AT PENPOINT
The PTI rally was finally held, but at its end there was no party chief Imran Khan standing outside the gates of Adila Jail,blinking uncertainly in the sunlight, free at last. However, the PTI rally in Islamabad was the first step on the path to such a goal. The rally ended with a call for more rallies, one in Lahore, then one in Karachi, both within the current month.
However, the optics of the rally left no doubt that the PTI was still a going concern. The rally did not have many things going for it. It was supposed to recall memories of the 2014 dharna, but unlike the dharna, it did not last for more than an evening. Also, the venue was a lot less central than D-Chowk. Perhaps more importantly, there was no stiffening of religious-party workers, like the Pakistan Awami Tehrik workers in 2014, who would ensure that the D-Chowk was always occupied.
There was so much concern that the protesters be prevented from staging a sit-in that there was police tear-gassing when the crowd did not disperse at the given time. Before the rally could take place, the organizers had to accept 24 conditions for the rally, and one of them was the time of dispersal. Memories seem to have faded that in 2014, the purpose was a sit-in, not that a rally was converted into a sit-in. The PTI had not announced a sit-in, and thus no sit-in could have been held.
Another hurdle the PTI faced is that there was apparently no outside support. In 2014, there was enough logistic support to ensure that the sit-in crowd was fed. The city was not as tightly shut down.
Again, it is as if the PTI is being assessed. It has at present a one-point agenda: Imran’s release. For that it has to establish two things. First, that it has not lost popularity, and second, that there is no other alternative. Rallies establish the first point, but the second is not yet established.
In 2014, the basic thesis of the PTI was that the elections had been rigged. The present rally makes the same point. However, the dramatic bill burning and other rhetorical flourishes did not occur, and though there was vigorous criticism of the Shehbaz government, the situation is perhaps not so bad this time around.
The PTI has shown that it is battered but unbowed. There is familial infighting going on, but the PTI has so far managed to retain the integrity it had lost after May 9. However, it is still trying to return to power rather than hunker down for the period in opposition that seems likely, at least until the midway mark in this Parliament, when precedent suggests a change will be made. If it is not made, it will at least be attempted, even if wiser counsels prevail.
Also it should not be forgotten that in 2014, there were three parties involved: the PML(N), the PTI and the establishment. Now there are two, as the establishment has declared its neutrality, but the PTI is trying hard to achieve two things: get the establishment involved once again, and convincing it that the PTI has enough support to make it worth talking to, and bringing it to power.
The PTI seems to have an ambiguous attitude towards the establishment. It seems to feel that it cannot come into power without its support, but at the same time, it has still not explained what happened on 9 May 2023. KP CM Ali Amin Gandapur has said that it was just an excuse to destroy the party, and has promised to make startling revelations at the next rally. His remarks, which were about the establishment, were not denied by the PTI, thus indicating that all is not well.
Clearly, the party has not moved back from its position that the party did not attack the military installations, but agents provocateurs from the intelligence agencies did so, using the cover of the crowds infuriated by Imran’s arrest by Rangers personnel.
The PTI has been consistent in refusing to talk to the PML(N), which it claims is merely a cover for the establishment, and would prefer to talk to the establishment directly, as talks with the government would be indirect talks with the establishment. However, the PTI has not done all that well on the legal front, for its petition against the NAB amendments, which it claimed had allowed the PDM to escape justice, was dismissed in an intra-court appeal after first being granted by a division bench of the Supreme Court. Interestingly, that will allow Imran’s lawyers to move for acquittal in the latest Toshakhana reference against him and his wife.
The rally’s taking place was a step forward, for two previous dates had been cancelled. The last, last month, had been called off after Imran’s meeting, under highly unusual circumstances, of Imran with former minister Azam Swati, who was supposed to have brought a message. It is being speculated that the display of obedience was both noted and appreciated.
However, Imran’s chances of a political return depend on the Shehbaz government blotting its copybook with the establishment. That would be visible in either a gross mishandling of the economy or any interference in the internal affairs of the establishment. The economy has only been achieving positive developments so far, especially with inflation coming down. However, there is the very big problem of the IMF bailout, which is still not reaching formal approval from the Board of Directors. Unprecedented for Pakistan, though a staff-level agreement has been reached, its case is not going to the BoD, because certain promises on rollovers have still to be obtained from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and China. Pakistan’s case may not be on the BoD agenda for September, which means that the approval, already due in August, may be delayed two months.
This makes matters quite complicated. The three friendly countries do not have anything to do with the IMF, nor with the Pakistani government or establishment. They do have an interest in Pakistan not going belly-up by a default, not least because they are among Pakistan’s largest creditors. However, they also are jibbing, because they probably do not know why they should effectively forget the money they have loaned Pakistan (about $12 billion collectively).
The PTI has tried to prevent the IMF agreement, both by a direct appeal that the IMF first address democracy issues, and then by laying conditions for giving its cooperation on the agreement (KP has to agree to generate provincial surpluses, as have other provinces). The establishment also wants the IMF to grant a package, because if there is a default, the country would find itself cut off from the world money markets.
The problem has not become one of external debt alone. Internal debt has risen to a level where it can only be serviced by more borrowing. That means that trying to get by without the IMF package may mean deep cuts in all kinds of expenditure. The problem the PTI has is that Imran does not seem a likely candidate if the Shehbaz government fails to deliver. He has a track record of making arrangements with the IMF and then reneging on them. Therefore, Imran has not only got to mend fences with the establishment, but also with the IMF.
Of course, the main difficulty the PTI had with its rally was that it did not have its main attraction, Imran himself. As the rally was meant to get him released, it was perhaps inevitable, Would Imran’s presence have made that much of a difference. Opinions will vary on that, but the real question will remain whether the crowd was large enough to convince the establishment that Imran had to be talked to.
The PTI has shown that it is battered but unbowed. There is familial infighting going on, but the PTI has so far managed to retain the integrity it had lost after May 9. However, it is still trying to return to power rather than hunker down for the period in opposition that seems likely, at least until the midway mark in this Parliament, when precedent suggests a change will be made. If it is not made, it will at least be attempted, even if wiser counsels prevail.
