Opposition, LK Advani (BJP) after being provided copies in advance.
He went on to state that “I strongly believe that it does provide the only rational solution to the resolution of J&K which has bedeviled Pakistan-India relations. Many people ask me ‘whether this framework popularly known as the ‘Four-Point Formula’ is still relevant?’ This is more so, after the recent statements of PM Modi and Home Minister, Amit Shah. I would say yes for the following reasons. Although I do not travel to India as I used to in the past because of the situation in that country, you will be surprised to learn that I have received, in the recent past, and continue to receive invitations to seminars organized by Indians in Dubai, London as well as Webinars organized from Delhi where I am asked if the so-called ‘four-point formula’ can still provide the way forward. Quite apart from all other reasons, it is relevant because it provides for the recognition of the aspirations of people of J&K in a manner that was, at least at that time, acceptable to the governments, the establishments and the vast majority of people of Pakistan and India.”
He further added that “Mr. Narendra Modi claimed that he had “resolved the Kashmir issue”; the Indian Home Minister, Amit Shah announced that the government would not talk on Kashmir with Pakistan. Let me remind the audience that such statements are not uncommon from current leadership in India and that not long ago, Indian Home Minister made a statement that India will not rest until it got back Aksai Chin from China and AJK and GB from Pakistan. Such statements may carry a resonance with the highly polarized electorate in India today but it does not provide a resolution to J&K. Putting it more bluntly, Pakistan could not have kept the Kashmir issue alive only through diplomatic efforts, had the Kashmiris accepted Indian occupation. Kashmir issue is alive and will remain so, as long as the Kashmiris refuse to accept Indian occupation. International Human Rights organization, including, UNHCR, has recently given a damning report in which gross violation of Human Rights of the Kashmiri people has been highlighted. An earlier report of the Human Rights Committee of the European Parliament had called Kashmir ‘the most beautiful prison on Earth’. Recently, UN Secretary General, António Guterres, reiterated his serious concerns over India’s continued use of reprisal attacks against Kashmiri journalists, activists and civil society actors. He observed that the purpose of India’s repressive measures is to deter Kashmiri human rights defenders from independently and impartially reporting the evolving human rights situation in IIOJK”
He also talked about how the current US foreign policy doctrine of ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ relates to its strategic pivot towards Asia and has been expounded by successive administrations from President Obama to President Biden. Its main purpose was to confront the rising power of China and India was brought into the equation as some sort of an equalizer on the Asian land mass. For this purpose, various defense agreements between India and the US namely LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), COMCASA (Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement), The Industrial Security Agreement (ISA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) were signed. The purpose was to provide interoperability of weapons. Furthermore, India was also brought into the Quad (US, India, Australia and Japan). All this has ramifications for Pakistan, given the fact that there have been 10 occasions when we are either fought wars or were in near war situations that have been listed in my book. The last war was fought at Kargil in1999.
He went on to add that “following the unseemly manner of US withdrawal from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, there was a tendency to blame Pakistan for all that had gone wrong in Afghanistan and perhaps for this reason, among others, the Biden Administration, initially tried to ignore Pakistan. Recently, we have seen corrective steps on both sides and the US has also realized that such a policy is counter-productive
He went on to add that “Pakistan will remain relevant for Washington because of its location at the crossroads of Afghanistan, Russia, China, India and Iran, the presence of four acknowledged nuclear powers; Pakistan, India, Russia, and China- and of course, the US which as a superpower, is everyone’s neighbor. Pakistan’s relations with China impact the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and Pakistan’s tensions with India undermine New Delhi’s capability to balance China”
He concluded by stating that “US is Pakistan’s largest trading partner. While it is true that China has supported Pakistan on all major international issues, Pakistan has also had extremely warm relations with the US in the past and having been declared ‘the most allied ally’ and ‘the most sanctioned ally’ in the past. During our tenure, despite problems we were able to maintain excellent relations with both the US and China. We hope that tensions between US and China do not deteriorate further as it will pose a threat not just to peace in South Asia but also international peace.”
Prof Christophe Jaffrelot serves as director of research at Centre for Studies in International Relations (CERI) at University of Paris, Professor of Indian politics and sociology at King’s College London, and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of several renowned books on Pakistan and India, including, ‘Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy’, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, and several others. He is also the editor of ‘Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures’ and ‘Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism is Changing India.’
Professor Jaffrelot talked about Chinese threat that has been largely responsible for the making of New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific policy.
He said that India’s growing apprehensions had become palpable after the launch of the Road and Belt Initiative and the growing presence of China in India’s neighborhood – as evident from the Chinese investments not only in Pakistan and Myanmar, but also in Nepal and Sri Lanka. In this context, India felt more and more encircled.
