Ever since receiving the special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008, India has been expanding its nuclear reach on the global stage. The NSG waiver essentially allowed India to sign nuclear cooperation agreements for sharing civilian nuclear technology and expertise with several countries despite not being a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The country has signed civilian nuclear deals with 20 countries, the latest being with the United Arab Emirates on September 9. Through this deal, India is set to provide assistance to the UAE in developing nuclear safety protocols and regulatory frameworks. The troubling irony of this development lies in the significant vulnerabilities within India’s own nuclear safety and regulatory frameworks, highlighted by recurring incidents of radioactive theft within its borders. As recently as August, three men were arrested in Bihar with 50 grams of Californium, a highly radioactive material, with a black market value of at least $100 million.
This is not the first incident of this nature. Nuclear theft has been an issue within India since the 1980s, however, it seems to have picked up momentum in recent years. Over the past two decades, more than 25 such incidents have been documented in India, whereas there is no track record of all the undocumented cases.
These are not isolated incidents, rather they point to a broader pattern of weak nuclear governance in the country. All the recent reports indicate that the stolen materials came, not from the generally well-guarded nuclear power plants, but from medical institutions and scrap dealers, among others. This inherent vulnerability of peripheral radioactive sources is inductive of systemic regulatory lapses, creating exploitable gaps for maleficent actors to take advantage of.
So the question that arises here is: can a country, which is grappling with such glaring security lapses within its own border, be a credible authority on providing nuclear safety and regulatory frameworks for other countries? This is not just a rhetorical question but a pressing inquiry. In recent decades, India has been making a push to expand its global nuclear network, aiming to position itself as a leader in the peaceful nuclear domain.
However, the discernable pattern of nuclear materials being stolen from within its borders and sold on nuclear black markets every so often raises concerns not only for India but also beyond its borders. Unsafeguarded radioactive materials pose a global risk, particularly given the proclivity of non-state-actors to exploit the smallest of gaps. While these radioactive materials are not enriched enough to make a full-fledged nuclear weapon, they can be used to create dirty bombs which could lead to environmental contamination and global panic.
The question remains whether India can be a trusted and reliable authority of nuclear safety and regulation. With its endemic problems pertaining to theft of radioactive materials and an evident lack of full regulatory oversight, the country’s ability to provide credible expertise on nuclear issues is far from assured.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office has, time and again, raised concerns, fearing the spillover effect of such thefts into its territory and the South Asian region, however, the issue continues to persist. Many such cases are not even reported by India to the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), which is the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorised activities involving nuclear or radioactive materials.
While India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has laid down some guidelines for the handling and safety of radioactive materials, enforcement remains a weak link. In addition, the nuclear power programme in India is complex, divided into three distinct streams. The first stream, consisting of military nuclear facilities, does not have any international oversight as it falls outside the preview of the IAEA. The second stream consisting of civilian Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) is fully under IAEA safeguards, whereas the third stream, which consists of the Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) for producing plutonium, falls into the most vulnerable category since these are only partially safeguarded. Thus, while the facilities are monitored, the materials can still be diverted to the military side. These multiple streams provide greater opportunities for malicious actors to gain access to radioactive materials, especially once they leave regulated environments.
This raises doubts, not only about India’s ability to ensure adequate nuclear safety and regulatory oversight over its own programme, but also its role as a provider of regulatory expertise to other nations, such as in its latest deal with the UAE.
This systemic problem of theft of radioactive materials requires the country to do a serious reevaluation of its internal security frameworks. This cannot be resolved by simply tightening security at major installations; the entire system which governs the handling, storage and disposal of radioactive materials needs better scrutiny.
Within this context, the question remains whether India can be a trusted and reliable authority of nuclear safety and regulation. With its endemic problems pertaining to theft of radioactive materials and an evident lack of full regulatory oversight, the country’s ability to provide credible expertise on nuclear issues is far from assured.
