As the USA seemed preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan, political and security officials from Pakistan discussed probable consequences. Earlier, the TTP faced challenges to its operations from limited financial resources and incapacity to execute large-scale assaults, both exacerbated by the Pakistan Army’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which compelled it to withdraw from North Waziristan.
In 2020, the TTP was on the verge of extinction; however, its capacity for reestablishment were significantly bolstered by its spiritual ties to the Islamic Emirate. The Taliban’s return to power in Kabul on 15 August 2021, seems to have given the TTP both ideological and practical influence. Subsequently, it reinvented itself, progressing from a ragtag militia to a fully operational insurgency. This reached its pinnacle in January 2023 when the group implemented a novel administrative and operational framework, mirroring the Afghan Taliban’s hierarchical structure.
The Afghan Taliban utilised the TTP as a means to expand their administrative structure into tribal regions. The TTP, having declared allegiance to the Islamic Emirate, offers it strategic and ideological influence within Pakistan. The TTP unveiled a novel organisational framework in February of this year, which comprised nine operational and administrative entities (wilayahs or shadow provinces) organised into two zones—north and south. Each province is supervised by an intelligence officer and governed by a shadow governor and a minimum of one deputy, like the Afghan Taliban. In a video in December 2021, TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud claimed the organisation was a continuation of the Afghan Taliban’s presence in Pakistan. Their primary funding comes from extortion, smuggling, and hostile foreign intelligence agencies.
Pakistan suffered 1,524 fatalities and 1,463 injuries in 2023, from 789 terror attacks and counter-terror operations. An estimated 1,000 civilians and security services personnel were also slain. Balochistan and KP emerged as the principal epicentres of violence, with approximately 84 percent of assaults and 90 percent of documented fatalities, encompassing both terrorism and operations by security forces. Militant attacks were up 69 percent and violence 56 percent in 2023, with 1,524 fatalities, up from 980 in the preceding year, 2022. security forces conducted a total of 197 operations to apprehend terrorists, which claimed 545 lives. Pakistan has experienced its greatest number of suicide attacks since 2014.
Inhabitants of KP, especially those in the former FATA districts, remained pessimistic about the eradication of militancy in the area.Their doubt stemmed from the persistent fatalities all over the province.
In recent years, there has been a notable increase in the frequency of attacks in the southern region of KP, specifically the districts of Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bannu, Karak, and Lakki Marwat. From 18 June 2022 to 18 June 2023, 665 insurgent attacks were reported by the KP police.
The highest number was reported in DI Khan at 81, followed by Peshawar at 56 and Bajaur at 51. So why does DI Khan stand out when it comes to militancy?
The varied terrain of southern KP, including DI Khan, consists of deserts, mountains, forests, and plains. Its resilient citizens are renowned for their capacity to persist in pursuit of economic success. Nevertheless, these individuals have endured decades of neglect and maltreatment by Islamabad and Peshawar.
Decades of neglect in all spheres of life, along with extreme poverty and a lack of employment opportunities have all contributed to the ability of radicals to entice the so-called “lost youth.”
Now it seems Pakistan is looking towards Washington to help it counter terrorism, and Washington’s declaration of Pakistan as an ally shows its willingness to help. The top military brass’s meetings with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and other important officials seems to have particularly planned to seek Washington’s support in its fight against terrorism.
Before each election, senior politicians and government officials visit different regions of the province for public dialogue. The activities are documented by their media teams, which portray the visit as if they were extraterrestrial expeditions.
“Blind adhocism” is a significant issue in Pakistan. We opt for band-aid solutions that fail to tackle root causes, rather than systematically devising courses of action and, as judicious decision-makers ought, predicting and equipping ourselves for the repercussions.
In the wake of the turbulent withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2021, a wealth of weaponry and military equipment remained behind. As US troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Pentagon officials provided evidence to the US Congress indicating that an estimated $7 billion worth of equipment, including firearms, ammunition, and other military supplies, was abandoned. NATO-issue M16, M-4, and sniper rifles are carried by terrorists. All of these cutting-edge weapons are being employed to launch attacks against the LEAs. The police force is more vulnerable and inadequately outfitted than the TTP.
A senior security official stationed in a critical district of southern KP conveyed apprehension regarding the insufficiency of essential resources required to effectively confront the proficiently trained and equipped Pakistani Taliban militants from a tactical standpoint.
The officer voiced apprehension regarding a scarcity of resources for material escort missions, despite the regular provision of up-to-date counterterrorism equipment and technology.