He went on to state that Narendra Modi shared his vision of the Indo-Pacific for the first time on June 1, 2018 at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore where he claimed that the Indo-Pacific “include[d] all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it”, an oblique reference to western powers which till recently were not welcome by India in its region. This trend culminated with the re-launching of the Quad in 2017, at minilateral was more clearly than any other diplomatic initiative a reaction to China’s assertiveness in the region.
He added that at the same time, India was not comfortable with the American anti-Chinese stands, her ambivalence resulting from her will not to alienate her big neighbour. In fact, India agreed to upgrade the Quad meetings at the ministerial level – something the US were longing for –only after the Galwan attack in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed in 2020.
While the India-US rapprochement in the Indo-Pacific seemed to be more necessary than ever visa-à-vis China, India continued to believe in plurilateralism, a doctrine that Jaishankar S. defines in his 2020 book, The Indian Way in one clear sentence: “If India drove the revived Quad arrangement, it also took membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A longstanding trilateral with Russia and China now coexists with one involving the US and Japan”. The idea, here, is to “engage competing powers like the US, China, the EU or Russia at the same time”. India stands in favour of a multipolar world where the plurality of power centers would allow her to play one pole against the other. In this context, New Delhi wants Russia to remain an important player – but this is not the only reason.
He further stated that this stand goes together with reservations vis-à-vis the West’s past hegemony and the international order that it has established in 1945. In his book, Jaishankar not only points out that the West never really understood India – and has been “historically so dismissive of our society”-, but emphasizes the fact that the West has imposed on the world norms that need to be dismantled:
“The key of Western durability till now is the set of institutions and practices that it progressively but firmly established in the period of its dominance. […] These are supported by narratives that serve the West well, while diminishing its competitors. The mix of institutions, regimes, regulations and understandings is such a complex web that creating alternatives is truly a formidable challenge. However, as global power redistribution progresses, this will inevitably happen”.
This discourse explains why India has also joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reluctantly (and partially) – because this is again a norms-based partnership which should establish standards in key domains, including the digital economy, he added.
He also stated that to get rid of the multilateral institutions shaped by the West in 1945 – or to control them – is also the objective of India’s BRICS partners – and Jaishankar, incidentally looks at China as a model for this very reason, “as the first non-Western power to seriously rise in the post-1945 era, [that] has drawn on its cultural heritage to project its responsibility and shape the narrative. It is but logical that India too should follow suit”. But of course, Russia is undermining the world order inherited from the western domination even more effectively.
While talking about Russia, he stated that Russia matters to India for two other reasons. First, India cannot emancipate itself from is dependence vis-à-vis this country in terms of military equipment – when more than two thirds of its weapons come from Russia (or have been conceived in Russia), including sophisticated ones like the S-400. But India may not be willing to emancipate itself from this dependence if, true to its plurilateral, doctrine, it aims mostly at diversifying its supply. Secondly, New Delhi is keen to remain a partner of Russia to balance China: isolated, Moscow may be tempted to get even closer to China.
He added that these factors explain why India took part in the recent Vostok military drill, along with Azerbaijan, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Laos, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Syria and Tajikistan. Such a participation was not well received in the US, but well in tune with of the strategy New Delhi where it is probably believed that the West needs India so much that the country will get away with it.
But does the West need India more than India needs the West? The response to this question will be over determined by two variables. First, Russia may not only be weakened by the western sanctions to such an extent that Moscow, not only would turn to Beijing, but fails to deliver some of the weapons India needs. And if Russia fails to win the Ukraine war, this pole will be so low that China will be the only non-western power which will really matter. Second, what will be China’s policy vis-à-vis India. This summer, while New Delhi had immediately come to the rescue of Colombo by offering some financial help after Sri Lanka got almost bankrupt, its pressures could not prevent its neighbour from welcoming a Chinese surveillance ship in Hambantota. If China continues to put this kind of pressure on India, New Delhi may need the Quad more than some of the SCO countries.
He further added that India’s attitude vis-à-vis Russia partly explains recent American initiatives. First, the State Department has become more critical of attacks against human rights activists and minorities. Second, the newly appointed US ambassador visited what he called “Azad Kashmir” and spent three days there. Third, the US has agreed to retrofit Pakistani F-16s after the visit of General Bajwa in DC, a deal probably over determined by the help Pakistan gave the US to locate and target Al-Zawahiri, but India itself may become more interested in normalizing its relations with Pakistan for two reasons at least. First, to fight on two fronts (in the North and in the West) is quite challenging. Second, restoration of some peace in Kashmir is also necessary to demonstrate that abolition of Art. 370 was the right policy – and elections have to be organized in the province for instance.
