As Pakistanis were busy with their turmoil, nations around the globe were resetting their preferences for the coming decades in an orderly manner. Around the same time, Turks went to polls to elect a potentially powerful President of the republic, in a presidential form of government; to implement an ideological agenda. Keeping in view Turkey placing in the international arena, Turkish foreign policy shifts under Erdogan during the last two decades, a military coup and its aftermath; it was all predictable that the just concluded Presidential elections were a hot contest.
The election once again of the incumbent President throws dice for an objective analysis of the event. for the event has many takeaways for Pakistan, struggling with a hotchpotch of a written constitution and the rule of force. The takeaways might not affect the Pakistani experience in the short term, but have the potential in the long term; of leading towards the better.
For the Pakistani experience, a radical shift from opportunistic politics to ideological politics is necessary. The former party-of-change stalwarts flocking to the kings’ party means they are looking for another opportunistic platform. The shift to ideological politics can be realized through a new cadre of political activists, not professional politicians for sale, with no political record or ‘unclean’ connections; or even police record. The current blizzard of regimentation is not a suitable course of action for the society as a whole. It has the ingredients to encourage centrifugal forces. As said in these columns; legions of darkness are a killer for a society and polity. Pakistan really needs to grow up in a true sense; not a prisoner to the few empty minds… and logics…
To understand that aspect, one needs to see how the Turkish nation state evolved itself a century ago. In 1923, the traditional Khalifat under the Ottomans gave way to a nation state dominated by rebel generals whose worldview differed from that of the now decadent Ottomans. The coining of the term, ‘Young Turks’ refers to that change of guard in Turkish history. The debacle the Turkish nation state suffered during the First World War, the onslaught of the western powers and its own decadence, all contributed in favor of the rebel generals led by the father of the modern Turkish nation state, Kamal Ata Turk.
The new managers of the Turkish society identified religion as a factor helping that decadence. Consequently, the Kemalist generals made it a religious decree of sorts that religiously inclined politicians would not be allowed in post-WW1 Turkey. They were partially successful, as a docile war-weary Turkish nation did not offer much resistance to their influence in Turkish society. Ironically, the Turkish example was also followed without much change and context in neighbouring Iran. The simultaneous secular thrusts in Turkey and Iran falsely triggered a perception that it was an easy excuse to leave all the misfortunes of the state, society, economy and polity at the doorstep of the Mosque. It was another story that an objective analysis might potentially throw up different results.
Coming back to the Turkish context, it was not an easy road to travel on. Organizing a party with religious slogans, in a society where the Azan remained off limits for decades, the Roman script was enforced and any semblance to the Arabic script was discouraged, was like calling for one’s political and even physical death sentence.
For obvious reasons, many devout Muslims who tried to make it big in that nation state supported a secular facial profile. An otherwise secular politician; Adnan Menderes was instrumental in allowing back the azan during the decades between 1950-60, and the return of Arabic script. These were the steps, which were to prove that the Kemalist establishment made sure that he should be hanged for crimes done; a reference to deviation from secularist worldview as espoused by Ata Turk.
The Islamist factor was to resurrect again in the 1980s when Nejmettin Erbakan was to organize a political grouping in a manner that Islam began to be discussed as a viable option for the polity, economy, and foreign relations. With an Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran, the Kemalist generals were too panicked to resist a coup call. Kenan Everen launched a coup in fall 1980, putting much of the leadership behind bars in the process. However, the Islamist flame could not be extinguished and Erbakan was to be elected Prime Minister in 1996, only to be deposed in a palace coup triggered by the generals.
It was in such an environment that Erdogan won elections in 2002. It was an era when the USA was basking in the unipolar world order, with the 9/11 aftermath according it all the required nuisance value to dictate terms. Erdogan’s early feat of defiance was his refusal to be part of US efforts in Iraq; while only a year back the Afghanistan invasion coalition included a Turkish contingent.
Ever since that period, Erdogan has treaded a political roadmap, where he had variables in hand to manipulate, whether the theatre has been domestic or international. From neutralizing coup attempts like Sledgehammer to starting the ‘Get Assad’ project in Syria, Erdogan has proved himself what a seventh century mystic combatant reflected in his poetry about ‘restless Turks’ precipitating a world where things will move fast towards the end.
For the political ideology to take root, it is imperative that a realistic scenario is followed. Movements generally avoid making multiple enemies. Rather they tread a path mixed with caution and cajoling the old order. The Turkish Islamist model precisely tried that successfully. Without antagonizing the Kemalist deep state, the Islamists gradually moulded the opinion in their favour with economic growth rates and a non-intrusive policy towards the sections of society which did not vote for them. Turkey had no moral police to monitor people like Iran; yet many unveiled women, or an increasing number of them, might have thought of voting for Erdogan.
Likewise, despite being a part of NATO and tolerating diplomatic ties with Israel, Turkish foreign policy tried vigorously to compete with Iran for what can be called a strong diplomatic support for the Palestinian cause. Here it did not antagonize the military, yet did not follow the path charted out by them.
In the case of Pakistan, such Erdogan-style foreign policy could only be felt in the 1970s under Bhutto. At that time, US planes could be found over Karachi skies in November 1974, breaking sound barriers under the auspices of the CENTO exercises, while at the same time, a few pilots were stationed at Damascus airport with battle-ready MiG-21s for potential combat with the Israeli air arm, and one such dogfight took place in April 1974.
Coming to how Pakistan can learn from the Turkish experience, that in the end stems from the fact that politicians show the guts to distance themselves from the established order. Currently the orphaned politicians flocking to a new party is not an encouraging sign for the development of a democratic polity in Pakistan. The reason being that much space which was gained since December 1988 when BB was elected the PM of Pakistan has been unceremoniously ceded to the military by the PDM; under the influence of the dictum that ‘enemy of the enemy is your friend’.
Given the fact that international concern for the loss of democratic space is not very encouraging, it will be upon the political forces to adopt two roles; of street and of the ballot simultaneously. It would not be an exaggeration that Pakistani democratic forces might have to start afresh in a very discreet way, the way Turkish Islamists started from scratch in the aftermath of 1996-1997 events. What allowed the Turkish Islamists a better position was that their structures were intact. The rest is history.
For the Pakistani experience, a radical shift from opportunistic politics to ideological politics is necessary. The former party-of-change stalwarts flocking to the kings’ party means they are looking for another opportunistic platform. The shift to ideological politics can be realized through a new cadre of political activists, not professional politicians for sale, with no political record or ‘unclean’ connections; or even police record. The current blizzard of regimentation is not a suitable course of action for the society as a whole. It has the ingredients to encourage centrifugal forces. As said in these columns; legions of darkness are a killer for a society and polity. Pakistan really needs to grow up in a true sense; not a prisoner to the few empty minds… and logics…