Amidst an open debate on the threat posed by the diversion, illicit trafficking, and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the United Nations Security Council, Deputy Permanent Representative Usman Jadoon said that such weapons are obtained by terrorist organisations such as the TTP “from illicit arms markets or by entities seeking to destabilise a particular region or country.”
The two most lethal attacks in KP this year— the suicide assault on the Police Lines mosque in Peshawar in January 2023 and the one that occurred recently in Daraban, DI Khan— brought to light an essential element occasionally disregarded in discussions about militancy. The Peshawar attack, which killed over 80 policemen, was classified as “Istishadi” because it was executed using a body-borne improvised explosive device (BBIED). Conversely, the Daraban attack, which was executed using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), was classified as “Inghimasi” because it killed 23 military personnel.
ISKP, or the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, is another key player. An extremist terrorist organisation founded in 2015, operating primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to affiliated to ISIS, it seeks to establish strict Islamic authority in the Khorasan region.
In recent years, ISKP activities in Pakistan have expanded significantly. 72 people were killed in August 2016, when the ISKP blew up a Quetta hospital, their initial act of aggression. Balochistan and Sindh were subsequently targeted. It extended its reach to additional provinces after 2018. ISKP attacks increased in frequency from 28 in 2021 to 47 in 2022.
A Shia mosque was targeted by it in Peshawar on 4 March 2022. The long-term resident of Pakistan from Afghanistan, who carried out the suicide bombing, killed 63 people and injured 196.The ISKP has reported 17 attacks thus far in 2023. At least 54 were killed when it attacked the JUI(F) workers’ convention in Bajaur 30 July 2023.
ISKP collects donations online using cryptocurrency funds through fraudulent activities, gofundme websites featuring fabricated narratives, and freelance work. Their territorial existence has ceased, and their Khilafat has transitioned to the digital realm. They have finance, health, and education ministries. Online physicians from around the globe are available. These E-clinics are staffed with exceptionally qualified physicians, including those of Turkish, Egyptian, American, and British Muslim descent.
Additionally, educated and university-educated individuals are recruited.They employ PUBG, Ludo Star, and Telegram to communicate, employing these platforms to coordinate attacks, issue orders, and orchestrate assaults. ISKP, which operates not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also in Iran and Central Asia, is a global menace. Muslims from the Indian state of Kerala are being sought. They are recruiting young educated individuals; for instance, a 19-year-old from a renowned institution in Islamabad was engaged in Instagram misinformation dissemination. Additionally, individuals residing in Hungary, Italy, and the USA oversee these accounts.
The nation unified following the APS atrocity and swore, “Never again.” Pakistan expeditiously formulated a National Action Plan for terrorism. After nearly nine years, we are once again confronted with identical circumstances. How shall we proceed? Let us not adopt the erroneous belief everything is fine.
When policy is being formulated, those who offer critical and independent analyses and perspectives are frequently ignored rather than consulted. To safeguard professional reputations, officials minimise adverse occurrences in their jurisdictions. Despite years of tremendous sacrifices, militancy has returned, this time with cutting-edge tactics and armaments. These cannot be resolved with superficial measures like holding jirgas in DCs’ offices; the country requires a comprehensive national dialogue, not just local ones.
We must strengthen our cyber security capabilities and cooperate with Afghanistan and Central Asian nations to counter the threat from the TTP and ISKP.
Although politicians have numerous shortcomings, they remain the most actively involved individuals with firsthand knowledge of the actual situation. They should therefore be entrusted with leadership positions in both military operations and peace negotiations. Confronting the imminent battle necessitates the people, political parties, and governmental institutions to unite.
The persistence of religious militancy as a hazard is improbable in the near future. Predicting the resolution of a two-decade-old conflict through initiatives lasting weeks or months is naive. In the so-called Islamic Emirate, Pakistani terrorist organisations have discovered a model to emulate as they pursue jihadist objectives against Pakistan.
Furthermore, the country’s internal dynamics are conducive to the growth of these organisations, given that insurgencies thrive on disorder and uncertainty, exacerbated by political, economic, and social unpredictability.
Eliminating the prevailing political and economic instability and resolving internal strife will be essential measures. This hinders these organisations in recruiting members, propagating their grievances, and constructing narratives against the state.
Over the past two decades, a one-dimensional strategy that ignores the political drivers of the insurgency in favour of kinetic measures have failed to produce any lasting results; if this strategy is continued, it will likely fail even more.
Now it seems Pakistan is looking towards Washington to help it counter terrorism, and Washington’s declaration of Pakistan as an ally shows its willingness to help. The top military brass’s meetings with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and other important officials seems to have particularly planned to seek Washington’s support in its fight against terrorism.
