The Islamic Republic of Iran has long been following the principle of neither “East nor West” as its foreign policy. However, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has supported “Look East”, especially after the US withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. It became clear to the Supreme Leader that preference of Europe for the JCPOA would not prevail. Many European companies withdrew from the Iran deals due to secondary US sanctions. Thus, Iran’s interest in closer trade relations with China increased.
Iran’s relations with China came to the fore in March 2021 when the two countries signed a long-term agreement. A key provision of the deal guarantees China access to subsidized oil purchases for the next 25 years in exchange for hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese investment in Iran. China has considerable economic influence over Iran as one of the few countries willing to defy Western sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.
Iran’s relationship with Russia came under the microscope when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Iran offered Russia diplomatic, economic and military support, including supplying attack drones for use on the battlefield in Ukraine. US officials have also said that Iran may send surface-to-surface missiles to Russia. Iran’s experience in sanctions evasion and indigenous weapons production makes it an attractive partner for Russia. Over the past year, Tehran’s Islamist government has doubled down on its “Look East” policy, betting China and Russia will be Iran’s main backers against the West. It’s a big gamble and, so far, there are few signs that it will produce more tangible benefits for Tehran in 2023 than in 2022. Still, it’s a fact that remains here.
With China, it has been a difficult road. Beijing has promised Tehran the right things, including during President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to China in February. But mere expressions of political solidarity are no substitute for Iran’s need for strong economic ties. The Chinese, by all accounts, are refusing to commit to long-term plans, apparently due to Tehran’s lack of big economic vision, sanctions-related hurdles, and doubts about the viability of the regime.
While Russian priorities may not have changed to protect Iran, it is hard for the Russians to ignore the fact that Iran is the only large and relatively resource-rich state in the region that is almost unconditionally ready to side with Moscow against the West.
Russia is the second pillar of Iran’s “look east” policy. Moscow needs Iranian support more than Beijing, and cooperation is cheap. Today Russia has more sanctions than Iran. And Moscow, unlike Beijing, doesn’t have to worry about offending Western sensibilities in its dealings with the Islamic Republic. At present, the growing breadth and depth of ties between Iran and Russia is considerable.
What should matter most is that, as with China, Russia’s economic cooperation is a source of frustration for Tehran. Both countries are cash-poor and dependent on selling oil to markets like China and India. This leaves military relations as perhaps the most natural approach. Tehran has already sent drones to Russia for its war against Ukraine, further alienating Western powers, and there are confirmed reports that Moscow will soon hand over its advanced Su-35 fighter jets to Iran.
While such military transactions are important and closer geopolitical alignment between Tehran, Moscow would represent an even bigger leap. When Raisi met President Vladimir Putin in July 2022, Tehran officials described the summit as the birth of a new regional understanding between Tehran and Moscow. So far, it has been difficult to find any significant signs of this restructuring, but Tehran seems optimistic. In particular, Iran hopes that rising tensions between Russia and Israel may limit Israel’s free hand over Syrian airspace.
For a long time, Russia-Iran relations can easily be described as heavy with promises and slogans, but lacking in substance. Officially, Moscow and Tehran say they want to challenge the USA in general, from fighting separatism and drug trafficking to establishing stability in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, so they are determined to face many threats together. But its war against Ukraine no doubt gave Moscow a reason to move Tehran closer to the Russian orbit.
Iran’s prospects as a regional hard power player in places like Syria, the South Caucasus or Central Asia would be greatly reduced by a Russian military defeat in Ukraine. After all, it was not Moscow that shaped Iran’s prospects in these fields so much as Iran’s ability, or lack thereof, to become a partner. What a Russian defeat in the war might do, however, is a pressure on politics in Tehran to fundamentally reassess the value of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s pet “Look East” policy.
That said, the “Look East” policy is unlikely to be moved from its policy. For Khamenei and senior IRGC officers, Russia has long been the West’s biggest counterweight, even though Moscow has long refused to participate in any major confrontation in the Middle East
While Russian priorities may not have changed to protect Iran, it is hard for the Russians to ignore the fact that Iran is the only large and relatively resource-rich state in the region that is almost unconditionally ready to side with Moscow against the West.
