As this piece hits the stands on Sunday (today), a caretaker setup might be in place in Pakistan. In an already uncertain political atmosphere, there is already talk of an extended caretaker setup. That suspicion is given credence by the fact that, while at the time of dissolution of the houses, every single name is sorted out; here the oddest instance has been observed by the bewildered nation.
A ceremonial opposition leader is being involved in equally superficial discussion. The whole scenario gives the going-off the look of a paranormal activity, this time in the corridors of power. A setup it seems is contemplated, which will not do the needful in the customary 90-day or three-month period, as enshrined in the 1973 constitution. It might go beyond. A political system afflicted with bad experiences during the Zia years in the late 1970s, when the 90-day period never ended; such talk is likely to fuel suspicion about the ‘benign’ intent of the establishment in pushing the electoral process forward.
The reasons for suspicion emanate from the fact that powers like the USA, despite being critical of Zia during the early years, preferred to look the other way when the ‘Afghanistan’ project kicked off in early 1980. Today, despite being a waning military power, the USA still seems to be embroiled in regional conflicts; a sort of proxy war. Its anticipated conflict with Iran over the failed JCPOA is very much feared. It is trying to buck up the Ukrainian defences without being in the conflict zone. With reports in Twitter filtering out, about the Ukraine war being a testing ground for Iranian drones on the Russian side and Pakistani multi barrel rocket launchers on the Ukrainian side, with Pakistani establishment-linked Twitter handles lovingly referring to the Ukrainian FM as from ‘brotherly country’ tells all. Such a ‘brotherly country’ title is usually reserved for Muslim nation-states; with Ukraine a rare ‘noble’ exception.
Coming back to the on-ground variables, which might influence the patterns in the governance and consequent public perception, it is important to have a look back at what has already been practised without success. The period between 1989 to 1993 has been characterized as an era when the Pakistani system was not engaged in any active war along with the USA. That period was characterized by stringent IMF demands, and no concessions on part of the USA either. During that period, Pakistan made payment for an additional lot of F16s, which were never delivered to the PAF. During that time, the GoP Ministry of Finance continued to reflect that payment in the annual budget documents in the vain hope that the deal might get through or at least the payment be returned. Neither happened until the Musharraf government settled the issue with the Bush Administration during the height of the ‘War On Terror’. This was precisely the time when the PAF started looking towards the Chinese options; the development of the JF17.
During that period, the bludgeon for the IMF was the swelling of the ‘budgetary deficit’ by successive PPP and PML(N) dispensations. Both the governments were forced to adopt the GST without homework, which alienated the government from the business community.
The self-correction might take an undesirable route, a perilous one to quote, if the public anger boils over. Given the fact that the setup is passing through uncertain times, a consensus across the spectrum can deliver the goods better than an edict based on a few ‘empty heads’. The hotch-potch being observed in Pakistan in the domains of economic and political management can still be managed without disrupting the electorate’s right. Students of IMF programmes know well that the stagflation-inflicted Turkey of the mid-1990s did not forgo the elections, even if it selected Erbakan, an Islamist. Similarly, the ASEAN member Thailand, when afflicted with the 1997 crash, did not forgo the elections.
The political crisis in 1993, when the incumbent President and the PML(N) PM refused to work with each other, the establishment under COAS Gen Waheed Kakar tried successfully to defuse the crisis through timely elections in October 1993. At that point of time, though the elections were not delayed, a sort of technocratic experiment was played to correct the economic direction of the country. The willingness of the succeeding PPP administration to go along with the IMF programme paved the way for the timely elections as well as the release of funds by the IMF to the new incumbents in Islamabad.
Going forward the PPP government fared badly on the economic front to the extent that the haphazard formulation of the Finance Bill for the Budget 1996-1997 sealed its political fate. A series of incidents like the murder of Murtaza Bhutto, somewhat precipitated the unceremonious dismissal of the Benazir government in the wee hours of 5 November 1996. Given the fact that the outgoing government in a desperate bid devalued the currency to the tune of 22 percent in the closing days of October 1996 and the forex reserves hit an all-time low, the debate for yet another technocratic set up drew strength again.
At that point of time, the pro-business PML(N) assured the establishment as well as the IMF that it would steer the system out of the crisis. That government, riding on the wave of ‘engineered’ mandate as the result of February 1997 polls, was able to upstage the other power centres at a spectacular speed; until the Kargil fiasco.
The Musharraf years, soon to be overtaken by the 9/11 developments, did not see any reason for the government of technocrats. The 2008, 2013 and the 2018 elections were held relatively in a relaxed atmosphere, where political forces as well as extra constitutional variables were allowed the manipulation of the outcome of the electoral exercise.
As things stand, on the top of the failed ‘hybrid’ experiment 2018-2022, the chief players seem to be pushing for a technocratic setup, as they feel the state they manage is at peril, if administrative intervention is not made urgently. The concluding remarks of the outgoing foreign minister of the PDM setup, pointing an accusing finger at the older generation of politicians, is in fact a protest over the political forces losing too much space to the nonpolitical ones during the last 16 months.
If the hybrid experiment precipitated that process, the so-called political forces did little to stop that slide into political uncertainty. Political forces are by nature the prime stakeholders of the electoral process. The current politico-economic chaos, even if it warrants a national government composed of technocrats, cannot be allowed for an indeterminate period. As such, open accommodation can only fuel further restlessness in the society and not to forget sane investment decisions, which the establishment wants the foreign investors to take, yet dampening the environment in the first instance itself.
Here one needs to question the intent; if the intervention allows across the board reform. Alternatively, the technocrat set-up is only a ‘Vitamin booster’ to enable a terminal patient to move as much to manage himself for a certain period. That is a query, which needs to be answered. A superficial treatment, which does not address the ills, but only manages them, will automatically benefit the old regime. Such a situation will not endear the masses to such steps. Rather, the electorate belonging to all the political groups will escalate their disapproval. The future scenario might not be composed of only one party in the wilderness fighting the establishment shadows; rather it can be critically democratic versus the undemocratic.
The self-correction might take an undesirable route, a perilous one to quote, if the public anger boils over. Given the fact that the setup is passing through uncertain times, a consensus across the spectrum can deliver the goods better than an edict based on a few ‘empty heads’. The hotch-potch being observed in Pakistan in the domains of economic and political management can still be managed without disrupting the electorate’s right. Students of IMF programmes know well that the stagflation-inflicted Turkey of the mid-1990s did not forgo the elections, even if it selected Erbakan, an Islamist. Similarly, the ASEAN member Thailand, when afflicted with the 1997 crash, did not forgo the elections.
Dominance of nonpolitical forces and deviation from the clear constitutional roadmaps is like delivering the nation-state to chaos. Whispering from the scions of dominant political families can be the writing on the wall that it can be counterproductive to push the system too much into the quasi-Pentagon settings. Democratic politics is corrected democratically; failing which all is evaporated; Tehran 1979, Manila 1986; it is the power brokers’ choice!
