PTI chief Imran Khan’s arrest was qualitatively different from two months ago. Then, it had been in execution of a NAB warrant, by Rangers personnel, to make him join an investigation, from the premises of a high court, where he had gone in connection with other cases. This time, it was in execution of a conviction by a sessions court, by the Punjab police, to make him begin a sentence of imprisonment, from his home.
That it was from his home, and not the court, is a sign of how mildly the legal system has dealt with an ex-PM. By not arresting him initially, the court had not submitted him to the indignities of an under-trial prisoner, which included the rather remote risk of being placed in leg-irons to prevent him trying to make an escape.
It was to no one’s credit that Imran was the third former Prime Minister to be arrested as well as convicted, though in the case of the first two, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif, the more orthodox method of arrest before conviction was observed. Actually, Imran was the fourth to be convicted, Yousaf Reza Gilani being found guilty of contempt, and Mian Nawaz Sharif in his last term being removed by the Supreme Court finding him not sadiq and ameen, and thus liable to disqualification. Imran was the first to be removed by a vote of no-confidence.
Except for 1993, the Supreme Court upheld all the four dissolutions of the National Assembly carried out by the President under Article 58 (2b) (1988, 1990, 1993, 1996). In 1993, though the Assembly was restored, the crisis continued when Mian Manzoor Wattoo replaced Ghulam Hyder Wyne after the dissolution, and resisted the federal imposition of Emergency, with the result that the President resigned and the Prime Minister dissolved the National Assembly.
Politicians are attracted by the support they will get, the electables thrown their way. The landscape seems littered with parties that at one time or another were flavour of the month. However, no party leader at the moment seems comfortable with establishment interference in politics. That is a problem for the establishment perhaps bigger than Imran‘s fate.
Elected in 1996, Mian Nawaz did not confront the military, but the judiciary. Not only did he have the Chief Justice removed, but he repealed Article 58(2b). However, not only was he removed by a military coup, but the judiciary upheld that decision.
Since then, the pattern has continued of the Prime Minister losing office around the third year of his term. The National Assembly remains, and a new PM emerges. The first example is of Zafarullah Jamali, who took office in 2002 and resigned in 2004, making way for Shaukat Aziz. Yusuf Reza Gilani took office in 2008 at the head of a PPP government, and was then convicted by the Supreme Court of contempt, and thus disqualified as an MNA, thus removed as PM, Raja Pervez Ashraf replacing him until the House was dissolved.
Nawaz Sharif was disqualified by the Supreme Court from the National Assembly in 2017, being replaced by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi. His disqualification for not being sadiq and ameen was later declared to be for life. To that extent, Imran is also better off, for the Constitution prescribes that he will be disqualified for five years after his release from jail. His original sentence being for three years, subject to the usual remissios, he should be released in a year and a half. If he pays the fine of Rs 20,000, well and good, but if he doesn’t, another six months would be tacked on to his sentence, again subject to the usual reissions. Add five further years of disqualification, it would mean he would not be able to return to politics till 2032, If elections are held on time, it would mean that Imran would not only miss this election, but the next, in 2028. He would only be able to return to electoral politics a year before the election of 2033. Of course, that is if the next elections are held on time, which is not necessarily a safe assumption. Another factor is that Imran, who is already 70, would be 80 in 2033.
Of course, he could look to the example of his archenemy, Mian Nawaz. He is proclaimed as likely to return as PM a fourth time. That implies he has been forgiven by the establishment for whatever signs led to his ouster in 2017. He is going to turn 75 in December. That seems to be no bar. If he can make a comeback, why can’t Imran? Of course, Nawaz has had the immense advantage of having Shehbaz at his side, not just a loyal deputy to fill in as party president and PM, but also someone who can build bridges with the establishment. Neither Imran’s sisters nor sons can perform the last role, even if they could fill in the others.
Because of this, one of the major problems for Imran seems to be finding a substitute for the party leader. Before May 9, there was a lot of jostling, but now there is not, because of the number of desertions. Those who have retained loyal are not being rewarded, but are viewed with suspicion by Imran, mainly because of their contacts with the establishment. The question seems to be why would the establishment allow them to remain, when it had pulled out everyone else?
However, one encouraging sign for Imran is that the charges against former PMs are growing less serious. Bhutto faced a capital charge, and was duly convicted and hanged.Nawaz faced a hijacking charge the first time, and went into exile, after getting two life terms in 2000. The conviction was quashed in 2009. Imran on the other hand has received a three-year sentence for what is actually a white-ollar crime.
It must also be noted that Bhutto and Nawaz were convicted in ways that made the courts look bad. Bhutto was convicted for abetment of murder, and became the only person ever sentenced to death for abetment, and to have the death sentence upheld by the Supreme Court. Interestingly, no court has followed that precedent.
Similarly, Nawaz did not look anything like a hijacker or a terrorist, nor had he been on the plane when the alleged hijacking took place.
On the other hand, the charges against Imran are credible. Of course, supporters would swear by his honesty, but the crime is not one which is beyond him. Nor did the judge have to strain any laws in making the conviction. He may not have an honest face, but then, no one would claim it was particularly dishonest.
There are certain problems with the conviction which may provide grounds for appeal, however. First is the issue of the debate on maintainability. The second is the refusal of the trial court to allow the defence witnesses. However, it will be up to the appellate forum whether it allows the appeal to result in an appeal, or it orders a retrial. For example, if the trial was not maintainable, the appellate court may identify the appropriate forum, and remand the case there. If it allows the witnesses, it may order the trial court to pronounce a fresh verdict after hearing the witnesses.
It is also possible that such appeals are held back for the right time, when the establishment has need of him again. Pakistan’s political history seems to show that the establishment does not make fresh mistakes, and merely repeats the old ones. The political forces it has produced have certain roots in the people already; that is why they are patronized.
Politicians are attracted by the support they will get, the electables thrown their way. The landscape seems littered with parties that at one time or another were flavour of the month. However, no party leader at the moment seems comfortable with establishment interference in politics. That is a problem for the establishment perhaps bigger than Imran‘s fate.
