AT PENPOINT
All the uncertainties are over. PML(N) Quaid Mian Nawaz Sharif is back in Lahore. His first speech, at the much-heralded rally at Minar-e- Pakistan, was supposed to give the party a new narrative, one which would take it into the coming election. The narrative he gave was not new, and gave credence to the rumours swirling about his return, that he had done a deal with the establishment, and would no longer demand action against either the Chief Justices or the Army generals who had ousted him, in exchange for being allowed to contest the coming elections and be elected for a fourth time.
The theory goes that he is to be helped again because friendly countries want the solidity of his presence. Those friendly countries are all the more important because of the investments they have promised, and which are being run through the Special Investment Facilitation Council.
According to this view, the Shahbaz-led PDM coalition was a success. It led to the revival of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as well as the establishment of the SIFC.
If CPEC has been a Chinese enterprise, the SIFC was meant to provide a vehicle for Gulf investors. PTI chief Imran Khan as PM is accused of offending both China and the Gulf countries. Indeed, China is said to have gone against its longstanding and strict policy of non-interference by indicating both a distaste of Imran and a liking for Mian Nawaz. (China is finding out one reason why great powers interfere in the affairs of small ones: the need to protect investments.)
Mian Nawaz is thus returning with the greatest chance of returning to office. However, he has a longer track record than ever before, and his first priority will be to straighten out relations with the establishment. Though he was an establishment man, having first held office during the Zia Martial Law, when he served as Punjab Finance Minister, he developed differences with the establishment as early as his first term as Prime Minister.
His second term ended with a military coup, again indicating that he did not get on with the establishment. His third term also ended after the Dawnleaks scandal, and after he was disqualified by the Supreme Court. That disqualification was supposed to be for life, but a recent amendment to the Election Law limited the disqualification of five years, which he has now served.
Mian Nawaz also blotted his copybook in his last tenure by bringing Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf to trial for high treason. The conviction of General Musharraf was not appreciated by the establishment, and it was then overturned by the Lahore High Court, However, it seems to have had the effect of preventing any further military takeovers.
It cannot be a good sign for Mian Nawaz that even before he has won the 2024 election, there is already speculation about where he could clash with the establishment. Unfortunately for him, his track record demands that the speculation be made.
The Constitution has not been broken, but it has been bent out of shape. The most egregious example is how the Punjab and KP caretaker governments have been holding office since January, even though the constitutional limit of 90 days for the holding of fresh elections to their dissolved assemblies passed in mid-April. Similarly, the National Assembly was dissolved on August 12, and thus elections were due by November 10. While that date is still some way off, it is impossible to hold elections by that date, because the Election Commission cannot issue an election programme meeting the requirements of the Election Law.
This is to ignore the fact that at present the ECP is engaged in fresh delimitations accordings to this year’s census, which means that only when the delimitations are complete will it be possible for the ECP to announce a date and an election programme. Though the ECP has not given any date, it has indicated that elections would be held in January. This would not only mean that the Punjab and KP caretakers would complete a year in office, but also that the federal caretakers would get six months. This does not factor in the delay demanded by some political parties for an even further delay, because of the difficulties that would be created in the country’s northern areas of conducting the polls in the depths of winter. The ECP has not accepted this plea, but it has not rejected it either.
Mian Nawaz has not only avoided demanding elections within the constitutionally defined framework, but has expressed support for the ECP, thus placing himself on the side of those who do not support the constitutional limit. While this is not the only reason why he is being subjected to criticism by the PPP, it is certainly one of them.
The PPP is also not a particularly principled obeyer of the Constitution. What seems to be bothering it more than anything else is that the PML(N) seems to be designated as the winner of the coming elections is not. The PML(N) appears to feel that the longer elections are put off, the longer Mian Nawaz will have to get out of his legal entanglements. This provides the PPP a motive for wanting elections as early as possible, because with elections yielding an assembly without either Mian Nawaz and Imran, Asif Zardari or Bilawal Bhutto Zardari would be better able to stake a claim to the Prime Ministership.
However, it should not be imagined that Mian Nawaz is going to be a shoo-in. There is a lot of hard work he still has to put in. The hard work of campaigning will only start after the ECP gives a date, but the effort of reinvigorating the party will start almost immediately. The divisions within the party reflect not only a generational conflict between Mian Nawaz’s own generation, reflected in his brother Shehbaz, and the next, reflected in his daughter Maryam. They also reflect the ‘reconciliation’ narrative of working with the establishment, and the ‘anti-establishment’ narrative of punishing those responsible for ousting him. Though Mian Nawaz initially said that he wanted to see those responsible punished, his speech on return said he left his retribution to the Almighty, and that he preferred to concentrate on the economy.
The implication was that concentration on the economy was safe, and did not require any clash with the establishment. However, the establishment has developed a concern with the economy. The measures taken by the caretakers might not be sustained under an elected government. Worse, if the measures are sustained, but there is a downturn nonetheless, a blame game will ensue. The whole secret of averting a clash between institutions is to avoid the need to apportion blame for anything.
One of the advantages of the PTI government was that Imran had no hang-ups on the economy, not having any illusionists that he knew anything about it. When it was time to replace Asad Umar as Finance Minister with Hafeez Pasha, he did so, and then moved on to Shaukat Tarin. Mian Nawaz does not have a solution for the country’s economic woes. Bringing back Ishaq Dar as Finance Minister may figure prominently on Mian Nawaz’s agenda, but there is no guarantee that this will find favour. Mian Nawaz may find himself running afoul of the establishment on matters of economic decision-making.
Still, that is a long way in the future. However, it cannot be a good sign for Mian Nawaz that even before he has won the 2024 election, there is already speculation about where he could clash with the establishment. Unfortunately for him, his track record demands that the speculation be made.
